

CONCERNING THE SEXUALITY OF WOMAN*

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1.

During the phase of the normal œdipus complex, we find that the child is tenderly attached to the parent of the opposite sex, while in its relations with the parent of the same sex hostility prevails. It is not difficult to understand what determines this attitude in the case of the boy. The first object of the boy's love was his mother; she remains the object, and as his erotic strivings develop and he becomes more aware of the relations which exist between his father and mother, his father necessarily becomes a rival. The situation is different in the case of the little girl. True, the first object of her love was also the mother. How is it then that she turns to her father? How, when, and why does she become detached from her mother? We have known for a long time that a woman's sexual development is complicated by the fact that she must abandon her originally dominant genital zone, the clitoris, in favor of a new zone, the vagina. Now it seems that another change of this order, the supplanting of her original object, the mother, by the father, is a no less characteristic and important feature of her sexual development. We cannot yet see clearly how these two processes are associated.

It is well known that many women (and not necessarily neurotic women) have a strong attachment to their father. It was on such women that I made the observations to be reported here, and from these observations arrived at a certain conception of female sexuality. In this connection, two facts seem to me particularly striking. The first is that the analysis of cases in which there was a very intense attachment to the father

* Authorized translation of *Über die weibliche Sexualität*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. XVII, 1931, by Edith B. Jackson.

revealed that this phase had been preceded by another phase, in which there was an exclusive attachment to the mother of like intensity and ardor. Except for a different object, the second phase added scarcely a new feature to the love life. The primary relationship with the mother had been rich and many-sided.

A second fact taught us that we had underestimated not only the intensity but also the duration of this attachment to the mother. In several cases it extended far into the fourth year, in one case into the fifth, and thus covered by far the greater part of early sexual floescence. We had to recognize as a possibility that the original attachment to the mother may never be outgrown and that some girls never succeed in making the proper shift to a man.

In view of this possibility, the pre-œdipal phase in women acquires a significance which we have hitherto not ascribed to it.

Since, in this phase, there is ample room for all the fixations and repressions to which we trace the origin of neuroses, it seems expedient to limit the generality of the statement, that the nucleus of a neurosis is the œdipus complex. But whoever feels disinclined to make this correction need not make it. He can either extend the meaning of the term œdipus complex to include all the relations of the child to both parents; or, he can give recognition to the newer findings by saying that the woman arrives at the normal positive œdipus complex only after she has passed through a preceding period dominated by the negative form of the complex. Indeed, during this earlier period the father is really little else for the girl than a disturbing rival, even though her hostility towards him never reaches the high pitch which is typical in boys. We have long since abandoned all expectation of finding a point-to-point parallelism in the sexual development of men and women.

The discovery of the pre-œdipal period of the little girl is quite as astonishing as was the discovery in the field of archæology of the Minoan-Mycenean civilization that preceded Greek civilization.

Everything relating to this primary attachment to the mother seemed to me so difficult to grasp analytically, so dimmed by age, so shadowy—it seemed as if it could not be brought back to life, but had succumbed to a particularly inexorable repression. Perhaps this impression arose because of the fact that the women I have analyzed were able to preserve, during their analysis, the very attachment to the father to which they had fled after the prehistoric period under discussion. Women analysts, like Jeanne Lampl-de Groot and Helene Deutsch, because they have the advantage of being suitable mother substitutes in the transference situation, have apparently been able to perceive these facts with greater ease and clarity. Since I have not, in point of fact, succeeded in completely penetrating all the obscurities of one case, I shall be content to report only general results, and give only a few examples of my new findings. Among these was the finding that the early phase of mother attachment seemed very intimately related to the etiology of hysteria—which, considering that both the phase and the neurosis are among the characteristics peculiar to the female sex, cannot be very surprising. Furthermore it was found that this early dependence on the mother has in it the germ from which a woman may later develop paranoia.¹ This germ referred to is apparently the surprising but typical fear of being killed (eaten up) by the mother. The assumption is obvious that this fear corresponds to a hostility which the child develops toward the mother in response to the manifold restrictions imposed by the discipline of education and habit training, and that the mechanism of projection is favored by the early stage of the psychic organization.

2.

I began with what I consider the two new outstanding facts: that the girl's dependence on her father is nothing more than

¹ In the well known case reported by Ruth Mack Brunswick: *Die Analyse eines Eifersuchtswahnes*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psch. XIV, 1928, the disorder arose directly from a pre-œdipal (sister) fixation.

a heritage of an equally strong attachment to the mother; and that this earlier phase is unexpectedly long in duration. I should now like to turn back and fit these findings into the picture of female sexual development with which we are already familiar. This will entail unavoidable repetition. A continual comparison with the sexual development in men will surely aid us in our exposition. In the first place, it is clear that the bisexuality which, we have claimed, is inherent in mankind appears much more distinctly in women than in men. A man has, after all, only one dominant sexual zone—one sex organ—whereas a woman possesses two: the characteristically female organ, i. e., the vagina, and the clitoris, which is analogous to the male organ. We feel justified in assuming that the vagina plays no part for many years, and that it is anæsthetic perhaps until puberty. Recently, however, an increasing number of observers have come to believe that vaginal sensations occur in the early years of life. Nevertheless, the essential genital activity of little girls must be connected with the clitoris. The sexual life of women is divided into two phases, the first of which is masculine in character; only the second phase is specifically feminine. In female sexual development there is consequently a process of transition from one phase to the other which has no analogue in male development. A further complication arises from the fact that in the later sexual life of women the virile clitoris continues to function in a very fluctuating and baffling way. Naturally we do not know the biological basis of these special attributes of the female; we have even less reason for ascribing a teleological tendency to them.

Running parallel to this first great difference between the sexes is the second one, relating to the choice of an object. Because she gives him nourishment and care, a boy's mother is the object of his first love. She continues to be until she is replaced by someone else who resembles her, or who has certain similar qualities. For girls too the mother must be the first loved object. The original determinants of the choice of

object are obviously the same for all children. But when the girl has completed her development, her new love object should then be a man (father). That her love object is then a member of the other sex must correspond in some way to her changed sexuality, to her abandoning the clitoris in favor of the vagina. This raises new problems for investigation: How does this change occur? Is it total or incomplete? What are the various possibilities which may arise in the course of this development?

We have already recognized that men and women differ in their relation to the œdipus complex. Our statements about the œdipus complex are, we believe, applicable, strictly, only to the male child; and we are right in rejecting the term "Electra complex," which tends to emphasize an analogy in the behavior of the sexes. The fateful coexistence of love for the one parent and hatred for the other, as rival, develops only in the male child. Subsequently, it is the sight of the female genital and the resulting conviction that castration can take place, which forces him to alter his œdipus complex, and to construct a super-ego, and thus inaugurates all the processes which have as their aim the adaptation of the individual to the civilized community. The paternal authority (*Instanz*) is first incorporated as the super-ego. Then arises the further task of detaching the super-ego from the individuals of whom it was originally the mental representative. Curiously enough, it is the narcissistic interest in the genital, the interest in preserving the penis, that is responsible for this remarkable turn in development, which leads to the curtailment of infantile sexuality.

Because of the residual influence of the castration complex, men retain a certain amount of disdain for women, whom they presume to be castrated. In extreme cases this results in an inhibition of object choice, and if supported by accessory organic factors, in absolute homosexuality. The effects of the castration complex are entirely different in a woman. She recognizes that she is castrated, and that consequently she is

inferior to men, and they superior—but she struggles against this unhappy state of affairs. Out of this conflict development may proceed in one of three directions. The first path leads to a general aversion to sexuality. The little girl, dismayed at the difference between herself and the boy, is dissatisfied with her clitoris, renounces phallic activity and, with it, sexuality in general, including a considerable portion of her masculine behavior. The second possible result may be that she holds fast to her threatened masculinity with obstinate self-assertion. It is incredible how long she may maintain the hope of reacquiring a penis; she may even make this her purpose in life—and the phantasy that she is, in spite of everything to the contrary, a man, may continue to be a determining influence in her life for many years. This “masculinity complex” of women may also result in a manifest homosexual choice of object. Only the third, quite roundabout path terminates in the normal feminine configuration, that is, in the feminine form of the œdipus complex with the father as object. The œdipus complex in women is, therefore, the end result of a long development; it is not overthrown, but established by the influence of castration; it escapes the strong antagonistic forces which bring about its downfall in the male; indeed all too frequently the girl never outgrows it. The cultural results of its disintegration are, therefore, insignificant and of less importance. It is probably not an error to say that this difference in the mutual relation of œdipus complex and castration complex determines the characteristics of woman as a social being.¹

¹ We can prophesy that the feminists among the men, as well as our women analysts, will not agree with these explanations. They will in all probability object that such doctrines owe their origin to the “masculinity complex” of the male, and are made up as a theoretical justification for his inborn tendency to depreciate and dominate the female. But such a psychoanalytic argument reminds one in this case, as so often, of Dostoievsky’s “knife which cuts both ways”. It will be clear to their opponents, on the other hand, that women refuse to accept anything that appears to deny the equality with men which they so passionately desire. The polemical application of psychoanalysis brings no decision.

The pre-œdipal phase, as we may call the period of exclusive attachment to the mother, is infinitely more significant for the female than for the male. Many phenomena of female sexual life which have been quite incomprehensible in the past can be clearly understood when traced back to this phase. For instance, it has long been remarked that many a woman chooses her husband after the pattern of her father, or in place of a father, but after marriage repeats with him her poorly adjusted relationship with her mother. That is, he falls heir to the mother relationship instead of to the father relationship which is his due. We may understand this as an obvious case of regression. The earlier mother relationship, the foundation on which the father attachment was built, released from repression, appears in the marriage. The carrying over of emotional attachments from the mother as an object to the father, constituted, indeed, the essential feature in the development of femininity.

Since many women give us the impression that their mature life is engrossed in a struggle with their husband just as their youth was spent in contention with their mother, we may conclude in the light of the preceding remarks that the girl's hostile attitude to her mother is not a result of rivalry in the œdipus complex, but that it arises in an earlier phase and is merely reënforced and used in the œdipus situation. This conclusion, moreover, is confirmed by direct analytic experience. The mechanism which is able to effect such a reversal in attitude, such a rejection of the mother, previously so intensely and exclusively loved, compels our interest. We are prepared to find the explanation not in one factor alone but in a considerable number of contributive factors.

Certain of these factors belong to the general attributes of infantile sexuality and are therefore equally applicable to the boy's love life. In the first place there is jealousy—jealousy of brothers and sisters and of other rivals, including the father. A child's love knows no limitations, demands exclusiveness, and is dissatisfied with having to share. But it is also essen-

tially aimless and incapable of being completely satisfied, and is therefore doomed to disappointment and resolution into a hostile attitude. Later the absence of complete satisfaction may tend to bring about another result, comparable to that of the aim-inhibited love relationships—namely, it may assure the undisturbed continuance of the libido cathexis. But in the agitated process of development, as a rule, the libido gives up an unsatisfactory position to look for a new more satisfactory one.

A much more specific motive for turning away from the mother lies in the effect of the castration complex on individuals born without a penis. At some time or other the little girl discovers her organic inferiority; earlier and more easily, of course, if brothers or other little boys are at hand. We have already mentioned the three different possibilities which may follow upon this discovery: (a) suspension of all sexual activity; (b) defiant overemphasis of masculinity; (c) definite femininity. It is not easy to make more exact statements as to the time of these reactions, or to determine typical modes of reaction. Even the time of the discovery of castration is variable, and many other factors appear to be inconstant and a matter of chance. The factors to be taken into account are the status of the individual's phallic activity, whether it was found out or not, and if it was discovered, how much it was interfered with.

As a rule the little girl begins her proper phallic activity—masturbation of the clitoris—spontaneously. At first this is certainly practiced without phantasy. That physical care given the child sets up phantasy activity is evidenced by the great frequency of the phantasy in which the mother, foster-mother or nurse plays the rôle of seducer. It is a matter of conjecture whether from the outset the girl's masturbation is less frequent and less active than the boy's; it might well be. Furthermore, actual seduction is not infrequent—perpetrated by other children, or by nursemaids, as a means of quieting the child, soothing it to sleep or of making it submissive. Whenever seduction takes place, it invariably causes a disturbance in the

natural processes of development and often leaves behind far-reaching and permanent effects.

Masturbation, as we have heard, is given up because it is forbidden. But this prohibition also causes a reaction against the person who issues it, that is, the mother (or the substitute for the mother, who later cannot be distinguished from her). The obstinate persistence of masturbation seems to open the way to masculinity. Furthermore, the prohibition may seem to be ineffective because the child continues to masturbate, but the manifest effects are only delayed and are to be recognized later in the girl's efforts to rid herself at any cost of this demoralizing (as she thinks) indulgence. Even after maturity, the girl's choice of an object may be influenced by this unrelenting intention. The grudge that the child bears because she is prevented from giving free play to her sexual activity plays an important rôle in detaching her from her mother. The same motive is reactivated after puberty, when the mother considers it her duty to protect her daughter's chastity. We are, of course, not forgetting that the mother is just as opposed to the boy's masturbation and so gives him too the same cause for rejecting her.

The little girl does not unhesitatingly and unresistingly accept the undesired knowledge of her own defect which she gets from seeing the male genital. As we have heard, she clings obstinately to the expectation that she, too, will some day have such a genital, and the wish for it survives the hope for a long time. The child's first reaction to castration is in every case a belief that it is her individual misfortune; only later does she believe that certain other children may be similarly affected, and finally certain adults. Her realization of the general applicability of this negative characteristic brings in its train a great depreciation of womankind, including, of course, her mother.

It is quite possible that the preceding description of the little girl's behavior in relation to the idea of castration and the restriction of masturbation gives a confused and contradictory impression. This is not entirely the author's fault. It

is practically impossible to give a description to fit all cases. Different individuals show the most varied reactions, and in the same individual contradictory attitudes exist side by side. The conflict arises with the first prohibition and from this time on accompanies the development of the sexual function. Another special hindrance in the way of our understanding is the great difficulty of differentiating the mental processes of this first phase from later ones, which cover the earlier ones and distort memories of them. For instance, later on the girl may consider that she was castrated as a punishment for masturbation, and attribute this to the father. Neither of these ideas can be primary. The boy also regularly fears castration by his father, although the threat usually comes from his mother.

Be that as it may, the strongest motive for the child's rejection of the mother appears at the end of the first phase of the mother attachment; namely, resentment that the mother has given her no proper genital, has borne her a female. Not without surprise we hear another reproach, which is somewhat less far-reaching, to the effect that the mother gave the child too little milk, did not nurse her long enough. In our civilized times, this may often enough be the case but certainly not as often as we hear it asserted in analysis. This complaint seems rather to be an expression for the general dissatisfaction of children who in our monogamous civilization are weaned at the age of six to nine months. The primitive mother devotes herself entirely to one child for two or three years. It is as if our children had remained permanently unsatisfied, as if they had never had their fill from the mother's breast. But I am not convinced that the analysis of children nursed at the breast as long as the young of primitive folk would not reveal the same complaint. So enormous is the greed of the child's libido! If we review the whole list of motivations for the little girl's turning away from her mother, as discovered by analysis: that the mother has neglected to outfit her with the only proper genital; that she did not give her enough to eat; that she forced her to share maternal love with others; that she never fulfilled all her love expectations; and finally that the mother was the

first to stimulate her sexual activity, and then forbade it—all seem to lack sufficient justification for the final hostility. Some of them are unavoidable consequences of the nature of infantile sexuality; others seem to be subsequent rationalizations for an uncomprehended change of feeling. Perhaps, rather, it is the case that the attachment to the mother must perish just because it is the first and so intense. Something similar is often seen in the first, passionate love marriages of young women. In this case, as in the former, the attitude of love is destroyed because of unavoidable disappointments and the accumulation of incentives for aggression. Second marriages are usually far more successful.

We cannot go so far as to maintain that the ambivalence of emotional cathexis is a universally valid psychological law—that it is quite impossible to feel love for a person without feeling perhaps just as much hate for him, or vice versa. Certainly the normal adult succeeds in separating the two attitudes so that he need not hate the object of his love or love his enemy. But this seems to be a result of later development. In the first phases of the love life, ambivalence is apparently the rule. Many people retain this archaic trait throughout life. It is characteristic of the obsessional neurotic individual that love and hate weigh equally in his love relations. We also know that primitive man is for the most part ambivalent. The intense attachment of the little girl to her mother must accordingly be strongly ambivalent, and it is this very ambivalence, which, in coöperation with other factors, brings about the swing to antipathy: another result of the general nature of infantile sexuality.

This attempted explanation at once brings up the question: Since the boy's attachment to his mother is surely no less intense than the girl's, why does it remain undisturbed? This is speedily answered: Because boys are better able to manage their ambivalence towards the mother—they can direct all their hostile feelings towards the father. However, we should not give this answer until, in the first place, we have made a thorough study of the pre-œdipal phase in boys; and in the second

place, it is probably safer to admit that we have not yet penetrated to an understanding of these processes, which we have just learned to recognize.

3.

Another question would be: What does the little girl want from her mother? During the time of her exclusive attachment to the mother, what are her sexual aims? The answer which we obtain from analytic case material entirely agrees with our expectations. The sexual aims of the little girl which refer to her mother are both active and passive in kind, and they are determined by the phases of the libido through which she passes. The relation of activity and passivity deserves special attention. In every field of mental activity, and not in the realm of sexuality alone, it is easy to observe that a passively received impression provokes an active response in the child. It, itself, tries to do that which was done to it or with it. This process is part of the work it must undertake to master its environment; it may even lead the child to a painstaking repetition of the very impressions which, because of their unpleasant content, it has every reason to avoid. Children's play also serves as a method of adding an active counterpart to the passive experience. After the doctor has pried open a struggling child's mouth, looked down its throat, and finally departed, the child plays doctor and repeats the vigorous procedure on a small sister or brother, who is then quite as helpless as it, itself, had been with the doctor. This unmistakably shows a disinclination to be passive and a preference for the active rôle. This swing from passivity to activity varies in different children, and may even be absent altogether. From the child's behavior we can judge the relative strength of the masculinity or femininity which will one day appear in its sexuality.

The child's first sexual, or sexually colored, experiences with its mother are naturally passive in kind. The mother suckles, feeds, washes, and clothes it, and directs its various functions. A part of the child's libido remains attached to these experiences and enjoys the pleasures connected with them;

another part is applied to reversing these experiences into activity. First, while at the mother's breast, being suckled is replaced by active sucking. In other instances, the child either chooses independence, that is, successfully carries out itself what had previously been done for it or contents itself with an active repetition of its previous passive experiences; or, it really makes the mother its object and behaves toward her as an active subject. I did not believe in the latter possibility of actual, active behavior for a long time, until experience finally set all doubts at rest.

We rarely hear of a little girl wanting to remind her mother to wash and clothe herself or attend to her excremental needs. She may occasionally say, "Now let's play that I am mother and you are my child." But she usually fulfils such active wishes indirectly in her play with dolls, where she is her mother and the doll her child. The little girl's preference for playing with dolls, in which she differs from the boy, is generally assumed to be a sign of her early awakened womanhood; and not incorrectly so. But we should not overlook the fact that this preference of the little girl's is probably an evidence of the exclusiveness of her attachment to her mother and of her total neglect of the father as an object.

The remarkable sexual activity of the little girl toward the mother is expressed in due order in oral, anal, and finally, even phallic strivings. It is hard to give an account of the details, for it is often a matter of obscure instinctual impulses which the child was unable to grasp mentally when they occurred, and which were therefore subjected to subsequent interpretation and appear in the analysis in terms which certainly could not be attributed to them originally. We find them transferred, for instance, to the later father object, where they do not belong, and this clouds our understanding of the situation. We find aggressive oral and sadistic wishes expressed in the form into which they were forced by premature repression, that is, as a fear of being killed by the mother; this fear, moreover, justifies the wish to kill the mother, should it become conscious. How often this fear of the mother depends on an

unconscious hostility on the mother's part, which the child senses, cannot be stated. (Up to the present, I have found the fear of being eaten up only in men; it refers to the father, but is probably a transformation product of the oral aggression directed against the mother. One wants to devour the mother from whom one has drawn nourishment; a direct cause for this wish is lacking in reference to the father.)

The women with strong mother attachments in whom I could study the pre-œdipal phase, have been unanimous in reporting that they opposed great resistance to enemas and irrigations at the hands of their mothers, and that they used to react with anxiety and temper tantrums. This may indeed be the very common, perhaps even regular, behavior of children. I gained insight into the reason for such particularly violent resistance from a remark of Ruth Mack Brunswick, who at the time was interested in the same problems, to the effect that she could compare the outburst of temper following an enema to the orgasm which follows stimulation of the genital. The anxiety which is included in this response would then be considered a transformation of the aggressive pleasure which had been activated. I believe that this is true, and that at the sadistic-anal level the response to an intense passive stimulation of the intestinal region will be an outburst of aggressive pleasure, expressed directly as rage, or, if subjected to repression, as anxiety. This reaction apparently disappears in later years.

Prominent among the ideas connected with the passive impulses of the phallic phase is the little girl's constant accusation that her mother seduced her, because the child must have felt her first, or at least her most intense, genital sensations while her mother, or the nurse acting for her mother, was washing her or caring for her body. Mothers have often told me that their little two year old or three year old girls find these sensations pleasurable, and try to coax them to prolong the manipulation and friction. The fact that the mother thus unavoidably inaugurates the phallic phase I hold responsible for a second fact—that in phantasies of later years the father is

constantly depicted as the sexual seducer. Once the girl turns away from the mother, she considers her introduction to sexual life also to be the work of her father.

Finally, in the phallic phase intense actively directed wishes appear, which refer to the mother. The sexual activity of this period reaches its climax in clitoris masturbation, during which the child probably visualizes her mother. But whether the child has any notion of a sexual aim, and what this aim might be, I cannot tell from my experience. It is only after the arrival of a newborn baby in the family gives a new incentive to all of the child's interests, that we can clearly make out such an aim. The little girl then wishes, just as a boy might, that she had given her mother this baby, and her reaction to the event and her behavior toward the child is the same as his. This sounds absurd enough, but perhaps only because we are unaccustomed to the idea.

Her turning from the mother is a highly significant step in the girl's development; it is more than a simple change of object. We have described how it takes place and listed the ostensible motives for it; we must add that with this process we find concomitantly, a marked decrease in sexual impulses actively directed, and an increase in passive ones. Naturally the active trends are more seriously affected by the frustration; they were found thoroughly impracticable and were consequently more easily forsaken by the libido, but even the passive strivings did not escape disappointment. Often, when the girl turns from her mother, her clitoridal masturbation ceases, and not infrequently, with this repression of her masculinity, a considerable part of all her sexual tendencies suffer permanent injury. The transference to her father as an object is effected with the aid of those passive trends which survive the general upheaval. She is then free to follow the path which leads to femininity, insofar as it is not hedged in by residues of the pre-œdipal mother attachment which have not been overcome.

A review of our account of sexual development in women forces upon us certain general conclusions about femininity. We found that the same libidinal energies are active in both

male and female children, and we could convince ourselves that for a time they have the same path in both sexes and reach the same destination.

Biological factors, then, divert them from their original aims, and guide even active, in every sense of the word, male strivings into the path of femininity. Since we cannot reject the idea that sexual excitement ultimately depends on the activity of certain chemical agents, we might anticipate that biochemistry will some day isolate two chemical substances, the presence of which would produce male and female sexual excitation, respectively. Yet this expectation seems no less naïve than another one, now fortunately abandoned, the expectation of finding and isolating under the microscope the causative agents for hysteria, obsessional neurosis, melancholia, etc.

In sexual chemistry, too, things are doubtless more complicated. But it is a matter of indifference for psychology whether there is only one, or whether there are two, or a large number of sexually excitant substances in the body. Psychoanalysis shows us that we may be content to assume a single libido, a libido which, to be sure, has active and passive aims, and active and passive types of gratification. This contrast, particularly the existence of libidinal strivings with passive aims, contains the remainder of the problem.

4.

A review of the analytic literature on the subject under consideration will convince the reader that everything I have presented here has already been said. Indeed the publication of this paper would have been unnecessary were it not for the fact that every report of one's own experiences and personal interpretations may be of value in a field so difficult of access. I have, moreover, formulated some points with more succinctness and more precision. In some of the other contributions, it is difficult to survey the presentations because they dealt at the same time with the problem of the super-ego and the sense of guilt. I have avoided this difficulty, and in describing the

different ways in which the phallic phase may terminate, I also have omitted any discussion of the complications which arise when, through disappointment in the father, the child returns to her previous attachment to the mother, or continues from that time on throughout life to shift from one attitude to the other. But just because this is only one contribution among others, I need not thoroughly review and appraise the literature on the subject, and shall confine myself to bringing out some of the more important points of agreement or difference.

In Abraham's as yet unexcelled description of the manifestations of the castration complex in women,¹ one might wish that he had included the influence of the originally exclusive attachment to the mother. I am essentially in agreement with the ideas presented by Jeanne² Lampl-de Groot³ in her important article. She recognizes the complete identity of the pre-œdipal phase in boys and girls, and she tells us that the sexual (phallic) activity of the little girl is directed towards the mother, supporting this statement with observations. She considers the turning away from the mother an effect of the child's realization of her castration, which forces her to relinquish her sexual object and, with it, not infrequently her masturbatory activities; and this entire development is summarized in the formula that the little girl passes through a phase of "negative" œdipus complex before she can enter the positive phase. I consider as an inadequacy of this paper the fact that it presents the turning from the mother as a mere change of object, and that it does not take into consideration the definite signs of hostility which are associated with this change. This hostility is given full recognition in the recent paper of Helene Deutsch,⁴ in which the little girl's phallic activity and the

¹ Abraham, Karl: *Äusserungsformen des weiblichen Kastrationskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. VII, 1921. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. III, 1922, and in *Selected Papers*.)

² At the author's wish I make this correction. Her name was given in the *Zeitschrift* as A. L. de Groot.

³ Lampl-de Groot, Jeanne: *Zur Entwicklungsgeschichte des Ödipuskomplexes der Frau*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XIII, 1927. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. IX, 1928.)

⁴ Deutsch, Helene: *Der feminine Masochismus und seine Beziehung zur Frigidität*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI, 1930. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. XI, 1930.)

intensity of her attachment to the mother are also recognized. H. Deutsch also states that the turning to the father is effected by means of passive strivings which were already aroused by the mother. In her book,¹ published prior to the article mentioned, the author was still applying the œdipus pattern to the pre-œdipal phase, and therefore interpreted the phallic phase as an identification with the father.

Fenichel² quite rightly emphasizes the difficulty of recognizing which part of the material brought up in an analysis is the unchanged content of the pre-œdipal phase and which part is regressively (or otherwise) distorted. He does not agree with Jeanne Lampl-de Groot in regard to the girl's phallic activity, and he protests against Melanie Klein's contention³ that the œdipus complex makes its appearance as early as the first half of the second year. The setting of this time for the œdipus complex, which would necessitate a change in our point of view in regard to all the other interrelated processes of development, does not in point of fact agree with what we have learned from the analysis of adults and is particularly inconsistent with my observation of the long duration of the girl's pre-œdipal attachment. This contradiction is softened if we add that in this field we cannot yet differentiate that which is immutably fixed from that which is variable and subject to the altering influence of accidental experience. It has long been known that seduction tends to accelerate sexual development and promote its precocious maturation; the same may be true of other factors, such as the time of birth of younger children, the time of the discovery of the difference between the sexes, the direct observation of sexual intercourse, the winning or repelling attitude of the parents, etc.

Some authors show a tendency to minimize the importance

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1925.

² Fenichel, Otto: *Zur prägenitalen Vorgeschichte des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI, 1930. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. XII, 1931.)

³ Klein, Melanie: *Frühstadien des Ödipuskomplexes*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XIV, 1928. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. IX, 1928.) And in other contributions.

of the earliest libidinal impulses of the child in favor of later processes of development, so that they credit the earlier development—to put it extremely—with nothing except the function of indicating the various directions which later repressions and reaction formations will take; only the later processes are supposed to be supplied with intensity. An example of this is K. Horney's opinion¹ that we have greatly overestimated the little girl's envy of the penis, and that the intensity of her masculine striving, which makes its appearance later, is to be ascribed to a secondary penis envy which is used as a defense against feminine impulses, especially the feminine attachment to the father. This does not correspond with my impressions. No matter how well assured we are of the fact that regressions and reaction formations later reënforce the older strivings, and no matter how difficult it may be to assess the relative strength of the confluent libidinal components, nevertheless, we should not overlook the fact that the original libidinal impulses possess an intensity of their own greater—we can say, incommensurably greater—than that of all later impulses. That the attachment to the father and the masculinity complex are antithetical is surely true—the antithesis is the general one of activity and passivity, male and female—but this does not give us the right to assume that only one of these is primary, and that the strength of the other is merely a defense. And, if this defense against femininity turns out to be so vigorous, from what other source can it draw its strength if not from the masculine striving which first found expression in the child's penis envy, and which therefore deserves the name given it?

A similar objection may be opposed to Jones's² point of view that the phallic stage in girls is a secondary protective reaction rather than a real stage of development. This agrees neither with the dynamic nor the chronological state of affairs.

¹ Horney, Karen: *Flucht aus der Weiblichkeit*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. VII, 1926.)

² Jones, Ernest: *The Early Development of Female Sexuality*. Int. J. Ps-A. VIII, 1927. (In German, Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928.)

THE ACQUISITION OF FIRE *

BY SIGM. FREUD

In a footnote in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (p. 50), I expressed more or less incidentally a conjecture which might be made, on the basis of psychoanalytic material, as to how primitive man had acquired fire. Albrecht Schaeffer's contrary opinion¹ and the surprising allusion in Erlenmeyer's paper² to the Mongolian edict forbidding urination on ashes,³ lead me to return to this theme.⁴

My assumption that the control of fire could be gained only after man had renounced the homosexually tinged pleasure of extinguishing it with urine, can be confirmed, I believe, by an interpretation of the Greek myth of Prometheus, taking into account the fact that the content of the myth shows such distortions as we might expect. These distortions are of the same type as, and not greater than, those we recognize daily, when, from the dreams of patients, we make reconstructions of their repressed, but none the less significant, childhood experiences. The mechanisms employed in dream distortion are: representation by means of symbols, and transformation into the oppo-

* First appeared in *Imago*, XVIII, 1932. Authorized translation by Edith B. Jackson.

¹ Schaeffer, Albert: *Der Mensch und das Feuer*. Psa. Bewegung, II, 251. 1930.

² Erlenmeyer, E. H.: *Notiz zur Freudschen Hypothese über die Zähmung des Feuers*. *Imago*, XVIII, 5. 1932.

³ This refers only to hot ashes, from which fire can still be kindled, not to dead ashes.

⁴ The dissenting view of Lorenz (*Chaos und Ritus*, *Imago* XVII, pp. 433 ff. 1931.) is based on the assumption that the taming of fire followed man's discovery that he could kindle it at will by certain manipulations. Dr. Eugen J. Hárnik calls my attention to the opposite opinion expressed by Dr. Richard Lasch (in Georg Buschan's encyclopedia *Illustrierte Völkerkunde*, vol. I, p. 24. Stuttgart: 1922): "It is probable that the art of keeping fire burning is much older than the art of kindling fire. Evidence of this may still be found in the fact that the present-day pygmean aborigines of the Andaman Islands possess fire and keep it burning continuously, although they lack any indigenous method of kindling it."

site. I cannot presume to explain all the elements of the myth in this manner; it is possible that besides the original situation, other and later processes may have contributed to form the final version. But the elements which admit of an analytic interpretation are those which are most striking and important, to wit, the manner in which Prometheus transports the fire, the nature of the deed (sacrilege, theft, deception of the gods), and the purport of the punishment given him.

The story goes that the Titan, Prometheus, still a divine "culture-hero,"¹ perhaps in the original version a demiurge and the creator of mankind, brings to mortals the fire which he has pilfered from the gods, concealed in a hollow stick, a stalk of fennel. Such an object appearing in a dream would be interpreted as a symbol for the penis, although the unusual emphasis on hollowness would disturb us. What is the connection between this "penis-stalk" and the preservation of fire? It seems impossible to answer this question until we recall the process of reversal—transformation into the opposite, inversion of relations—which so often conceals the meaning of a dream. In his own "penis-stalk" man does not hide fire but, on the contrary, the means of extinguishing it—a stream of water, his urine. A large amount of well known analytic material relates to this connection between fire and water.

In the second place, the acquisition of fire was a sacrilege. It was obtained by theft or robbery. This is a constant feature in all myths concerning the winning of fire. It is to be found not only in the Greek legend of Prometheus, the bringer of fire, but among remote and widely different races. This fact, then, must hold the essential content of the distorted reminiscence of mankind. Why should the winning of fire be inseparably connected with the idea of sacrilege? Who is injured, and who is deceived? As told by Hesiod, the myth provides a direct answer by relating another incident which has no direct connection with fire: Prometheus performing a

¹ Herakles, later, is a demigod, and Theseus entirely human.

sacrifice arranges it so that human beings get a better share of the sacrificial animal than Zeus. So it is the gods who are cheated! It is a familiar fact that in legends the gods satisfy all desires which human beings are forced to renounce, for example, incest. Speaking analytically, the instinctual life, the id, is the god cheated when fire is not extinguished by urine: a human wish is transmuted by the myth into a divine privilege. But the divine being of the myth has none of the characteristics of a super-ego; it is still the representative of the instinctual life.

The transformation into the opposite is most thorough in a third element of the legend, the punishment of the fire-bringer. Prometheus is chained to a cliff and a vulture comes every day to prey on his liver. A bird also figures in the fire legends of other peoples, and must somehow be of significance in the setting, but for the present I refrain from interpreting. We feel more certain of our ground, however, when we come to explain why the liver was singled out for punishment. The liver, for the ancients, was the seat of all passions and lusts; a punishment such as that meted out to Prometheus was the appropriate one for an abandoned criminal whose evil passions had incited him to sacrilege. But the bringer of fire was the exact antithesis of this—he had restrained his instincts and shown how beneficial and how indispensable for the purposes of civilization such an instinctual restraint is. Why, at any rate, was a deed which brought such cultural blessings treated in the myth as though it were a transgression deserving of punishment? When the myth allows us, despite all distortions, to catch a glimpse of the fact that the precondition for the acquisition of fire was the renunciation of an instinctual activity, it is expressing undisguisedly the resentment felt by instinct-ridden humanity toward the culture-hero. This confirms our interpretation and is what we should have expected. For we know that injunctions to renounce instinctual activity and the putting into execution of such demands give rise to hostility

and aggression which only in later phases of psychic development become transformed into a sense of guilt.

The Prometheus legend, as well as other fire myths, is made less transparent because of the fact that primitive peoples must have regarded fire as something analogous to erotic passion—as we would say, a symbol of the libido. The warmth irradiating from a fire provokes the same sensation as that which accompanies sexual excitement; in form and motion the flame suggests the active phallus. That the phallus was represented by flame in myths is beyond doubt; the legends of the descent of the Roman king, Servius Tullius, still testify to this fact. Nor have we departed to a very great extent from our ancestors' way of thinking when we speak of the consuming fire of passion, and of licking flames, comparing the flames with the tongue. The premise for our theory of the winning of fire was, that for primitive man the attempt to extinguish fire with his own urine meant a pleasurable combat with another phallus.

It is possible that through this symbolic assimilation, other purely phantastic elements have been forced into the myth and become interwoven with the historical elements. It is difficult to avoid the supposition that, since the liver is the seat of passion, it must have the same symbolic meaning as fire, and that its daily consumption and renewal is a fitting description of libidinal desires, which, sated for the day, reappear on the morrow. The bird that feeds on the liver would also represent a penis, which, as we know from legends, dreams, linguistic usage and plastic representations that have come down to us from antiquity is not an unusual part for a bird to play. We are immediately reminded of the phoenix, the bird that rises fresh and rejuvenated after each fiery death. Rather than the sun, setting in the evening glow to rise again, this bird in the beginning probably meant the phallus, reanimated out of its flaccidity.

The question might be asked whether it is fair to attribute to the mythopoeitic function an attempt to portray in disguise

—and so to speak, in fun—the well known, but for all that, extremely interesting mental processes which are expressed in bodily functioning, with no other motive than to derive pleasure from the portrayal. No one can give an assured answer to this question unless he has an understanding of the real nature of myth, but in the two instances we have given it is easy to recognize the same idea and a definite purpose. Both myths describe the reanimation of libidinal desire after it was extinguished through satiety—its indestructibility. And if the historical and nuclear subject matter of the myth is the subjugation of instinct, or the obligatory renunciation of instinctual activity, the emphasis laid on this indestructibility supplies a fitting consolation. It could be the second part of the reaction of primitive man to the impairment of his instinctual life: after the offender is punished, an assurance that he did no essential harm.

We unexpectedly find reversal into the opposite in another myth, which appears to have little in common with the fire legend. The Lernæan hydra with the countless writhing snake-heads—one of them immortal—to judge from its name is a water dragon. The culture-hero, Herakles, fights with it and cuts off the heads, but new ones constantly grow in their place, and he cannot defeat the monster until he has burnt away the immortal head. A water dragon who is conquered by fire is—an absurdity. However, as in so many dreams, there may be a reversal in the manifest content, so that the hydra is fire, and the darting snakeheads tongues of flame—and in proof of its libidinal nature it shows, like the liver of Prometheus, the phenomenon of regeneration after attempts to destroy it. Herakles puts out this fire with water. (The immortal head is of course the phallus itself, and its destruction is castration.) But Herakles is the deliverer of Prometheus, the slayer of the bird that preys on the Titan's liver. May we not conjecture that there is a deeper connection between these two myths? It is as if the deed of the one hero made amends for the other. Prometheus (like the Mongolian edict) had prohibited the

extinction of fire; Herakles licensed its extinction in case the fire became a menacing evil. The second myth seems to correspond to the reaction of a later period of civilization to the circumstance which provoked the winning of fire. It appears that from this point we might penetrate much further into the mysteries of the myth, but we really cannot go very far with any sense of security.

In the antithesis of fire and water, which dominates the entire scope of these myths, besides the historical and the symbolic-phantastic factors I have mentioned, there is still a third demonstrable influence—I refer to a physiological fact which a poet describes in the following lines:

“Was dem Menschen dient zum Seichen,¹
Damit schafft er Seinesgleichen.” (Heine.)

The male genital has two functions, whose proximity to each other is an annoyance to some individuals. It is used to empty the bladder and to carry out the act of love which assuages the desire of the genital libido. A child still believes that both functions are united; it is his theory that babies are made by the man's urinating into the woman's body. But an adult knows that the two activities are really incompatible—as incompatible as fire and water. When the genital is in the state of excitement which is responsible for its comparison with a bird, and as long as the sensations which come from it resemble the warmth emitted by fire, it cannot be used for urination; and contrariwise, when it is used for the excretion of urine, all its connections with the genital function appear to be obliterated. The antithesis between these two functions might give us occasion to say, that man quenches his own fire with his own water. And it is likely that primitive man, compelled to turn to his own bodily sensations and bodily states for assistance in comprehending his environment, did not leave unnoticed and unused the analogies afforded him by the behavior of fire.

¹

“The part man has for making water
Begets him also son and daughter.”

PLEASURE IN DISGUISE, THE NEED FOR DECORATION, AND THE SENSE OF BEAUTY

BY EUGEN J. HÁRNIK (BERLIN)

I.

The Specific Ideational Content of the Castration Anxiety in Transvestitism

My use of the expression "pleasure in disguise" in the general title of this paper is not merely an attempt to coin new terminology in the field of clinical psychoanalysis. It is used only to indicate that in the following pages there will be no attempt to classify the pleasure obtained from putting on, wearing, looking at, admiring, or otherwise enjoying sexual stimulation from clothes, into mutually exclusive rubrics of "transvestitism" and "fetishism" in any precise differential diagnostic manner. The recent valuable contribution of Fenichel, written from the special point of view of psychoanalytic differential pathology, has made such an effort even less necessary. In Fenichel's paper we may find a summarized discussion of all that has been previously established in regard to the deep psychology of these conditions (Freud, 11), and new observations of the author which add to our knowledge. It is certain that the interest of all will be aroused by a contribution which was summarized by the author himself as follows: "If the homosexual will not take any interest in a creature without a penis; if the fetishist constantly denies the existence of any such creature; and if the exhibitionist, voyeur, and transvestite continually attempt to repudiate its existence, we must conclude that these perverse individuals are trying to conquer the cause of their anxiety (the idea of castration) by such denials." (10, 34) Although recognizing the relation to the castration complex as the specific factor in these conditions, Fenichel was not able, he

tells us, to designate an etiology pathognomonic for transvestitism. As my good fortune permits me to present what may be this particular bit of missing information, I shall, in deference to my new findings, omit any further consideration of Fenichel's clean-cut differentiations.

The analysis of the case I am about to report attained only a moderately satisfactory depth, and in one feature differed from the usual run of transvestitic cases reported. I refer to marked manifest homosexuality, which, however, according to Kronfeld (46, with literature), is to be found in half of the cases. The patient was a young man who had lived with another man in a situation resembling marriage for several years. He did not however masquerade as a woman, but found his pleasure, and gave pleasure to his friend, by donning apparel suitable to a laboring man, sometimes with a suggestion of the *Apache*. His most important impersonation was that of a drayman, and the costume for this rôle consisted along with other variable requisites, in the main of a rough apron such as these men use when they transport heavy burdens. Such aprons always caused our patient to be sexually excited, and were, indeed, necessary conditions for potency. He wore one when he masturbated, imagined himself as wearing one in his masturbation fantasies, and was fascinated and attracted when he saw one being worn by someone on the street. His friend also had been induced to wear one during sexual play. Fetishism, therefore, was a manifestation which was entirely consistent with our patient's other peculiarities, and which was not always to be isolated from them, and it was brought into the analysis in the most natural way. When he began to have intercourse with women, he continued to wear his apron costume for its stimulating effect. But subsequently, as he gradually came to prefer heterosexual relations, his dependence on the apron diminished proportionately.

I do not wish to run the danger of diverting attention to the problem of therapy in homosexuality by continuing the discussion of our patient's more successful attempt during

analysis to turn to women. This behavior was repetitive; for in his early youth he had made practically successful attempts in the same direction. But my material would not allow me to pursue this problem even if I wished, and I shall not attempt to explain his personality in general.¹ The observations to be reported are for the purpose of elucidating the origin of his sexual peculiarities, and to furnish a basis for conclusions concerning transvestitism and fetishism.

Our patient's perverse interest in aprons began at puberty. One day he found an apron of his mother's and suddenly was overpoweringly stimulated by its sexual, indeed fetishistic, quality so that he masturbated. A pattern for the drayman's apron, which later came to dominate his sexual activity so completely was present in his earliest childhood, for during that period there were always many draymen in the street in which he lived, either passing his mother's shop or bringing in wares such as butter.

His mother was a widow, who besides our patient had one other, somewhat older son. His father had died when the patient was an infant.¹ Only too justifiably did the little boy suspect his mother of sexual irregularities with the sturdy draymen; he remembers several occasions on which she retired from the shop with one or another of them. It seems that this fatherless boy came to regard "the drayman" (a remarkable schematic generalization!) as a father substitute. In one respect at least he envied and emulated "the drayman"; namely, sexual prowess. Thus he identified himself with the drayman, and the drayman's apron became for him a symbol for the large strong penis he would have if he were a drayman.

¹By chance I could report on *Homosexuality and Psychoanalytic Therapy* and discuss indications, prognosis, and modifications in technique, as illustrated by two other cases, at the second session of the German Psychoanalytic Society at Dresden (Sept. 27-29, 1930). See reviews in *Psa. Bewegung* III, 87 and *Int. Ztschr. f. Psa.* XVII, 156. 1931.

¹Here again the monotonously regular situation of a homosexual man who lacked a strong father; the occasional exceptions to this situation, as in my report at Dresden, will be increasingly instructive.

We may well surmise that the apron symbol was over-determined and complicated. For the apron not only stood for the genital; it also covered and protected the genital against castration and similar dangers. It covered the pubic region, and thus gave his imagination license to believe that it concealed a penis even in women—for the apron is of course an exquisitely feminine garment. Indeed, we learned that at the age of three or four, he had a marked aversion to wearing a little apron, such as most children of that age wear when playing, because his masculinity protested against being dressed like his mother—to interpret, against having the sexual structure of a woman.

We thus catch a glimpse of his œdipus complex, virtually and presumably inherently, positive, and of the influence of his castration complex. Later in infancy, however, he became thoroughly homosexual in his relations with his brother, although, if his remembrance of events at this time is trustworthy, he played the active part. He would mount his brother from behind, and imitating the motions of coitus rub his penis on the upper part of his brother's back, the part covered by a night-shirt. There is no doubt that this relationship offered a point of fixation for his libido, and ultimately determined his later interest in men. This homosexual period was a reaction to a specific experience, which not only determined this late infantile sexual activity, but also will show us the content of his œdipus complex, his reaction to it, and why he developed his later sexual interest in aprons.

Among the men who came into his mother's shop were certain salesmen for wholesale firms, persons of a superior social status. One of these gentlemen must have been a frequent visitor, for he brought the children little presents, of which more will be said later. He was a married man, perhaps the father of a family. One day our patient's mother had gone into the living-room adjoining the shop. A customer entered the shop. The patient and his brother tried to summon their mother. They found the door to the living-room locked.

They knocked and knocked on the door, but there was no response. It may be that the mother had told them that she was not in. At any rate the older boy went into the courtyard and proceeded to knock on the window panes of the living-room. Suddenly the door to the shop was opened and out came the mother and her friend. . . . The patient's memory of this scene ends here. All the signs indicate that her admirer never returned. But he had powerfully influenced our patient. From now on, the boy developed an intense longing for a father, which culminated in his homosexual object choice. His sexual advances to his brother were only a transitory and inadequate attempt to gratify his wish for a father, who would be well-to-do and kindly like his mother's lover. A hasty erotic identification with such a father is also contained in his homosexual attitude. Needing a father, he turned, so to speak, to the nearest objects available for transference, the draymen. Even though they were poor and of the working class their presence in the shop was of much assistance in the modest economy of this family. They were, furthermore, impressive in their strength, and the boy indulged in jealous fantasies. No one individual among them was sufficiently striking to produce a special preference. All of them came and went, and one was easily replaced by another. "The drayman," an impersonal figure, thus became what we call an *imago*, a substitute after repression for the definitely lost *one* object.

The workman's apron of our patient's later activity is thus seen to be a sign for and means of identification with the drayman; and we now ask what was its concrete representative or equivalent, and determinant, in the traumatic scene at the shop. Unfortunately we must rely upon constructions to answer this question, for the analysis was interrupted before we arrived at ultimate clarification. Nevertheless, these constructions are reported because of the important conclusions to which they may lead. They are, moreover, not inherently improbable, indeed in certain respects very probable. Finally, the conclusions deduced may be applied in other cases of

transvestitism and fetishism, and help fill a gap in our knowledge of the etiology of these perversions.

To continue, it is probable that the little boy, taking advantage of the general confusion, went into the room just vacated by his mother and her friend, and proceeded to investigate; and that he found on the table by the bed a freshly used condom. In keeping with his intellectual development he formed a theory to suit his findings.¹ Our patient at first heard our reconstruction with indifference and with argumentation, and for a long while had no feeling of remembering anything of the sort. But one day, completely of his own accord he made the following suggestion: that his peculiar preference for aprons which come together in back and have a completely *seamless* free edge originated in the fact that the condom examined had been torn. Obviously a condom is seamless under any circumstances; but the equation, apron = condom, gives us a hint as to the child's theory of coitus. In coitus, he probably thought, the penis (and because of bisexual implications, the male and female penis, but surely his own penis) has its foreskin and all its enveloping sensitive cutaneous covering pulled off.² Thus, his attempts at coitus with his brother represented in several ways an effort to allay the anxiety aroused by the thought of such a process. In his relations with his brother he could be reassured, because neither of them suffered; both were and remained "of the same sex." Again, the shirt against which he rubbed empha-

¹ To cite one of the most striking screen memories, repressed almost completely because of the traumatic experience and its partly painful consequences: The boy had a rubber ball which was a gift of this "uncle" (the mother's lover). He lost it and was severely punished by his mother, who had become very irritable since the traumatic incident, and who now spanked him often and without just cause.

² As so frequently happens, a scurrilous anecdote, for which I must acknowledge my indebtedness to Mr. Felix Bryk, illustrates this theory completely: The innocent country girl comes to the big city and becomes a chamber maid in a hotel. One morning she finds a used condom and asks another maid what it is. "Come, come!" says her friend, "You have things like that in the country." "I know," she replies, "but out there the whole skin doesn't come off."

sized the presence of a protective covering, and diverted his erotic interest to the harmless and pleasurable symbol of clothing. A remarkable fact in his life story was the total absence of any memory of dogs engaging in coitus, although he had spent all his childhood in a poor and thickly populated section of the city. Such a repression must have resulted from the appearance presented by the erect penis of the dog; with its vivid coloration, this organ readily gives children the impression that it has been skinned or laid bare by some bloody procedure. Just before puberty, but after he had become familiar with condoms, as he remembers, he was beset by an intense dread of even touching the prepuce, and its motility, perceived during spontaneous erections, was a source of great anxiety. Once he bared his glans, and thinking that it had an unhealthy appearance, he showed it to his mother, to be severely scolded. We have already sketched his subsequent development to maturity.

To summarize, we may offer the statement that in fetishists and transvestites with various habits and types of behavior, even where a definite childhood determination is less apparent than in our case, the castration complex must be particularly related to the danger of losing the prepuce or the whole cutaneous sheath of the penis. The mechanisms involved in originating the pleasure in being disguised, and the specific interest in clothes, which have been described by previous investigators may be supplemented by this pathognomonic factor. I feel free to make this statement, because other cases than mine have demonstrated either the definite presence of this etiological factor or a high probability of its existence.

A case brought to my attention by Miss Berta Bornstein, then of Vienna, belongs to the former group. Her patient was a boy in early puberty, who had developed a thorough-going "classical" transvestitism. He would dress in women's clothes and masturbate in front of a mirror with heterosexual fantasies of coitus. When the analyst called his attention to the topic of circumcision, the analysis took an unexpected turn.

The analyst had called his attention to stereotyped procedures which occupied much of his time, such as manipulations of the nail of his great toe, and pulling at his eyelids. She was able to interpret these structures as symbols for the prepuce, and cleared the path by this interpretation for the presentation of the child's Jewish complex and concealed circumcision complex, in which he expressed his castration anxiety proper. The associative bridge between circumcision and compensatory stimulating garments was found to be the ceremonial and ritual garments of the Jews, such as the prayer shawl and skull cap.

The second case was analyzed by Dr. March of Berlin. The patient was a very intelligent young man who masturbated and had intercourse with prostitutes, but only after he had put on a rubber-impregnated rain coat. When masturbating he inserted his penis into a rubber-impregnated sponge bag, clasped the bag to his penis, and then applied friction. These complicated habits were partly explained by a memory from his childhood; just after his father's death, he had put on his father's rubber overshoes and walked about in them. That a knowledge of the use of condoms may have contributed to bring about this piece of behavior is difficult to refute. At any rate, it is certain that in these cases the circumcision of Jews, and Judaism in general were topics of great importance.

In conclusion, for purposes of comparison, I should like to refer to a case published by Lorand of New York in his article, *Fetishism in Statu Nascendi* (42, 87 ff). About two years before the beginning of the analysis, the little boy, a shoe fetishist with many unusual interests in clothes, had undergone an operation for a phimosis. It was perhaps the brevity of my patient's analysis which determined that circumcision was not a more prominent topic; a fact which forces me to borrow from other sources my material for the deeper determinations. Yet the results of my analysis permit me a cautious remark concerning my patient's inherent make-up: he had a very strongly developed, presumably constitutionally reën-

forced, skin eroticism which was manifested in wishes for certain types of component pleasures.

The question arises, then, is such a disposition a constant factor in the development of pleasure in being disguised? And again, is it more than a tautology to relate the inherent function of the prepuce—to give pleasure during genital stimulation—to this genetic factor?

II.

Empirical and Theoretical Observations on the Need for Ornamentation, and a Hypothesis of the Origin of the Sense of Beauty

To test the value of our new ideas, it would be safest to begin with the familiar field of clinical psychoanalysis, and see if they are useful in explaining neurotic symptoms and behavior. I recall the analysis, completed some years ago, of a young man whose love life and general adaptation were unsatisfactory. He told me that once as a boy during an outburst of temper he went to a drawer, wherein his two older brothers kept apparatus which they used in amateur physical experiments, extracted a rag probably used for the frictional production of electricity, and threw it into the water closet. Interestingly enough, it could be shown that he had since then unconsciously arranged his destiny so that repetitions of this incident, on a larger scale and detrimental to himself and others, were constantly occurring.

The incident occurred after he had just learned of the custom of circumcision and was a reaction to this bit of knowledge. He was in this instance satisfied to indulge in a symbolic act, but during the period before puberty he reaped a rich harvest in the form of sanguinary masturbation fantasies. One of his favorite fantasies was of women and girls being flayed, and he thought up numerous ways of utilizing the skins, for which there are many ethnological parallels. (See 56, 395.)

Another man, whose case was reported by Dr. Barbara Lantos at a meeting of the German Psychoanalytic Society,

made his skin the arena of his neurotic conflicts.¹ He suffered from a compulsion neurosis. Like the patient just described, he was also a Jew, and had a fear of touching certain objects, most particularly shirts. If I remember correctly, this neurosis, which was completely dominated by the castration complex, was interesting among other reasons for the fact that it demonstrated—corresponding to Freud's classical formulation—the negative of an apparel perversion. Further observations of this sort will be collected in the future, once our attention is directed to this quarter. However, even now we are able from this standpoint to survey normal libidinal interest in clothing, the intensity and magnitude of which cannot be exaggerated. (See 46, Art. "Kleidung und Mode," "Gürtel," "Schleier," etc., with references. The latest work (10b) is that of J. C. Flügel: *The Psychology of Clothes*, London: Hogarth Press, 1931.)

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Psychoanalysis has long been acquainted with several associative connections involving clothes. Freud² discovered the symbolic meaning of the cloak, and in one instance found that a transparent gray dress in a dream stood for a condom (13, 259 ff.).³ Jones then attempted to show more definite determinants for this symbolic representation (37, 77 ff.), and, as it seems to me, narrowly missed the decisive point, cloak=

¹ See Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVI, 132. 1930.

² "Demons in cloaks and hoods are, according to one authority, phallic in nature." (12, 83.) See also 12, 72; and *Vorlesungen*, Ges. Schr. V, 157, 159. (English translation by Riviere, pp. 31 f.)

³ One of my female patients because of certain tragic events unfortunately had to reproach herself for not having protected her son from venereal infection. In the punitive dream which contained her self-reproach, a man appeared wearing a rubber raincoat. The coat signified "condom" and at the same time "fore-skin" with the association that ritual circumcision is considered by some a prophylactic measure. To demonstrate how manifold the representations may be I digress to refer to the dream of another patient, which was of a torn brassiere. Interpretation: 1. hæmorrhoidal bleeding (paired body structures, in back in place of in front, organ lesions); 2. Circumcised penis (displacement upwards from below, "castration" of the testes as the ideational connection, "covering" for "skin").

skin, foreskin. G. Róheim (57, 95 ff.), using exceptional comparative material, was the first to show the symbolic equation of hat, hood, cloak and prepuce; and to show from this equation how they ultimately became penis symbols also, on the principle of *pars pro toto*.

Contrariwise, we may expect that these associative relationships will be involved as a constant in the genesis of the libidinal, or as we are accustomed to say, the narcissistic estimation of clothing. So far, the contributions cited encourage us to turn our attention first of all to the state of affairs in the male sex, that is, to begin with the simplest situation. To set a "cap" on the penis, or envelop it in some covering is a widespread custom in primitive culture, widespread both in point of time and space. The most current designation of such coverings is *penis-case*. A simple form is used by certain tribes such as the Botocudos and related peoples in eastern Brazil; a twisted or folded palm leaf is wrapped about the penis. (4, I, 287 ff. with illustration. See also 51, I, 574, according to the Prinz zu Wied, 78.) Krickeberg, the author of the section dealing with this topic in Buschan's book, thinks that it serves to protect the genitalia from injurious insects, especially ticks. Other local variants of the penis covering are stiff cases made of shell, gourd, and bamboo in West Melanesia; in south-eastern Polynesia soft material is used, and in Togoland penis-bags are employed. (64, 489, according to Graebner; and 44, 197 ff.)

It is frequently asserted that these coverings are intended as a protection against all sorts of noxious influences (4, I, 27), and this view is strengthened by the remarkable parallel phenomenon of *cynodesme*, or infibulation, closing the foreskin with sutures, which may be combined with an elevation of the penis by tying. In the forest region of tropical Brazil, suture of the prepuce and elevation of the penis by tying to the taut string about the hips is customary. (4, I, 251, illustration.) The mode and distribution of *cynodesme* has been

most thoroughly investigated by Friederici, whose vivid description is worth quoting:

"Whereas some of the Polynesians, among them some of the Tuamotu, practised incision; that is to say, laid bare the glans, others among the Tuamotu practised cynodesme, and were extremely ashamed and fearful of letting the glans be seen. This is one of the differences and sharp contrasts to be found in the conceptions and customs of the Polynesians, which does not fit in very well with the idea of 'unexampled uniformity'. . . . The cynodesme, a fine thread, was tied about the prepuce, which had been pulled forward over the glans like a sausage end, and then tied to the belt so that the penis was elevated. It was not to be discovered whether this elevation of the penis was a constant part of the procedure. . . . It is worthy of note that certain tribes in Melanesia combine incision with a kind of cynodesme in a very curious way. . . .

"The highly curious practice of cynodesme is not limited to the South Sea region. It is also to be found among the inhabitants of the land along the Strait of Magellan, among the island Caribs, among the Mayonnas of the upper Amazon, among the Chichimecs of Jalisco, and among the antique Etruscans and Hellenes. No ethnologist can be surprised at this, for cynodesme owes its origin to geographic and social influences." (22, 53 ff.)

In addition we may refer to an example of an archæological portrayal of cynodesme, a seated clay figure found in a grave in Venezuela, of which Buschan gives an illustration. (4, I, 345. Fig. 138b.)

A member of the "regional culture" school of ethnology, Graebner, has used the presence of cynodesme in so many peoples to draw far-reaching parallels. (28, 47; 29, 1119). The improbability of any rational explanation for this deeply rooted ambivalent practice is obvious. Even among the forest Indians in the tropics we find, according to Krickeberg, that decoration is already present as an aim. "A little string tassel or a little square rag hanging from the waist makes the elevated

penis conspicuous rather than the contrary." (4, I, 251) Besides any practical considerations, the wearing of a penis-case obviously is meant to attract the eye. It seems to me that Von Sydow (74, 142), whose valuable contribution will be discussed later, has underestimated the æsthetic significance of this factor. Buschan (4, I, 27), for example, holds that there is an æsthetic purpose even in the wearing of simple cases made of shell, etc., which sometimes cover only the glans penis, and which are called *nutschi* by certain Bantu races (Kaffirs); and more especially in the penis covering used by the Zulus, which is made of leather, like the finger of a glove, and sometimes ornamented with a long decorated string. The string is also to be found on the penis bags of the Moba of Togoland, referred to above. Luschan (44, 197 ff.) compares them to similar features in Egyptian costume, but adds (*l. c.* 198), "In both instances this is obviously merely a secondary style," referring obviously to its use as a decoration.¹

The same ornament, "a remarkable genital decoration," may be found on the figures depicted on cliffs, copies of which Frobenius (23, 316) brought back with him from his latest African expedition. (See fig. I.) In a work that is commendable not only for its thoroughness but also for its style and breadth of vision, Frobenius tries to present evidence that these cliff drawings, previously often referred to as "Bushmen art," are really remains of an older cultural stratum, which is to be included in the "Great Erythrean culture." He assumes that the penis envelope was a privilege reserved for certain important personages, and refers to it elsewhere as "royal loin clothing" (23, 308). He was kind enough to inform me in a personal letter that he regards this costume as connected with rituals of this southern culture group, who celebrate the act of procreation as a holy activity. A brilliant description of these rites may be found in the author's book. With this

¹ He also states (45, 67f.) that the *nutschi* is designed to protect and ornament the glans, and he lays especial emphasis on the hand painted calabashes of the South Sea Islanders.

mystical-esoteric interpretation he goes beyond a previous theory which he defended in his discussion of the even older, extremely interesting, cliff-drawings of the so-called Capsian




FIGURE I

(Fig. 4, [no. 249] in 48, 101).

culture (from Roman "*Capsia*") of northern Africa. Here was represented a late diluvial hunter wearing a phallic covering to protect his organ (as Frobenius and others thought)

from the evil eye; for example, from the force of the shattering look of a wounded animal. (Fig. II; reproduced from 25, 167.¹) (See also, 25, 55 and 165 f., and Von Reitzenstein in 46, 135.) He drew upon Lybian and Egyptian parallels, traced their modifications in the Hamitic-Ethiopian cultures, and found connections especially in the puberty initiation customs of the Bakuba, in the "ritual of playing the leopard spirit" (*l. c.* 164). In this way we unexpectedly approach the simpler explanation that the covering is intended to replace the removed prepuce. Frobenius himself found this to be the case among the Sola of the Niger region. "The young man is permitted to wear the penis covering (*tassisso*) only after he




FIGURE II

has had his prepuce (*kukon*) removed. He becomes a man, properly speaking, when he is circumcised." (26, 329.)

The same view is maintained most intransigently by the Catholic writers, W. Schmidt and W. Koppers, who, sup-

¹ The same group remarkably reproduced in 24, fig. 125.

porting the "cultural region" theory, regard the penis covering as a "garment peculiar to totemic culture,"¹ interpret its use in ancient Egypt from this point of view, and have no doubt that "it developed from the covering originally used to protect the wound after circumcision." (64, 489.) Unfortunately there are facts which seem to contradict this simplifying explanation, and force us to admit, as in the case of the Polynesians, the operation of ambivalently developed possibilities. As Dr. Baumann of the Berlin Ethnological Museum had the kindness to demonstrate to me, the map in Frobenius and von Wilm's *Atlas Africanus* which shows the distribution of various types of apparel indicates that the penis-case is worn, at least in an extensive zone in equatorial Africa, by people who do not practice circumcision, but special operations such as knocking out a tooth, etc.² Nevertheless, the idea that the penis-case functions as a substitute for the foreskin, seems to me psychoanalytically correct, that is to say, it is in accord with psychic (symbolic) reality.

On the other hand, ethnologists of many schools are in agreement that the penis-case cannot be attributed to any sense of modesty. Von Reitzenstein points out that the penis-case is a very conspicuous object, sometimes as long as an arm, and

¹ For a critique of this theory, see Krickeberg, in 4, I, 236 and 238.

² This contradictory alternation between showing and concealing the glans is also emphasized by Bryk, who bases his views on the work of Frobenius and others. (3, 199 ff.) Bryk's contribution, which came into my hands only after the present study was completed, also takes into account the results of psychoanalysis, although in my opinion without completely understanding them. Nevertheless we agree in many points; he lays perhaps more emphasis than I on the importance of the penis-case as an ornament, speaking indeed of a "style demon". Bryk's fundamental thesis of the effect of a "prepuce complex" seems to me to involve a too general, and hence superfluous, terminological innovation. The basic dynamic factor (of which Bryk would be convinced through clinical findings) is the castration complex, and derivatives of this complex may be traced in various directions, with varied ideational content. My own intention to derive clothes and decoration from the effects of this complex surely prevents me from denying that the phenomenon of circumcision is an excellent starting point for the solution of many problems in this field.

very grotesque in form. (See fig. III.) K. von Boeckmann, in the explanatory text to the map referred to (*Atlas Africanus*), is even more extreme, and interestingly quite as a matter of course applies his explanatory principles to the analogous garments covering the female genitalia. He gives many comparative illustrations of garments which really conceal along with garments which do not conceal at all and which certainly have nothing to do with modesty. (See 73, 44.) For him it is problematic "to what extent the types of sexual garments listed (especially penis-cases, tassels of leaves, single leaves) are opposed to concealment and represent a means of




FIGURE III

Penis-cases from New Guinea (after L. Schultze, 3, fig. 24, page 199).

provoking sexual stimulation; that, in Darwin's sense, they are sexual equivalents. There are strong indications that this is the case." Fascicles of leaves or grass, and single leaves are the most primitive form of feminine clothing, to which might also be added the pubic gird worn in South America, a triangular folded piece of the inner bark of a tree which closes the entrance to the female organ, found, for example, among the Bakairi, and called *uluris*. (Illustration in 4, I, 708.) Since other authors (see Von Reitzenstein, 46, 135) emphasize to such an extent the function of protection against the evil eye, it might be well to corroborate Von Boeckmann's view by the following quotation from Krickeberg: "The painted triangular clay objects (Tanga) found abundantly in Marajo seem to be representations of such a pubic covering." (4, I,

251.) As these objects were used as amulets and charms, we are brought nearer to a topic to be discussed later; namely, that of symbolic usage.

One point seems to be established for all types of penis coverings, whether these be of the simplest construction or whether they be aprons, which, it should again be noted, may be either simple affairs made of grass or leaves, or else of shells, pearls, metals, cloths or skins. They are all much more suited to attract attention than the reverse. In this respect they are like a veil, which both conceals and displays and thus serves, according to Storfer (69), as the ambivalent symbol both for chastity and immodesty. They may be classed along with the hat, the cloak and the hood as symbols suitable for representing either the penis or its covering skin or foreskin.¹

The *uluris* of the Bakairi women, mentioned above, is worn with the definite intention of furthering the illusion that a penis is hidden between the legs; all the more because the hair of the mons veneris is carefully removed. That the apron may be used in other instances for purposes of concealment permits of the same symbolic interpretation applied in the analytic case.

¹ For the use of the foreskin as a female symbol (Ferenczi, Groddeck), see Groddeck, *Psa. Bewegung* III, 169.

The bisexual possibilities in this symbolism and its connection, in individual cases, with the idea of a concealed female penis, was illustrated very nicely in a dream brought to me by a patient, a girl, whose hippopotamus phobia was reported in my article, *Ueber eine Komponente der frühkindlichen Todesangst* (Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI, 246. 1930.) About the age of four she dreamed that her father was sitting in front of his desk dressed in his underdrawers, with a black spot on the drawers. The first interpretation of the spot, that it was due to menstrual blood, which corresponded to ideas arising from her castration complex, served only as an approach to the total interpretation. After much elaboration of material, the analysand herself suggested a solution which surprised me. The black color of the "spot" was identical with that of a horse's "bag", so-called, that is, the fold of skin homologous to the human prepuce, from which as a child she had seen appear a big organ, whenever a horse, in her experience usually a gelding, prepared to urinate. It became clear that the black spot represented the hair over her mother's genitalia, and that she had been familiar with the appearance of this region even as a little girl and had constructed a theory that the hair concealed a penis.

At this point we may begin the application of our findings to the topic of civilized women's clothing, which is still so problematic. Concerning the apron, which has become a characteristically feminine garment with a charm peculiarly feminine (46, 420), we luckily have access to an excellent study by Ljuba Daničič (5). This author tells us that among the Southern Slavs the apron is thought to possess quite unusual erotic power. Girls and women consciously attempt to make use of this power in games in which they make love to their beautiful aprons. She also describes incidentally a case of outspoken apron fetishism. Daničič, one of whose charms is the appealing frankness with which she recounts her own childhood fantasies, has also studied the rôle of the shirt in the love life of the Southern Slavs (6). These peoples believe very strongly in the occult magical effects attributed to the shirt. There is little doubt that these effects depend on the symbolic transference of qualities peculiar to the female skin, such as color, smoothness, etc., and that it is rooted in unconscious sexual symbolism. (See also 46, 190.) It can hardly be accidental that linguistic usage, especially of the present day, tends to identify clothes and body surface; and that primitively "clothes are simply a duplicate of the natural surface." (56, 182 ff.)

2

At this point I should have been forced to content myself with the interesting corroboration of my theories by ethnological data, and should have proceeded in my study of narcissism in women¹ by demonstrating the overdetermination derived from prepuce symbolism. As I stated above, my own case, otherwise so interesting and instructive, did not furnish me with empirical material for deductions concerning deeper, that is to say, pregenital determinants. For such material we

¹ Hárnik, E. J.: *Schicksale des Narzissmus bei Mann u. Frau*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. IX, 1923. (Trans. Int. J. Ps-A., V, 1924.)

Hárnik, E. J.: *Die ökonomischen Beziehungen zwischen dem Schuldgefühl u. dem weiblichen Narzissmus*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XIV, 1928.

must turn to the psychology of women. It is natural to expect that only a deep analytic exploration of the development of narcissism in women would bring out the problems as to the need for decoration which were still hidden from us, and indicate from what quarter we may hope for their solution.

Here, fortunately, we are in position to use the recent contribution of the American psychoanalyst, B. D. Lewin. His paper (40, 42 ff.), which attests a notable freshness of observation and independence of thinking, has the advantage of being based predominantly on female cases, and it elaborates on certain important points in my publications. For the purpose of systematic presentation, I give a free summary (which will not replace first hand knowledge of this interesting paper), of the conclusions reached by Lewin.

The need to ornament the body surface or skin, by whatever means—to make it “lovely” and “beautiful”—is a constant correlate of a more or less autochthonous narcissistic self-esteem. As such it represents a sublimation of anal impulses, more particularly the impulse to smear the skin with faeces or other excreta. These impulses tend to be regressively reactivated at those important developmental periods which characteristically begin with an increase in repression; this is the case at the passing of the œdipus complex, and at puberty with the onset of menstruation. These repression processes all confront the ego with the task of renouncing the gratification of wishes or instincts desired by the id; and the defense mechanism formed for this purpose brings about a regression to pregenital tendencies and then an erotization of the skin. Faecal smearing had a similar meaning—to compensate for losses, more especially to compensate for the loss of anal values at defæcation. In this way the impulse to smear is suited, as a “prototype of narcissistic compensation,” to compensate for the deprivation of objects, or other libidinal satisfactions—œdipus wishes, wishes to incorporate, wishes for a penis. However, because of repression, it can not come to expression in an unmodified form, and therefore it is expressed in sub-

limited form as a need for decoration, either directly of the skin, as for example in cosmetics, or indirectly in clothes and ornaments. Direct ornamentation of the skin is institutionalized among primitive races in the customs of scar tattooing, painting of the skin, or true tattooing where pigment is rubbed into a prepared pattern on the skin. These two latter methods may be equated with those employed by civilized women in their cosmetic practices; they are narcissistic compensations.¹

"It is moreover clear that the idea of bodily beauty and the idea of cleanliness are not subject to sharp distinction. Wearing a nice starched dress enhances beauty and cleanliness at one and the same time [in one of Lewin's cases], and must derive some of its evaluation from the reaction formation against being anally dirty." (*l. c.* 56.) This is not so new, for the idea has often been touched upon by Freud and others, and for the time being does not appear a suitable beginning for further progress, which must be guided by the thought that beauty is a problem in itself, and that its solution, as Freud sharply emphasizes (*l. c.* 35 f.), is still to be discovered; and we might add, is to be sought in paths still untrodden. "Only its origin in the field of sexual feeling seems assured," says Freud, "It would be a model example of an aim-inhibited impulse." The idea of sublimation, therefore, which Lewin emphasizes, can be accepted as valid until psychoanalysis differentiates

¹As a corollary of his findings, the author suggests that certain mourning customs, such as rubbing ashes on the skin, might be interpreted as an attempt to introject the lost object cutaneously, analogous to the cannibalistic (necrophagic, coprophagic) process. For my part, I should hesitate to speak of a "cutaneous introjection", for the process in question deserves some other special designation, "adjection", perhaps, or something similar. Fenichel, however, in a recent paper (*Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVII, 249. 1931*), which reports new findings in the analysis of his transvestite case, agrees with Lewin in this point, and generally in all important points. I might add here that the material in my case, so far as it showed pregenital (anal) determination, was quite consistent with this author's views also. Thus, conflicts in the field of the castration complex were expressed in terms of finance by the principle "who could skin the other fellow best". The coprophilic stimulation arising from the animal odors in his mother's shop are also relevant to this point.

more sharply between sublimation and aim-inhibited impulse.¹

Prior to Lewin, Von Sydow had recognized in tatooing a sublimation of cutaneous eroticism. Lewin was acquainted with this fact, but it would be well to show by a quotation how Von Sydow attempts to analyze the function of the sublimation, and how he furnishes us with an æsthetic-analytic superstructure to Lewin's ontogenetic foundation.

"The designs of the paintings on the skin surface have, so to speak, a certain independence of their own so far as their form is concerned, although they do take into account the curvature of the body. *They cover the body with a veil.*² But as the material of the veil consists of the superficial part of the cutaneous organ, of the skin, the paradox arises that the cover is at the same time an exposure: the skin surface reappears at an æsthetic sublimated stage, in that it is first destroyed and then renewed at a superior stage.

"We could possibly speak of a desexualization of the cutaneous surface, for it is striking that the natives rarely find the tatooed skin sexually attractive. The few bits of information which we have on this point refer not to the æsthetically superior pigmentary tatooing but to scar tatooing. We might in passing suggest a hypothesis that scar tatooing, the technique of which makes such a barbaric impression, is the earlier, more sexual stage of tatooing, which was followed subsequently by

¹In an article which appeared while the present paper was being written, Winterstein (*Das Erlebnis der Schönheit und das künstlerische Ichideal*. Psa. Bewegung III, 112 ff. 1931.), following Sachs, takes his departure from the demands for sublimation which emanate from the super-ego, and which are complied with in the formal beauty of artistic production. The creative activity responsible for the product depends essentially on the sublimation of anal and sadistic impulses—a point on which all writers on this topic are in agreement—grouped about a desire to give birth. The fulfilment of this wish assists in satisfying desires arising from the œdipus complex as well as the corresponding demands of the super-ego. Important as they are, these theories displace the center of interest from beauty of form to the process of artistic creation, and do not give an explanation of the "nature and origin of beauty" (14, 35).

²Italics mine (E. J. H.), because of the importance of this sentence in later discussion.

the æsthetically superior color method. However one may choose to interpret the facts, it is in every instance true that the original sexual character of the skin is repressed by the painting of the body, and replaced by the secondary artistic productions." (74, 150 f.)

These quotations give Von Sydow's cautious, but we might say, conclusive formulations from his analysis of the æsthetically most important variety of what he happily terms "body art." At any rate, this author, in another part of the same work (*l. c.* 125) shows a tendency to assume (even though only aphoristically) that, "one will have to find the origin of the delineative arts in the erotogenic zone of the bodily coverings." Here again I should like to repeat my proposal to omit any consideration of the problems involved in the creative artist, or in the origin of art in general; although we gladly accept Von Sydow's happily applied term "body art," we can not as yet foresee how a sharp differentiation between body art and art of other types can be carried through.

3

Let us return to Lewin's empirically substantiated point of view of narcissistic compensation for a loss through beautification of the body by means of clothing, ornaments, and body art. So far as the first of these alterations in the natural appearance of the body is concerned, that is, clothing, it is clear that it serves an entirely rational purpose by protecting the body against cold, etc., and does replace a loss—the loss of the natural protective clothing of the body. Our prehistoric ancestors had natural clothing in the form of more abundant body hair, which in the course of time disappeared. "During the interglacial periods, the greater abundance of body hair may have sufficed to protect man against the cold, but with the gradual loss of this hair and in the colder glacial periods, he could not manage without clothing." (34, 36.) To cite an authority in the field of somatic anthropology:

"There is no doubt that the scantiness of bodily hair in

human beings is a secondary state, and that man is descended from forms with abundant hair. As evidence of this, we might cite the presence of *lanugo*,¹ the occasional occurrence of excessive hairiness (*hypertrichosis lanuginosa*),² the development of a secondary coat,³ and perhaps also the terminal hair." (47, 501.) This statement is entirely in accordance with the biogenetic law, and with theories of evolution in general. Darwin himself had attempted to discover the reason for the disappearance of hair, and formulated it as a progressive atrophy, brought about by the æsthetic feelings, and based on sexual selection. He explained the terminal hair distribution in a similar way. Yet, the situation is not simple, and contrary views and other opinions are possible, as may be seen in the following quotation:

"The disappearance of hair is typical and peculiar to man, and distinguishes him from the other primates."⁴ Yet we see that animals which are domesticated also tend to lose their hair, so that domestication also exerts an influence in this

¹ *Lanugo* is the primary coat of hair which covers the embryo. After its gradual disappearance the so-called secondary coat appears (infantile hairs). (E. J. H.)

² So-called "dog-faced men". See illustration in Martin (*l.c.*) "*Hypertrichosis lanuginosa* is generally regarded as a throwback to an earlier state of hairiness, the original state of man. (Wiedersheim)" (47, 502) (E. J. H.)

³ For purposes of reference, I give the account of later hair development according to the article in Marcuse's "*Handwörterbuch*": "In man, as in animals, hairs develop all over the body surface. In most areas, however, they are small and colorless, so that ordinarily they are not visible on cursory examination, and the areas seem to be free of hair and bare. These small downy hairs form the so-called infantile coat, to which are added at puberty (besides the hair of the head already present), the permanent or terminal coat of hair: at first in the axillae and in the pubic region in women, and in men on the lips, chin, and cheeks as well. Besides these regions, in the male, there is a thick growth of permanent hair on the chest, the abdomen, the buttocks, the neck, and the extremities, whereas in women the infantile hair covering, generally speaking, persists." (46, 186) (E. J. H.)

⁴ A sign of the lack of agreement and uncertainty in this field—one may find in Martin: "It has been stated that in anthropoid forms the process of hair atrophy has begun (*sic*) in certain areas of the body. See fig. 183, p. 480." (*l.c.*, 501) The figure shows a young chimpanzee with hairless facial areas, and bare paws. (E. J. H.)

direction.¹ Schiefferdecker (*Ueber die Haarlosigkeit der Menschen*. Anat. Anzeiger, Vol. 53, 1920) properly contends that the disappearance of hair is not determined by sexual selection, for hairlessness was unknown to the earliest primitive man. The first man with scanty hair must have been a mutant, produced before his fellow men could have developed any desire to be hairless. (32, 97.)

The same author, in connection with histological work on the organization of the organs of the skin, furnishes us with an extremely lucid exposition, which he calls a "consideration" (*eine Betrachtung*), that may help us to attain clarity in this somewhat confusing field. He argues: "Man was able to become hairless because his body had developed sufficiently to produce adequate warmth, and to employ this warmth in resisting the variable conditions of temperature in the environment, naturally only within certain limits." (62, 387.) "Hairless man must surely have developed originally in a warm climate and from a hairy ancestor; but later, in spite of the absence of hair he was able to migrate into colder regions. . . ." ". . . Clothing originally was not necessary. Naked man, originating in a warm climate, migrated naked to colder regions, and lived there naked for many thousands of years." "At any rate, his hairlessness did not arise because man began to wear clothes; instead, man was first hairless, and was able to live in this state. He began to use clothing first for decoration, later for various other purposes, and then more or less lost his capacity for living as a hairless being without clothes." (*l. c.* 385.) As to the cause of this development, the author merely states: "Whatever may have been the source of this bodily development, we can only say that we are in ignorance. . . ." (*l. c.* 387.) And I am not able to decide whether his cautious indication suffices to quell our surprise that nowhere in this

¹ The extensive and general influence of domestication on human racial characteristics is upheld among others (e.g., Fischer with reservations, however) by H. W. Siemens in Marcuse's *Wörterbuch* (46, 61). See literature referred to there and in 36a, 3 (83).

connection does he mention the well-established changes in temperature and climate during the history of our planet, the alternation of warm and glacial periods, and the concomitant alterations in the animal and plant world (68, 6 f.; 77, 6 f.).

For the sake of completeness I should like to discuss the genesis of the permanent hair coat. The point of most importance is the dependence of this hair, a secondary sexual character, or rather its growth, on metabolic products of internal secretion, as Friedenthal (21), a pioneer in this field, has long held to be true for the hair of the head and beard. To be sure, this does not invalidate teleological evolutionary theories, either in respect to the origin of hairlessness, such as Darwin's, for example, or of the functional rôle of the secondary coat. Friedenthal's contribution well attests this fact by approaching the problem from many different angles.

The psychoanalyst will be most interested in his discussion of the pubic hair. According to Friedenthal, its origin is related to the peculiarly human sense of modesty. It is adapted to conceal and cover the genitalia, and arose as the result of nervous stimuli and vascular reactions, the latter being the result of sexual excitement and its psychic elaboration, suppression, shame, etc. Furthermore he attributes the terminal hair covering of the face, beard, etc., to the same type of sensations, referring to the changes in the blood vessels during blushing. (See *l. c.* Pt. II, 18 f. and 34 ff.). We shall not attempt to follow the discussion which has arisen in regard to these theories (see 47, 504; 46, 186), but the psychic significance of the permanent hair will occupy more of our attention. It must be noted, however, that there is a certain unanimity in biological thought concerning the importance of permanent hair for sexual stimulation. In harmony with their development at puberty, the hairs are said to convey olfactory impressions, like a fine perfumed brush. (46, 187; 62, 387.) The rest, as we have stated, is still the subject of indecisive contention.

The appearance of the hirsute ancestor of modern man is

also an unsettled problem. Attempts to picture him are now regarded as scientifically unjustifiable. Birkner (1, 277) reproduces a reconstruction of the whole body of a Neanderthal man by the Parisian artist, Kupka, with the remark: "At any rate, the coat of hair which he gives to this diluvial human being is pure fantasy." Boule ironically refuses to portray the Neanderthal man, until recently the most primitive human form known to us, whose age has been estimated at 100,000 years, "with skin and hair" (2, 229). Instead he gives us a plastic reconstruction of *Homo Neanderthalensis* (or *primigenius*) with the muscles of the face and neck exposed, as these might be "restored" in accord with the configuration of the bony structures. Von Eickstedt, who calls the Neanderthal men "a withered side-branch in human evolution" (8, 55), and considers it impossible that they should be direct ancestors of modern man, goes a bit further in giving us interesting and striking pictures of models of this race. He cautiously indicates the hairline on the head by a light line, and dispenses, as he says, "with any indication of the beard, for this would have covered up too many characteristics of the facial profile." From his description we are led to assume that the Neanderthal man no longer possessed an animal-like coat of hair. The following quotation gives us the same impression: "Since the Neanderthal man was doubtless thrown out of a subtropical climate into the unreality of glacial Europe, we might assume that he had deeper pigmentation, and thus exclude a resemblance to that peculiar domesticated variant, the Nordic European, with his scanty pigmentation, that is to say, 'brownish skin, black hair'." (2, 284.)

Schiefferdecker has a not dissimilar idea: "that the extinct races of man, such as the Heidelberg and Neanderthal men, perhaps even *Pithecanthropus*, were already more or less devoid of hair." Furthermore, "that Neanderthal man was not so hirsute, may be deduced from the fact that he used ochre

to paint his body,¹ which he would not have done if he had been covered with thick hair." (62, 393.) It is, therefore, very surprising to find Martin stating: "Very few definite facts are known as to the distribution, form, and color of [the original hairy covering of man], but it may be remarked that in the oldest Eburnée ivory figures, there is portrayed a definite hairy covering of the body. (Piette)" (47, 502.) Piette is the discoverer of the famous remains at Brasse-Empouy, which are frequently classed, along with other later remains, as belonging to a *glyptic period* of the glacial age. Since the objects in question belong in any case to late palæolithic times, which period produced all the other famous glacial art, and in which the human representatives were highly developed, and because of climatic changes surrounded by animal forms showing appropriate adaptive alterations, one must take the statement quoted above as a slip on the part of this master of anthropological science, all the more because a careful inspection of a reproduction of the female figure referred to does not arouse an impression of "definite bodily hairiness."

Nevertheless an eminent prehistorian, Obermaier, describes the same figure in a manner which does not exclude at least the possibility of this interpretation: "an object made of ivory, which shows a fine line of streaks on the breast (hair or tatooing?) . . ." (50, 227. Table 14.) It would assist our argument if we assumed that the lines, as suggested, represented tatooing, which would be phylogenetically more probable. I am indebted to Dr. von Jenny, of the Department of Pre-

¹To be sure this argument is not absolutely convincing. For, leaving all else aside, the first abundant pigment find which can be ascribed to the Troglodytes, according to the best authorities, is Aurignacian. (7, Art. "Ockerfarben"; 50, 226; 65, 21.) Nevertheless, and in this field one becomes accustomed to such contradictory evidence, there are records of other finds in the Mousterian period (at La Chapelle aux Saints, according to Boule and others), for which references I am indebted to the kindness of Dr. Doppelfeld of the Berlin Museum of Ethnology. (See 7, Art. "Rötel" [red chalk].) The general impression gained from reading is that Schiefferdecker's evolutionary theory is correct and useful.

historic Science, in the Berlin Ethnological Museum, for the opinion that the line in question undoubtedly indicates the top of a girdle. Stratz similarly says of this same figure, "above the navel there is a linear ornamentation, which may be intended to portray a girdle, or perhaps tatooing." (72, 47.) If this line does not simply represent the mark left by a girdle which had been removed by the girl model (see figure with a girdle in Obermaier, *l. c.*, plate 14; other figures in 36, 314), then the alternative interpretation must be that the line is a tatoo mark or painted. We find similar lines in present day primitive peoples, not only in the cruder form of scar-tatooing, but also in specialized tatooing of the pubes, to be discussed later. But more to the point, there are numerous prehistoric parallels in figures from the late neolithic period in Egypt: female figures of clay with painting or tatooing on the abdomen and pubes. Hambly reproduces illustrations of such figures from Flinders Petrie's *Prehistoric Egypt*, and estimates their time of production as 4000 to 3000 B. C. (31, 108, 319 ff. See also 61, 60, plate 10.) It is moreover generally assumed that glacial man decorated his body (50, 226; 1, 74; 34, 37), and the well-known discovery of large quantities of coloring matter (earths) attests to the soundness of this assumption.

I should therefore, if it is allowable, regard the alternative "hair or tatooing" in this case not so much as an alternative but rather as an equation arising in the unconscious, and recommend it as a psychoanalytically correct interpretation. Tatooing and related bodily decoration is for the purpose of replacing the body hair lost by the human race; but not for the same reason as ordinary protective clothing,—rather as part of the mechanism described by Lewin. Before going on to the corollaries of this assumption, I must refer to the interesting fact that tatooing is in practice performed on areas normally supplied with hair; I especially refer to the genital tatooing of women in the South Sea Islands, illustrated in Ploss-Bartels (51, 414), an ethnological parallel to the clinically well-established genital symbolism of decoration. The

genital hairs are first carefully removed, and the genitalia then ornamented with colored designs. This genital decoration frequently is an emblem of sexual maturity; various magical explanations of it are given (Preuss, *cit.* in 3, 148); undoubtedly its function is to increase the sexual charm by æsthetic means. Our opinion, held for want of more authentic sources, that an object originally considered ugly is turned into something more beautiful, reminds us of our own negative æsthetic attitude to the sexual organs, which Freud has often noted. He has recently stated: "It is noteworthy that the genitalia themselves, which are sexually exciting to look upon, are hardly ever considered beautiful, although, contrarily, the quality of beauty seems to be resident in certain secondary sexual characteristics." The truth of the first half of this statement is contested by several authors, for example, by Wittels, who thinks that Freud "covers 'the shameful parts' with an æsthetic fig leaf" (80, 465), and he makes other remarks in the same vein. But he seems to forget, for example, that throughout its long history, art has considered the pudenda "an eye-sore"; and that for centuries, pubic hair, especially in the female, has been excepted from artistic representations of the nude form.¹ Should we therefore develop another, let us hope, more natural æsthetical appreciation of the external genitalia, we should have to accept all the more the fact that the perception of beauty here depends on the overcoming of very ambivalent feelings, whether they were mobilized by anxiety or clouded by repulsion. Or again, and both formulations may come to the same thing, this progress might essentially mean that we had become "perverse"; i. e., attained an attitude which seems natural to the perverse. I once observed

¹ Parenthetically, I refer here to the wide-spread practice of removing pubic and axillary hair. Ploss-Bartels (*l.c.*) devotes an entire chapter to this many-sided phenomenon. Hoernes explains it as an "imitation of the infantile state" (36a, 8 (86)). I should also venture the opinion that shame (14, 62) in sexual matters may originally have appeared with the growth of the terminal coat of hair on the previously hairless epidermis, because it was perceived as a kind of "organic return of the repressed" (See below).

an unbounded *Schwärmerei* for the beauty of the female sexual organs in a genital hair fetishist, whose interest at times was completely absorbed by the conformation of the female pubic hair, samples of which he would procure for his private enjoyment.

I should like to devote more space to this case, from the nosological standpoint again, for it was of the type which after a great increment of repression, developed not a perversion but a neurosis (compulsion neurosis), but pursuant to my theme, I wish to compare it with a case analyzed by Lorand, reported in the article already referred to (42, 94). Lorand's patient was also a pubic hair fetishist, who was able to sublimate his fetishistic tendencies to a certain extent in his occupation of furrier. He furnished the analyst with a hitherto unrecognized determinant of the coat symbol: The coat, especially a fur coat, represented male body hair, and thus indirectly the penis (43). To refer back to our previous discussion of the coat symbol, we see without difficulty that in the unconscious, body hair and skin covering are equivalent, just as linguistic usage employs "hide" and "skin" synonymously. By a small step we come to the idea that in the replacement of the original hairy covering by more or less artificial equivalent "coverings," rational and irrational motives played a rôle either alternately or concomitantly.¹ As to the painting of the body, which is to be found in many forms

¹ It may be interesting here to relate an Arabic-Jewish traditional biblical myth. "And when they had eaten of the tree, their hair fell off, and they stood naked." (*Die Sagen der Juden*. Frankfurt, 1913. Vol. I, p. 343). And in the same work (p. 95) "What garment did Adam have? A hard skin covered his body, and a cloud of the Lord always enveloped him. But when he ate of the fruit of the tree, the skin was taken from him and the cloud of the Lord, and he saw that he was naked and bare. And he hid his countenance from the Lord." (*Cit.* 53, 187.)

Compare with this the Old Testament text: "And the eyes of both of them were opened, and they knew that they were naked; and they sewed fig leaves together, and made themselves aprons." (Gen. 3, 7) And: ". . . Unto Adam and to his wife did the Lord God make coats of skins, and clothe them." (Gen. 3, 21.) (*Cit.* from 59, 17.)

among many different peoples, there is general agreement that it is supposed to safeguard the skin against harmful influences (30, 60; 33, 92; 4, 27), and perhaps was originally intended for this purpose, as a kind of "protective clothing," while its magical, mystical, and social significance as ornamentation was a gradual development (33, 96) which led to the great variety to be found in the practice. In this way, the old argument as to whether "tattooing replaces clothing" or not (51, I, 415) settles itself. "Here clothing and decoration are the same" (4, I, 27), hits the nail on the head; it is decorative clothing, which ultimately serves to replace the lost hairy coat.¹ We find here a solution to Von Sydow's subtle paradox concerning tattooing—that it supplies the body with an organic veil, yet leaves it uncovered.² With its numerous patterns, described with great completeness by Von den Steinen (*l. c.*), it forms a sensual and æsthetic analogue to the various ritual garbs, such as dance masks, etc., which are developed more on a spiritual or demonistic (totemistic) basis, and which—leaving aside cases of plant or tree identifications as probably secondary—usually serve for ritual identification with the furry or feathered form of an animal. (See 54, 128; 58, 83 f.; 74, 90 ff., with illustrations of tattooing and dance masks. The latter have been found in late diluvial remains; see 34, 38; 25, 142; 39, 464.) But the same intention to imitate the appearance of animals, in its profane and free manifestation, is the most general and best developed basis for all the rest of "body art," and of the need

¹ My theorem and Lewin's explanation coincide in the point that in the unconscious, hair and fæces, as dejecta of the body, form the members of a symbolic equation. (See 38, 80) It is also pleasing to find that, in principle, J. Warburton Brown (*Psycho-analysis and Design in the Plastic Arts*. Int. J. Ps-A., X, 1.) has the same idea. He interprets the ornamentation in tattooing as containing an "undoing" of castration.

² K.v.d. Steinen, one of the main supporters of the view that tattooing is a "sexual ornamentation of purely æsthetic character" (67, 47), holds that the self-decorative intention of civilized women is to apply ever *new* ornamentation to their body, whereas in contrast, the primitive through tattooing establishes a *permanent* decoration for his body—an idea which might well lead to interesting conclusions.

for decoration in general. From my review of ethnological data, I am unable to arrive at any other theory, and I can find nothing seriously refuting it. Let us consider, for example, the frequently mentioned lip ornaments used by the Botocudos of eastern Brazil, which are also found among certain African peoples ("lip negresses"); ornaments found, therefore, in regions remote from each other. (See 33, I, 6 f., with illustrations.) Many of the older reports state that the Botocudos, or Tapuyas, are the "ugliest people in Brazil," and that it might well be doubted "whether these heads belong to human beings" (75, 25 ff.). Here I should maintain that the possessors of these heads *wished* them to resemble animals. We shall pursue this train of thought further, but first we must consider another common decorative article of clothing.

In eastern Brazil, "the Kayapos and Bororos are specially noted for the rich elaboration of their feather ornamentation. The Kayapos own feather bands, which they tie about the head, feather crowns and diadems for the back of the head, strips of feather worn on the neck, necklaces of shells, and beautiful bracelets made of the inner bark of trees on which are wound or sewed strings of cotton and colored strips of bark. Among the Baroros, the head is bedecked with a heavy wheel-like radiating dress of blue arara feathers, with a round diadem applied to the forehead, and with streamers of hawk feathers in back. Rows of strung monkey teeth stretch across the chest, and jaguar teeth tied in pairs; and a pair of armadillo teeth are placed vertically (111, 112)." (4, I, 288.)

This description readily permits an interpretation: we have an imitation of animals, or an identification with one or more animals. Indeed many ethnologists come to much this same conclusion. Thus R. Lasch in his introduction states that "whereas nature takes care of this matter among animals, man must use all his imagination, technical cleverness and artistic talent to make up for his natural lack of body decoration."

(4, I, 27.)¹ And with the naturalness of an investigator who knows primitive man at first hand, Bryk states: "Essentially the main idea in ornamentation of the body is to create by means of foreign, chiefly inorganic, substances applied to the human body the same æsthetic effect which natural somatic decoration gives to animals." (3a, 18). Róheim in *Australian Totemism* goes so far as to attribute certain ritual decorations directly to imitation of bodily characteristics of animals which appear during the rutting season.

I cannot see, therefore, how A. Heilborn, who, as we shall see, ordinarily shows great understanding of the natural multiple significance of phenomena of this type, can write: "It can not be true, that as Weule says, in his *Leitfaden der Völkerkunde* (1912), 'ornamentation of the body is fundamentally derived from the direct elaboration and alteration of animal models'." (33, I, 92.) According to Heilborn the source of the pleasure in ornamentation lies in the pride obtained through the possession of trophies of the chase; which does not conflict in principle with the above. He furthermore emphasizes that "among primitive peoples, men are almost always the ones to be ornamented" (*l. c.* 93), an important point also corroborated by Lasch (4, I, 28), which is very suggestive.

Our investigation of primitive costume, to give decoration and clothing a common name, so far as its secondary functions are concerned appears to leave us with the conclusion that it was intended rationally and æsthetically as a substitute for the coat of body hair that had been lost. To use a syllogistic device, we find, therefore, that the sense for beauty, which the impulse to decorate obviously tries to satisfy, must be derived from the phylogenetic disappearance of hair. In view of our knowledge of the significance of female narcissism, the difference in the hairiness of the two sexes, which surely must have dominated the development of the need for decoration

¹ Similarly from a psychological standpoint: 75A, 198; from the standpoint of magic: 52a, 378 ff.

in them even in prehistoric times,¹ must be of great importance. Heilborn discusses the differences in elaboration of decoration in the two sexes in an interesting way: "In general there were two directions in this development: one specifically male, traces of whose origin are easily seen, in which the objects of decoration emphasize the warrior qualities and are menacing or terrifying; and a second tendency to emphasize that which is particularly attractive about the body, or those traits in which an individual is especially favored, a tendency which might be called feminine, perhaps not only in contrast to the first. Sometimes, at least in superior cultures, both tendencies become vigorous; male decoration is softened by feminine elements, feminine decoration strengthened by masculine ones." (33, I, 93 f.)

We see, therefore, that our occupation with ornamentation, without distinguishing between the male and the female varieties has made us lose sight of an important trail. This trail, recognizable with difficulty, leads us back to prehistoric times and into the history of human evolution. If it is true that women of prehistoric days got along without decoration or rather with little decoration—for they seem to have made extensive use of paints—could it be because the female body was from the beginning the pattern and epitome of "beauty"? Today we still speak of the "fair sex."² Before taking up the origin of this impulse to decorate, I should like to cite Freud's most important formulation. "'Beauty' and 'charm,'" he writes (14, 36), "are originally attributes of the sexual object." Limiting our attention to the female sex we are in a position to commentate Freud's statement (*l. c.*) that "the quality of beauty seems to be connected with certain secondary sexual characteristics." We can say that *the female exterior as revealed after the disappearance of hair, with its specific*

¹ Data in 50, 226; 1, 73 f; 34, 37.

² "The first one to employ the concept, 'the fair sex', thought perhaps that he was being flattering, but he built better than he himself may have thought." Kant: *Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen*, Part III.

attributes, is the original, or uncomplicated, or, so to speak, autochthonous or standard *source of beauty*. As to male "beauty," as we have seen in regard to decoration, impressions of power and energy (potency) complicate the result.¹ Masculine beauty and ornamentation essentially follows the animal tradition; feminine beauty, on the other hand, means a radical breach with the animal and an emphasis on the intrinsic value of that which from an evolutionary standpoint is specifically human in the external appearance of the individual. Here I am completely opposed to Heilborn, who maintains that women were originally exhibited as evidence of material possession (*l. c.*). Rather, it seems to me, were they valued as ornaments, because of their ornamental and precious charm. I am forced here to appeal to the history of art.

Although the older palæolithic Europeans such as the Neanderthal men (e. g., *Homo Mousteriensis*) had long before honored the dead, as we must assume from their funeral customs,² a sense for the artistic seems to have made its first appearance among the Cro-Magnons, a branch of *Homo sapiens*, in the Aurignacian period of the later palæolithic age. Art "attains remarkable heights, with striking rapidity, in reliefs and models of nude female figures made of ivory." (63, I, 28.) There hardly exist any comparable male figures. "Woman stands at the beginning of art," says Woermann. (*Cit. in* 72, 46.) And, as the famous "Venus" of Willendorf, the statue from Brasse-Empouy, and other similar figures testify, there was among these peoples a quite definite, though possibly not exclusive, ideal of feminine beauty. "Even though we possess only fragments, they suffice to attest to the bodily beauty of the human beings of those times." (72, 48.) There took place then an evolution centuries in length; and as we must assume that centuries were needed for the process which caused the hair to disappear and the sense of beauty to arise as a result, during many more centuries in endless variety

¹ See 46, 186 "Magical Powers"; and 52a, 416 f.

² 63, I, 30 and 65, 20 f.

combinations of the "male" or "female" types of beauty—the two opposing, bisexual, ambivalent types—were brought forth, somewhat in the manner described by Heilborn for the development of ornamentation. On the one hand, it is believed that the criterion for all that is "ugly" is that which reminds us of the animal, for which the statement concerning the Boto-cudos serves as an example, or the impression made by the face of a clown, which looks as if it were a direct imitation of a monkey's. On the other hand, this persistent combination of elements of the two types of beauty particularly in the field of "body art" must reënforce our laboriously won conviction of the relativity and subjective nature of all beauty. This is so well recognized that a reference to Heilborn (33, I, 95) will be enough to confirm my statement. How is it, then, that one constantly finds attempts not only to set up standard rules for judging beauty,¹ but even to set up objective standards for human beauty? Siemens, for example, referred to above as a supporter of the theory of the influence of domestication, hopes to "arrive at an objective basis for an anthropological conception of beauty," if it can be proved "that no race, to the extent to which this is true of the Nordic race, has been so influenced in its immediate and voluntary selection by human standards of taste. . . . For it would be consistent to call that race which has been most modified by sexual selection, which has, so to speak, been most 'domesticated,' the most beautiful, because in its development and origin the factor most effectual in selection is the human sense of beauty." (Quoted with rearrangement after 46, 61). Since it is not our task to discuss the theory of sexual selection,² we shall merely add a somewhat analogous, more convincing formulation of C. H. Stratz: "Since deep pigmentation is a general characteristic of the lower races, blond hair may be considered as an advantage,

¹ Although this particular tendency is pretty much a thing of the past. See critique of "the golden pattern" in 41, 240.

² For a critique of sexual selection, see 39b, 7; for a critique of domestication, see 74b, 469.

especially in women. . . ." (70, 203.) But those who have followed my train of thought may doubtless decide for themselves that the scanty pigmentation characteristic of northern Europeans can hardly represent anything else than the progress of the same process which led to the disappearance of hair, though, in a sense, in a rather extreme form. We recall that we used the term "atrophic mutation" to designate this process.¹ Since a sense of beauty is a constant attribute in some degree of *Homo sapiens*, we can speak only in these terms of an objective development of beauty. Freud also has referred to a "development of human beauty" in which "the genitalia did not partake." (*Cit. Wittels*, 80, 465.) This objective and general progress to beauty is the development of hairlessness of the body. It is determined by this process and coincides with this part of the phylogenetic origin of man. My suggestion is accordingly almost the opposite of Darwin's hypothesis which held that hairlessness resulted from the more manifest sense of beauty.

Finally we are able to understand why writers on æsthetic theory, indefatigably tracing the multifarious conditions for the perception of the beautiful, come to a halt before the final riddle of the nature of beauty. Even Th. Lipps, who knew quite well that "man is the source and the ultimate content of all the more highly specialized visible beauty of form" (41, 239), had in the end to be content to assume a transferability

¹"The fair skin of the Nordic race is unique, and unknown in any other race." (10a, 210.) Recently Von Lebzelter has explained the "gradual depigmentation of the Eurafrian races (Mediterranean through Nordic) on the principle of the "geographic chain of forms [of Sarasin]." He believes "the geographic environment in general, the alimentation, the social milieu, all coöperate in altering the form of the widely distributed human race". The susceptibility to environmental influence, he thinks, must be regarded as specific to a race or a species and that this depends on the lability of the endocrine organs. "The characteristic is only fixed by civilization (domestication)." (39a, 782 f.) To gauge the time necessary for such a change, cf. "Blond is the normal complexion of the peoples of Central and Northern Europe, the latter especially; the peoples of this region were already blond in neolithic times, perhaps even before." Reche in 7, Art. "Hair".

of this experience to the rest of the living and inorganic world. Stimulated by these ideas, Selenka then studied the words used in regard to decorations, and differentiated them according to the degree and quality referring to the body (66). But the foundation which might have supported this proud æsthetic super-structure, was, in actuality, not there.¹ Yet we need not conceal that the infinitely expanding tendency of the "impulse to beauty" (Sachs, 60) is still very puzzling, and we may well feel that the beautiful and its attributes still hold many problems whose investigation can not be skimmed, and which we have hardly touched. These include all the paradoxical peculiarities of variability and relativity, autonomy and dependency, lability and stability, and the rest.

One problem at least is unavoidable: what are the mental processes whose combination produced the resultant, sense of beauty? And which known, or perhaps unknown, psychic

¹ Should my assumptions gain any sympathy or usefulness as a working hypothesis, I suspect that they must be put on an anatomic-physiologic basis. The beginning of a connection with an organic basis, may be found in a discussion by Schiefferdecker as to "what consequences the loss of the hair must have had for other organs." He says: "In view of the close correlative relations of the organs to each other, other organs must have surely been influenced by the imperfect development, or rather atrophy, of the hair formally present, of which the *Anlage* is still to be found in the embryo. Perhaps the development of the nervous system is somehow related to this phenomenon, to a certain extent at least, since both are ectodermal organs." But this savant cautions us, on grounds of scientific discipline, that "to speculate on this point has not at present much purpose." (62, 387) Further search in the literature discovered an equally competent handling of the same topic. F. Lenz, in an article entitled, *Der phylogenetische Haarverlust des Menschen* (Arch. f. Rassen- und Gesellschaftsbiologie, Vol. 12, 1917), presents similar biological arguments, and also goes on to say that hairlessness was extremely helpful in society formation, for it eliminated to a certain extent the body louse which transmits such epidemics as typhus and relapsing fever. Without attempting to assess the general validity of his theory, I should like to quote Lenz's principle, "The atrophy of the hairy coat is intimately bound up with the acquisition of those hereditary dispositions which make the human race human." (39b, 15 f.) Since he always considers biological determinants in connection with sociological and psychological ones, the statement made below (p. 44. Note) must be modified accordingly.

mechanisms might these be? I approach this problem reluctantly, for it can obviously be treated only by adding to one hypothesis still others, whether as confirmations or as supplementations. Yet I do so with the hope that my right to make reservations will be granted; as Freud has said in reference to the "primal horde" hypothesis, "It would be as stupid to attempt exactness with this material, as it would be futile to demand certainty." (15, 172).

We may best begin with a consideration of the neuroses, the subject of so much intensive study. Freud investigated the origin of these states essentially by tracing the dominant mechanisms back to their ultimate factors, somewhat as one might separate for study the various steps in a manufacturing process; the manufactured finished article corresponds to the neurotic symptom. Such steps in neurosis formation are represented by the different sources of anxiety, which represent precipitating factors. Freud believes it probable that each one of the neuroses, especially transference neuroses, has its specific source of anxiety—a specific danger situation—to which it can be traced or from which symptom formation begins. (16, 90 f.) The result of my analysis of "pleasure in disguise" is quite in harmony with this theory; this pleasure is related to a specific anxiety, a variant of castration anxiety; namely, fear for the safety of the foreskin. It may be anticipated that parallel specifically differential factors may be found in all the other neuroses and allied states. At this point I should like to call attention to an analogy between the phylogenetic loss of hair, and those situations in ontogeny which have to do with losses or threatened losses, situations which are recognized as the source of neurotic anxiety, particularly castration anxiety, or anxiety concerning the loss of a valued part. I refer to the *anal* and *oral* danger situations, which psychoanalysis regards as prototypes of the danger of castration. "Castration can be imagined, so to speak, because of the daily experience of parting with the *faeces* and because of the loss of the breast at weaning." (16, 71 f.) How similar in effect the danger of losing

the prepuce, circumcision, may be at a more advanced stage has been adequately discussed. (See, among others, 55, 204 f.) If we class these three danger situations together as ontogenetic prototypes of castration, we might comparably speak of the loss of hair as a phylogenetic prototype, and *sit venia verbo*, a kind of organic or hereditary content of castration anxiety.¹ In this last idea, we follow a suggestion derived from Freud's latest broader prehistorical hypothesis, applied by him to explain the inheritance of the erect posture, that of "organic repression." Psychic reaction formations are comparable to "organic repression," in that they too represent "defense against previous stages of development." (14, 62.) Accordingly the formulation is obvious that *beauty developed in place of, and as a reaction against, a previous primitive state of the human exterior.*

At another level, Freud tells us, this same process makes the gods of a certain historical period become the demons of the succeeding one. (See also 55, 161 ff.) And the same mechanism is utilized in his explanation of the "uncanny." "An event becomes 'uncanny,'" he writes, "if repressed infantile complexes are reactivated by it, or if it seems to substantiate a former primitive conviction." (17, 403.) I should be in agreement with anyone who might choose to find in this formulation an analogy to our views on beauty, especially in the second part; and there seem to be grounds for an impression that beauty and the uncanny are somehow related, or mutually effective. I should indeed be unable to refer to any other familiar idea to which the idea of "the beautiful" is

¹ I can best give an idea of the difficulties which inundate our thinking in questions of this type, including the one I am attacking, by expressly emphasizing how little appreciation we can possibly have, once we leave the ground of natural selection, as to whether the psyche has participated in bringing about events of a biological order, and if so, to what extent it has done so. This problem does not seem to have been envisaged by the anatomist Schiefferdecker, whose acuteness otherwise impresses me greatly. He is content to limit his explanation to the adaptational attainment, which to be sure is always of importance. We attempt in our formulations to remain true to our psychological standpoint, whatever may be its deficiencies or weakness.

comparable. I can on the other hand present certain statements—they are not explanations—which may substantiate the idea that the beautiful involves the uncanny. For example: "The sight of a beautiful nude woman lets me fantasy her skeleton." (Flaubert: *Correspondence*. Cit. 53, 204.) "Form and beauty are somehow related to death." (Thomas Mann. Cit. 79, 114.) And even the worthy champion of physical beauty, Stratz, appears to have similar sentiments: "The well-bred European is as ashamed of the nude body hidden beneath his clothes, as he is of the skeleton he carries about with him." (73, 3.)

I think that only general impressions are to be gained on this topic. But these impressions may permit us to make an assumption that the origin of beauty is somehow analogous to the origin of "the uncanny," although it must have been at a stage in human development in which so refined a sentiment as that of the uncanny could not have been extant, nor the psychic antecedents, which Freud demonstrates are necessary for the development of such a sentiment. In favor of this assumption we may adduce the fact that a sense of beauty arises quite early in individual development, indeed in infancy, whereas the "uncanny" belongs to the most complicated of aim-inhibited emotional impulses. On the other hand, these relationships can be more easily recognized when we turn our attention to the manner in which the need for the beautiful is extended to more and more new fields of interest. It is then apparent that the beautiful has psychological functions comparable to religious illusions, which, according to Freud, are reactions against the feeling of human weakness and impotence. (18, 52. Ges. Schr. XI, 441.) An excellent example of this process of expansion is the case of the Alps, which originally inspired fear and terror, but gradually became objects for lovers of nature.¹ Indeed the origin of the beauty gradually diverted into other fields may become completely obscured

¹ Innumerable analysts have dealt with this topic, M. J. Eisler among others. For a practically complete list, see Psa. Bewegung III, 96, 1931.

through æsthetic disguise; Selenka holds that the appreciation of natural beauty was fostered at the expense of a loss of interest in (male?) ornamentation. (66, 70.) My suggestion, expressed on a previous page, that each new acquisition in æsthetic pleasure involves the conquest of painful, or other ambivalent affects, is justifiable, if, as Freud (14, 35) tells us, "even the beauty of scientific inventions" may become the source of such a pleasure,—for at first, to learn truths may tend to call forth feelings of antagonism or repulsion.

Is it presumptuous of me to remark how well this process may be studied in Freud's works themselves? Indubitably much of their success lies in Freud's brilliant literary style. On this point, let us hear the testimony of an author, W. Muschg, who insures himself against a possible misinterpretation in a sentence which by his choice of metaphors he brings into contact with essentials in my thesis. "But," he writes, "I have no thought of stealing this author's [Freud's] linguistic clothing, to hang them beautifully racked in the clothes press of æsthetics: indeed my satisfaction lies in the impossibility of such a procedure." (49, 467.) In short Muschg contends for the indivisibility of form and content. According to Hoernes, primitive man felt much the same about his ornaments, for he believed that "his personal ornaments were part of his body, and of his soul as well." (35, 21.) If this formulation of the origin of the need for ornamentation, in which I concur unreservedly, is verifiable and consistent with all other findings, we should have to believe that mankind in building up this illusion of beauty was following a hint from nature, which had concealed and covered the pubis and analogous areas with hair, though perhaps only secondarily (*10a*, 168), but which at the same time had given the rest of the body that particular appearance which we regard as human. To return to Freud's explanation of the uncanny: if the growth of the terminal hair corresponds in a way to a "recurrence of the repressed"—a reactivation of an earlier state of "animality"—then the compensatory sense of beauty would represent a kind

of "primitive conviction," the intrapsychic perception of the power of the Eros instinct, of love, which on the plane of "supraorganic evolution" (Róheim, 56, 394) unites man and woman, then man and the animal world, and finally more universally man and nature.

We are less dependent on pure speculation when we attempt to discuss the qualities of instinct which characterize the end product. Freud has characterized beauty, as well as the analogous "uncanny" as among "those aim-inhibited softened emotional impulses, dependent on so many accompanying constellations, which are mostly material for æsthetics"; (17, 369) the instincts involved, then, are inhibited as to aim. Indeed, Freud considers them "a model example of an aim-inhibited impulse."

If I understand Freud correctly, he regards the domestication of fire, as he outlines it in his much discussed hypothesis (14, 47 f.), as a model example of a sublimation: according to his formulation, in sublimation the aim and object of an instinct are changed so that the originally sexual instinct finds gratification no longer in a sexual activity, but in nonsexual, ethically or socially higher attainment. (19, 221.) Sexual impulses inhibited in aim, on the other hand, are a "class of instinctual strivings, which need not yet be called sublimated, though they may be very nearly of the same order. They still keep their sexual aim, but are prevented from its attainment through inner resistances, and are content with certain approximations to gratification." (l. c. 222.) Beauty can be differentiated from sublimation by the circumstance that beauty in the first instance is gratified by an internal alteration, *autoplastically*, whereas a sublimation would rather strive to bring about an alteration in the environment, an *alloplastic* effort. Concerning beauty as a possible source of gratification, Freud says: "The enjoyment of beauty has a special, mildly intoxicating, sensual quality." (14, 35.) This would lead us to metapsychological, particularly economic, problems; but I shall proceed with my consideration of the problems involving the

chief instinctual sources, whose derivatives fundamentally supply this experience.

The most primitive form of æsthetic feeling may have arisen when man, whether through internal or external inhibitions, renounced the immediate sexual enjoyment of an object (a woman), and instead was temporarily content to experience the pleasure otherwise caused by the object. The object of the suspended intention might be utilized directly in three ways, corresponding to the three prototypes of castration anxiety referred to above: (1) sexually, that is, genitally, of which there is no more to say; (2) anal sadistically, if, for example, the woman was forced to work or exploited in some other way useful to the man—a directly opposite attitude, let us say, to that which produces a luxurious harem; (3) orally or cannibalistically, actual eating, which could only take place at a very primitive stage of society.¹ The renunciation of an attempt to gratify these three libidinal urges invariably leads to an increment of the pleasure taken in the beautiful. In individual development, it may be recalled, the dynamics of this process—the activation of smearing impulses which lead to ornamentation of the body by unutilizable oral, anal, and genital (phallic) energies—was demonstrated by Lewin's work.

In conclusion, we shall attempt to indicate what future work will support my contentions and test the whole hypothesis. Lewin's results will need testing and supplementation from the standpoint of the new hypothesis, and the new hypothesis will need ontogenetic confrontation with the œdipus complex; and, so far as I can ascertain from casual discussion and from my own observations, will receive it. The objects most suitable for this study are still women who are markedly narcissistic, "beauty narcissists," and particularly those persons who belong to the "æsthetic group" of human beings. I set high hopes also on the coöperation of those learned in the

¹ But in prehistoric times, the existence of true cannibalism is well established. (76, 708; 63, I, 16; 15, 171.)

psychology of primitive races. This investigation must take into account what is known concerning the artistic development of prehistoric man,¹ and use it for purposes of comparison; it must utilize what the books of Preuss (52), Thurnwald (74a), and many others have to tell us about the psychology of savages and primitive peoples; and as a control and for revision, as a matter of course, the numerous interesting contributions by analytic authors, which have appeared since the publication of *Totem and Taboo*. In view of the deeper layers of biological psychological material which enters here, the impression must arise best expressed by the statement of Freud, which antedated and we may suppose foreshadowed his hypothesis as to the origin of the use of fire. "Possibly," he writes, "there are in these reactions and connections, a precipitate from the cultural history of mankind which penetrates deeper than anything preserved in myth and folklore." (20, 536.) I prefer to be less skeptical on this score. I believe that the analysis of myths in particular will throw light on the relationships between the origins of a sense of beauty and the earliest history of the œdipus complex, including its prehistoric development, as conceived by Freud in *Totem and Taboo*. For, Aphrodite, so preëminent in the Greek theogony, and her homologues, the great mother goddesses of the ancient East, were goddesses of love and personifications of beauty.

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¹For example in Hoernes (34), and Kühn (39).

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SOME CLINICAL DATA ON IDEAS OF REFERENCE *

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The patient, an unmarried woman of thirty-three, became ill following the death of her father, which occurred three years before her treatment began. She had helped manage her father's business, and on his death, with the help of her stepmother, she took over the trusteeship of the estate. This proved a heavy task, and the patient suggested that one of her father's friends, a bank treasurer, also be made a trustee. The choice proved unwise, for, some time after this, the man absconded with money belonging to the estate. This worried the patient, who felt guilty, as she considered that she was to blame for his appointment. It was during this period that she became seclusive and complained of being tired and languid. Her stepmother noticed that the patient's attitude towards her too had changed; the patient was no longer as cordial and friendly as she had been hitherto. Suspecting that something was wrong, the stepmother advised her to consult a physician.

When the physician examined her, misinterpreting something he asked her about her menses, the patient thought he was implying that she was pregnant. She thought that this pregnancy was the result of masturbation. She then spent some months in a sanitarium, where she expressed suspicions concerning different persons. She felt that she had committed a great wrong, that she was being hypnotized, and that her food was "doped." On one occasion, during a menstrual period, she accidentally touched a man's hand and immediately felt as if a penis was in her vagina. However, she improved sufficiently to warrant her leaving the hospital.

Some months later, before her admission to McLean Hos-

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pital, she became excited and irritable, and for the first time expressed ideas of being controlled by electricity and hypnotism. She stated that this method of influencing her was used by a Surety Company at the behest of its board of directors. She expressed a number of other paranoid ideas, which, however, are irrelevant so far as this communication is concerned.

It is of interest to note the following facts in the patient's history. Her father had married four times. The patient was the youngest of four children by his third wife, who died after a cerebral hæmorrhage when the patient was sixteen. Seven years later her father married his fourth wife, a woman thirty-five years his junior. The patient developed a cordial friendship with this new stepmother.

As will be recalled, the patient's main delusion was that a Surety Company was controlling her by means of electricity, hypnotism and mental telepathy. This control gave rise to many complaints: her thoughts were taken from her, her mind was controlled, and she experienced genital sensations. Whether the genital sensations were vaginal or confined to the clitoris has not been definitely established.

When she began her analysis, the patient refused to lie down on the couch. She stated that she was afraid the analyst would assault her sexually, and therefore insisted on sitting up, either in a chair or on the couch. It became known afterwards that this behavior of the patient was due to genital sensations which she felt at that time when in the analytical room. According to her, the analyst caused these sensations. She was not able until some months later to describe in detail the exact means by which the Surety Company influenced her. At first she merely said that this influence was exerted by a machine or instrument which could control her mind, read her thoughts, and cause sensations in various parts of her body. Later she said that this instrument was like a French telephone—the controlling part corresponded to the dial, and the combined mouth and ear piece, which was about ten inches long, was

an important part of the machine. She complained that she had to play a passive part and that things were done to her. She was being influenced and was attempting to resist the influence. Several methods might be used to free her, make her "come out," of this condition, she stated. Sexual intercourse or killing a man would have this effect. "The Surety Company has an instrument which affects both the mind and the body. It causes sexual excitement. You too have an instrument, and therefore I don't want to lie down. The Surety Company has [her maternal] Uncle G.'s brain. They are making millions out of it. He invented electricity, the telephone, and many other things."

At this point, the patient stated that the Surety Company was using her Uncle G.'s organ. She alleged that her mother had told her that he had the power to hypnotize or "put under" all women, so that even the most chaste woman would have sexual intercourse with him while under his influence. She presented as real memories a great many fantasies of being sexually abused by Uncle G., who had tuberculosis and was confined to his room. She would visit him in his room, she said, and he would put his "organ" into her mouth, or else "tube" her—by which she meant, put his phallus into her vagina—and carry out many other sexual acts on her. This, she was quite certain, happened when she was about three or four years old.

The Surety Company had either bought or stolen the instrument from her uncle and was now using it on her. Her mother, Uncle G.'s sister, also had a remarkable brain; she too was an inventor of many things, such as electricity, the radio, mental telepathy and the like. Later the mother too had tuberculosis. (This fact also was used by the patient to identify her mother with Uncle G.) Her mother once told the patient that Uncle G. was really the patient's brother, and that he had been cheated out of all his inventions by the Surety Company.

The patient said that Uncle G.'s organ and the instrument

used by the company were somehow the same thing. Pointing to a freckle on her right wrist, she said that she had a genital on her arm. She ascribed great significance to this, for she understood that the person in her family who was born with a genital on his arm would inherit all the money and have the right to engage in sexual intercourse. This genital was on her right wrist and in masturbating she used her right hand. She differentiated between two types of genital sensations: one an itch, and the other a feeling which led to passion and consequently to masturbation. This latter, sexual, feeling was induced by the instrument in the possession of the Surety Company.

Early in the analysis the patient stated that her mother had borne many children, and that consequently she had many brothers. These brothers because of their mother's brain were endowed with great intellectual ability, which enabled them all to become world-famous individuals. Among the brothers were Edison, Ford, Owen D. Young, Hoover, and others of similar prominence. The instrument owned by the Surety Company influenced primarily the mind and put sexual thoughts in it. A direct connection between the brain and the genital was established through the nerves coming from the brain; hence, by influencing the mind one could excite genital sensations.

At the beginning of the analysis the patient insisted on "standing by" her mother and helping her brothers and sisters in some unclear way to obtain money and to regain their just rights. Later the patient began to feel that she might be pregnant and have children. Her pregnancy, she believed, was due to her having eaten a great deal on Thanksgiving Day (a fantasy of oral impregnation), and the individuals who had been her brothers and sisters became her own children, so that she now had to "stand by" them. She had many children, she stated, eighty-nine, perhaps more. She called the analyst by his first name and said that he was her son—she had given birth to him when she was ten months old, he weighed twelve

ounces and was ten inches long. She recognized the weight and the measure as those which might apply to a phallus and laughingly said that at birth her child was a genital or "genteel." She then began to insist that the analyst have sexual intercourse with her, for then she could "come out" of her condition.

During the night, she said, she had intercourse with one of her brothers, J. X. by name, who was a director like her father. She readily saw that she identified J. X. with her father and spoke of him as if he were either brother or father. She said that she was having sexual intercourse with him nightly.

Gradually as the patient became in her fantasies a mother of many children, with the analyst as her favorite child, the ideas of being influenced by the Surety Company receded into the background. Although when she was questioned directly these ideas could be easily elicited, it was apparent that they began to play a minor rôle in her psychosis. Previously she had been irritable, excitable and angered by the influence; now she was happy and cheerful in her motherhood. She demanded sexual relations and love from the analyst who was now to her her own favorite child. As the analysis went on and she saw that she could not obtain any actual love, she began to doubt whether her children loved her. She related that her own sister had once double-crossed her in a matter connected with some money left by the father, and her step-mother was also brought into the plot.

Whereas up to that time she had protested great love for her own mother, she now turned away from her and felt that she had not been properly treated. She said that she had always been forced to do what other people wished, and that she had never had a mind of her own. She gave numerous instances of how other persons had settled things for her in spite of her own wishes. As a child, she said, she was fated to have sexual intercourse with Uncle G. weekly, and when she had complained to her mother she had been told that she had to go through with it no matter how unpleasant it might

be. She had told her mother at that time that Uncle G. "tubed" her. She believed that she had a tube in her now which she would have to expel. If she only had the physical strength to do this, she thought she would "come out" of her present condition. The tube was in her rectum and was a man's organ. "My mother told me when I was a child that I had a tube in me. I had told her when I was six years old that this was a man's world and that I would like to be a man. I was having sexual intercourse at that time. I didn't want it. It was then my mother told me I had a genital in me." During her psychosis, while the patient was living through the fantasy of being a mother and having many children, she remained quiet and cheerful. As reality was being introduced by the analysis, this fantasy became insufficient, and the ideas of being influenced by the Surety Company again were brought to the fore.

This communication will deal only with the specific question of how the feeling of being influenced, as expressed by the patient's genital sensations, originated. It will naturally be necessary to leave in the background a great deal of important material without which the total picture would remain unintelligible. However, if we can trace a "thin red thread" through the skein of the other threads with which it may be connected, the purpose of this communication will be fulfilled.

Let us begin with the symptom expressed in the statement, "I am being influenced by the Surety Company." This influence can be resolved into several components: There is the influence through telepathy, which is specifically related to her mind and thoughts. There is "putting my mind on a reel," which only allows her to think of what is on the reel. And there are the genital sensations produced by the Surety Company's "control"—either through the connection of the nerves of the brain with the genital, or through electricity, radio, or television working through the instrument directly on the genital organs.

It will be recalled that during the first hours of the analysis, the patient, fearing a sexual assault, refused to lie down on the couch, and that later this idea was seen to be the consequence of genital sensations which she felt in the presence of the analyst. He, too, she thought, had an instrument—the same instrument which Uncle G. possessed—and was in league with the Surety Company, using the instrument which they had bought or stolen from Uncle G. Since she believed that Uncle G. was a fiend who had the power to hypnotize or “put under” women for his purposes by means of the organ or instrument he had invented, the instrument which had the power to influence others was evidently a phallus.

As to the Surety Company, this organization acted through its board of directors, a body of men associated with her father: they thus stood to her in the double relationship of fathers and of brothers, and it was they who bought or stole the instrument from Uncle G. It was when this uncle became her own brother, the son of her mother by Edison, that he was cheated out of his invention by Edison, the father. The instrument, whose identity with the phallus was so clearly demonstrated by the patient's account, then became the instrument which was used to influence her.

In describing her uncle, the patient laid stress on two facts: he had great inventive powers, and he suffered from a tuberculous illness. In both these traits, her mother resembled him. She too was described by the patient as an inventor of genius—she had the greatest brain in the world and was the greatest woman inventor; and she too had tuberculosis. The identification of the mother with Uncle G. is quite apparent. Uncle G. also stands for the father and brother of the patient; he is the brother and son of the mother with whom she had sexual relations.

The patient felt that the Surety Company controlling her, in addition to being responsible for her feelings, was also responsible for the death of all the members of her family. As soon as the patient received word that her mother was ill,

she was put into a trance, and the Surety Company put in her mind the thought, "You killed her. You killed her. You killed her." She understood by this that her mother would die through no fault of the patient's, but because the Surety Company had made the mother its victim when it put the thoughts in the patient's mind. The patient's belief in the omnipotence of her thoughts in matters of life and death is also brought out by another incident. The patient once remarked, "Maybe my father will be dead in two years." This was at 1:13 P. M. on April 6, 1925, and at 1:13 P. M. on April 6, 1927, he was dead. The control exercised by the Surety Company might therefore serve two types of purpose—a sexual and an aggressive one.

The patient's identification of herself with her mother is evident in the following ideas: Originally it was her mother who was said to have many children; later the patient felt that she herself might be pregnant and have male twins in her uterus; still later, all the imagined sons and daughters of the mother became her own sons and daughters. These beliefs appeared after a period in which the patient was protesting great love for her mother, speaking of the kindness her mother had always shown her, and of her need to "stand by" the mother. Now this attitude was gone; she now "stood by" her father and her own children and rejected her mother. There was only one person with whom she now would have sexual intercourse, the person who could satisfy her completely. This, she stated, was in accordance with the provisions of her mother's will, made many years previously. In this will, the Y. money (Y. was her mother's maiden name) was to become the Z. money (Z. being the patient's own surname). The will mapped out the patient's entire future life in detail. The person referred to who could satisfy her completely was J. X., a son of her mother, and therefore her own brother; but since J. X. was also stated to be the husband or lover of her mother, he also stood for her father. Her identification of herself with her mother was thus complete. The patient also was concerned about her mother's soul, which had returned and had been

eaten by the patient (a fantasy of oral incorporation). It was in the patient's stomach, and consequently she had to watch her faeces, urine, and menstrual blood lest the soul be excreted and come to harm (anal birth and expulsion with degradation of the object).

It will be remembered that the patient said that she had a penis on her right wrist, which made her hand a male genital. It was the right hand that she used in masturbating. At the onset of her psychosis she felt that her pregnancy might be the result of masturbation. She first became aware of this when at the age of six she was told by her mother that she already had a man's organ inside her. Her mother had told her this to console her, for she had complained to her mother that this was a man's world and that she wanted to be a man. The son she had when she was ten months old, who was ten inches long and weighed twelve ounces is obviously a phallus. Thus, the patient in her imagination had become a female with a phallus, which she projected into the external world by playing the rôle of a mother with children. This fact must be considered in connection with the events of the first hours of the analysis, when the analyst—her “baby,” i. e., her projected phallus—caused her to have genital sensations.

It is possible at this point to speculate on two other ideas expressed by the patient: (1) her belief that she had a desire for a penis when she was six years old, and (2) her delusion that at the age of ten months she had given birth to a phallus. Her real envy of the penis as an object, at the age of six, is demonstrated clearly in the material brought up in her psychosis. As to her delusion of giving birth to a penis (that is, obtaining it) at ten months, it is possible that this means that she first became aware of clitoris sensations at that time without, however, having the ideational representation “clitoris-penis.” In other words, we see here a regression to an emotional state when only pleasure, that is, sensation, was obtained—later the desire for a penis reawakens that early, unspecific objectless experience.

The patient had shown two attitudes towards her mother: love and hostility. She desired her mother as a love object and rejected her as an object of hatred. The children she produced were projections of her fantasy phallus. As a bisexual individual with a male genital on her arm, she was able to play a double rôle: possessing her father's genital she could have coitus with herself as if she were both father and mother. The identification was therefore a double one. She identified herself with her father by virtue of her identification with Uncle G., which enabled her to assume a masculine rôle. She stated in this connection that the impulse to masturbate caused by the genital sensations appeared only in the presence of girls. On the other hand, her identification with her mother allowed her to possess her father while playing a feminine rôle. She was forced, in accordance with her mother's will, to have sexual relations with Uncle G. and was visited nightly by J. X. (a surrogate of the father), the only person who could satisfy her completely. She stressed the fact that two ways existed which might bring her out of her condition. One was to have intercourse with the father substitute, J. X.—that is, to accept completely a feminine rôle. The other way was to “blow the tube,” which might be interpreted as a production of the male organ and acceptance of the masculine rôle. For a time following her mother's death the patient practically assumed her mother's place in the father's affections. During her psychosis she stated that she should have married her father at that time. Her relationship with her stepmother, in the pre-psychotic period, was a happy one—apparently because of an identification with her. At the beginning of her psychosis, however, her attitude changed to one of suspicion and irritability. The difficulty which she had in accepting completely either the mother's (feminine) rôle, or the father's (masculine, overtly homosexual) rôle was expressed in her psychosis.

We see then that the instrument, or the ideas of being influenced by the Surety Company through the use of the instrument, can be traced to the idea of a male genital—a fantasy

phallus—which the patient ultimately projected. The phallus was obtained by way of a narcissistic identification with her Uncle G. (as a substitute for the father) on the one hand, and by an identification with her mother, the imaginary possessor of a penis, on the other.

It is interesting that as the patient's ideas of influence were analyzed, she regressed and lived through at a symbolic level the fantasy of being a woman with a penis—that is, the mother—with children which were the equivalents of penises projected into the world. While this fantasy was in the foreground, the patient was quiet, cheerful, and very happy. However, as reality became introduced into the picture and her position became untenable, she engaged in attempts at healing—that is to say, at integrating herself with reality. She began to leave her world of fantasy in which she had been acting out the solution of her basic conflict in a symbolic way, and, again by way of projection, she developed delusions and ideas of influence.¹

The series of unconscious equations resorted to by our patient was then as follows: instrument=Uncle G.'s organ=the mother's imaginary phallus=the patient's own introjected penis. Thus the instrument of the Surety Company is the projection of the patient's own fantasy phallus. The conflict between the masculine and feminine identifications—ultimately between having a penis or a female genital—was solved by projecting her male organ and then responding with genital sensations to its influence (a return of the repressed). This explanation of the meaning of this type of projection differs considerably from that current in general psychiatry. This delusion has been regarded as a rationalization of the genital sensations which are already present, as if to say, "I have sensations in my genitals. I can find no reason for them and consequently must seek their cause in the world outside."

The problem of the meaning and origin of the "influencing

¹ This point in the psychopathology of schizophrenia has been discussed by many authors, and I hope to return to it at some future time.

apparatus" was first discussed in a brilliant paper which appeared in 1919 by Tausk.¹ Tausk came to the conclusion that this apparatus represented both the entire body and the phallus. His chief conclusion, that the influencing apparatus is a projection of the patient's own genital is confirmed by the material in our case. Here the genital sensations seem to be secondary, and the apparatus does not appear to be constructed to account for them. Rather, the unconscious formula appears to be: "My father's penis, which I cannot accept as my own, becomes an instrument which then gives me genital sensations." The material in our case also confirms Tausk's formulation of the genitalization of the whole body and its subsequent projection. Tausk refers to Freud's statement that in a dream a machine represents the dreamer's genital. As we see from the material of our patient, this is also corroborated in schizophrenia: the genitalization of the whole body and the genital itself are represented by the influencing instrument.

Of interest in this connection is the statement by Moses² that the words "fascinate and fascination are derived from Latin *fascinum*, which was one of the names of the male organ of generation—the *fascinum* was worn suspended from the necks of women, and was supposed to possess magical powers, hence to fascinate."³

This parallelism between a delusional formation and a group belief reminds us that many, if not all, of the so-called bizarre delusional beliefs of psychotic, especially schizophrenic individuals may duplicate group beliefs which have existed at one time or other in the course of human cultural history.

¹ Tausk, Viktor: *Über die Entstehung des "Beeinflussungsapparates" in der Schizophrenie*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. V. 1919.

² Moses, Josiah: *Pathological Aspects of Religion*. Amer. J. Religious Psychol. and Education. Monograph Supplement, Vol. I. Sept. 1906.

³ "*Fascinum—membrum virile* (because an image of it was hung around the necks of children as a preventive against witchcraft). *Fascinus* as a deity, the phallus." Harper's *Latin Dictionary*. Amer. Book Co. 1907.

TELEPATHY IN A DREAM

BY GÉZA RÓHEIM (BUDAPEST)

The patient, whose case leads to certain hypothetical views regarding the unconscious meaning of telepathy and magic, is a girl aged twenty-six suffering from anxiety hysteria and from a generally arrested development of her personality. She came into analysis because of an unfortunate love affair and because of a state of general depression from which she had not been free since her friend abandoned her. She could not talk to people, was afraid of everybody, began to cry when in society, and feared she would become a prostitute.

At the beginning of the love affair, the young man was in the position of a hopeless and romantic adorer. She was ashamed of being seen in his company because he was shabbily dressed and did not know how to behave in society. But she admired him as a scientist of reputation and pitied him because he was a consumptive. Finally she yielded to his entreaties and went with him to a room. She explains that she did not know what she was doing, and that she thought it was her duty to do everything he desired because he was sick and she could cure him. The liaison lasted several years. Its chief features were the perversions imposed by her lover which he compelled her to endure and her crying spells whenever their rendezvous ended. Her behavior was extremely passive and timorous from the beginning, and must have provoked bullying from anybody who was sadistically inclined. He used to beat her whenever he failed to get an erection, or when she cried after their assignments or if she followed him in the street. To produce an erection he would masturbate or tell her smutty stories in which homosexuality and other perversions figured conspicuously. Another important incident in their liaison was when he made her confess the whole story with all its humiliating details to a married woman with whom he was seriously in love, while he continued to have intercourse

with her in a sadistic manner. It was, furthermore, his custom to call her a prostitute and to assure her during cohabitation that he did not love her. When she came into analysis the state of affairs was that he would have nothing more to do with her, and she considered herself a social outcast because of this affair. She could not possibly love anybody else because by rights she belonged to X, her first lover, and consequently she was, as she put it, "beyond the pale," that is, excluded from any kind of pleasure.

Her lover, who had been analyzed during the love affair, had told her that there was something wrong with his potency and gave this as the reason why he could not dispense with perversions. The reaction of the patient was an unconscious identification with the beloved object. This identification became especially marked when the love affair was broken off. We are familiar with this mechanism in melancholia where the lost love object is introjected into the ego. Indeed her condition when she came into analysis might be described as depressive and hysterical at the same time. She was excluded from pleasure by a double mechanism: (a) because she was a male and not a girl, (b) because she was an impotent male, that is, her lover. In her fantasies she played the rôle of Parsifal and other knights of the Grail—the rôle of a chaste male—and explained this by saying that she had remained pure through all the perversions which she had permitted only in order to cure her lover of his impotence. There was however something exaggeratedly feminine and passive in her whole character. She obeyed everybody, was incapable of making any objections and had a retreating, cringing way of shaking hands. She attributed this timidity to her humiliation during the love affair. Indeed she managed matters as unskillfully as possible, involved her family in the affair, complained about it to her friends and to the lady with whom her lover was really in love, and made a thorough mess of things.

She had had much suffering in her life. Especially prominent in this connection was her brother who had the same Christian

name as her lover and who had beaten her terribly when they were children. Even at the time of her analysis, he would box her ears at the slightest provocation. Her father had the same habit. If she bathed at home without locking the door her brother was wont to come in and stay in spite of her screams. These episodes were always related in the analysis with horror, contortions and protests.

This leads to the central delusion of her neurosis, viz., that everybody at home masturbated. When her father read the newspaper—why did he put his hands under the table? He must be masturbating! She would hear her mother moving about in the next room and would hide her head under the cushion, because she was afraid of hearing her mother having intercourse with her brother. Her parents would have intercourse in the next room. It was unbearable that she must hear it. The analyst probably masturbated, too, when she related these things. She shouted and gesticulated protestingly as if she were trying to rid herself of something filthy.

After about six months of analysis, she had the following dream:



"I dreamt that I did not dream anything. The telephone rang but I did not go. My father was undressing beside his bed but he too refused to go, saying: 'This is not the time for business, I have something else to do'."


The telephone call referred to her lover. She was always imagining that he had been calling her but that her family did not tell her, or something of the kind. She feels much better; now she would not go if he did call. In fact her idea in the dream that she did not dream anything means that she does not need analysis. But the emphatic negation only serves to cover up the all-too-manifest contents—that her father is undressing and is going to have intercourse with her, he has no time for business. In real life, the situation was of course just the opposite—her father had no time for her, only for business. Then she talked about a friend of hers who refused to be remarried and stayed with her father. After this she had, to her great horror, a fantasy of coitus with her father and

concluded by declaring that she must go to a factory as a common working girl. This led to her fantasy of becoming a prostitute, and the analysis of a poem she had written on this subject showed that becoming a prostitute meant intercourse with a stranger, and that the stranger represented the father. Notwithstanding the fact that she had actually gone through the fantasy of intercourse with her father and had done so with a considerable show of emotion, this idea continued to form the nearly manifest subject of her dreams and always came to her as a surprise and a shock. The next dream:

"There is a stigma, or sign, on my forehead. My father tries to rub it off with his saliva but I will not let him do it."

Another verse which she wrote in childhood came to her mind: the stigma on her forehead means that she will never be happy. An exclamation of alarm. So it is her father who is trying to make her happy! Hindu women have the sign on their forehead; it means that they are married. She showed great alarm because this meant marriage with her father and was followed by a memory of having urinated into her swaddles. There was a "prostitution" then—no, she means a demonstration—and she thinks her forehead must have been wiped when the swaddles were opened.

The next dream was about a corridor in which she was divided by a glass partition from a laborer and a dancing girl. The question as to what the glass partition reminded her of produced a very violent reaction: She dreamt that she heard her mother's voice and her father's voice panting, she asked what the matter was, and after that they put her little bed out of the parents' bedroom. This she regards as a great injustice and a deprivation of pleasure. In another dream she saw a window and light that shone beyond the window. The window was something that protects or isolates her. Then she had the following vision:  a triangle covered by a quadrangle. Then the vision changed and she drew it as follows:  She looked at the draw-

ing and then said that it represented a couple in the act of cohabitation, the woman being covered by the man. No, it was her father in his night-shirt and he was masturbating. Her lover used to masturbate before they had intercourse and when they had intercourse she felt pleasure but then she "closed the window" and did not let the feeling of pleasure penetrate any more deeply into the vagina. She showed what she meant by another drawing  in which the triangle stands for her genital and the circle represents the "closing" of the passage. Then she spoke of the analyst's wife as the only woman who had seen the Australian initiation ceremonies. (She has read my book.) Again a vision: seven flutes (Pan) in a row. Many men or one? A penis in erection—darkness—faces emerging from the dark—a negro—"he is going to eat me—my father is coming to kiss me!"—another period of darkness—a Chinese with a big hat—then, with the greatest horror, shuddering, "Father said yesterday I have not f—d you for a long time." (The word used for cohabitation means in popular slang "a licking" and it is in this sense that the father was using it.) After having had a casual love affair with a married man, as a substitute for the analyst, she related that a horrible grinning face disturbed her pleasure in coitus. She saw birds cohabiting in the garden when she came today, a sight which she professed never to have seen before. The grinning face reminded her of a picture postcard. Yes, it was something horrible. They must have been about six or seven years old, when she and her brother found a postcard in her father's drawer. She could not say what it was. It began in the beautiful legs of a girl and as they went upward where the vagina might have been, there was the grinning face of a big fat man. She recognized this as the vision she had seen during cohabitation but became terribly excited about the postcard, which she regarded as the father himself performing cunnilingus. She experienced enormous relief when the analyst suggested that the picture must have been a hoax. The person who looked at it would be expecting something

piquante; he would pull some trigger contrivance, and all he would see would be a fat man laughing at him.

The above material has been related in order to demonstrate the paramount importance of the primal scene in her symptoms, in her character formation and sexual life. Her frequent visions of objects that are separated and reunited correspond to a symptom of which she complained in the first three months; she felt as if there were a cleavage in her, as if she were cut into halves. Obviously she has introjected the parents in the act of coitus, and the complaint that the two halves cannot meet is really the expression of a desire that the coitus between father and mother should not take place. This identification with the primary objects is very strong in her, but it is hidden under the guise of an extremely fleeting identification, or a series of hysterical identifications with men (fathers) and women (mothers). Everybody has become the representative of the parental imagines; and therefore she was afraid that she must do what any man (father) or any woman (mother) tells her to do. Hence her prostitution fantasies and occasional homosexual episodes. The extremely developed "non-resistance" in her character was, on the one hand, a permanent cry for her brother (father) to come and beat (rape) her, and on the other hand, was due to the repression of her rage against her mother. Having had to bear a great deprivation at a very early age, she was now incapable of bearing the slightest strain. The insults she suffered from her lover or his refusals to meet her produced an unbearable anxiety, and she was compelled to telephone to one of her acquaintances and arrange a meeting as quickly as possible although she had no real desire for these meetings. "To be left alone," to be separated from the parents and love was an unbearable catastrophe. She had been reënacting her part of the primal scene in analysis in nearly every hour, for she went through a coitus fantasy and also enacted a coitus scene in which the analyst was having intercourse with her but at the same time was masturbating, which is of course what she did at this juncture. She frequently had trance-like states, in which she actually believed in the reality

of her "visions." In these states her whole manner and voice changed and became completely infantile. Once she declared "The sun is coming into me. Now Bessy [her name] is the sun and the sun is Bessy." Then she felt a pressure on her head, something heavy bearing down upon her. It was an "iron hat" (*vaskalap*), a figurative expression used in Hungarian for conservatism. Sometimes instead of "iron hat" (*vaskalap*) she said "iron sheet" (*vaslap*), and it might feel like either. This "pressure" was really *repression* and it usually appeared when she could not bear the sight of one of the visions. After the solar vision mentioned above, the iron sheet again appeared and the patient asked, "What is a grown-up?" The sheet reminded her of the coffin of Attila, the King of the Huns. According to the Hungarian chronicles, Attila was buried in a threefold coffin, or rather in three coffins: one of gold, one of silver, and one made of iron. A river was diverted from its stream and the coffin was buried in the river bed. Then the river was turned back into its former course, and the slaves who performed the ceremony were all slaughtered, so that no one would know the place where the great king of the Huns was buried. Attila wedded a young German princess and bled to death through the nose on the night of his wedding. When it was pointed out what all this meant—that the great secret is that Attila, the father, buries himself in her on his wedding night—she remarked that there were certain things that she forbade herself to think about when she was a little girl. One of these was something she had read in the newspaper about a musician who had raped an immature girl. The other was to think about God when she was in the toilet, and the third to think about the worms that were once found in her excrements—that is, she is raped by the father and is delivered of an excremental child. Then she began to ask many nonsensical questions, and said that at the age of six her brother had told her that children were made whenever a girl and a boy put their "water-makers" together. She suggested to her brother that they might try this, but he refused because this was done only by lovers. Then she arose from

the couch with frightened protests, and when asked what was the matter, replied that she thought her father was here and was just going to try it with her. In connection with a dream about having intercourse with her brother, she began to scream "I cannot look. The iron sheet is coming down! The electric light! Father in his night-shirt lying on top of mother—darkness."

During the first few months of the analysis she gradually gave up one of her very characteristic habits. She used to form her handkerchief in a way that varied between the shape of a nipple and of the penis and put it into her mouth. The analysis of this led to a real event which, according to what her mother told her afterwards, must have happened when she was about four months old. Her mother did not have enough milk and the patient was taken off the breast when she was still very hungry. She remembers distinctly that she did not cry although she felt terribly like doing so. Her mother confirms this memory; she remembers it very well, for everyone was astonished that the baby did not cry. This was the beginning of her theory that pleasure is a substance (milk) of which there are only limited supplies in the world, and that she can get only very little or must suffer for whatever amount she consumes. She was hungry for love, and when she went home after the analytic hour she was hungry and had some white coffee (i. e., coffee with milk).

We see therefore that her depression is rooted in two events of her infancy: in the deprivation she suffered through her mother and in the deprivation she suffered through her father. The two traumata are superimposed on each other with a continual identification of nipple and penis. The case confirms both the earlier views on the oral conditioning of melancholia and those advanced by Lewin who found that a hypomania or euphoric state was really a repetition of the excitement felt in connection with the primal scene.¹ In the course of the

¹ Lewin, Bertram D.: *Analysis and Structure of a Transient Hypomania*. This QUARTERLY I, 1932.

analysis the two traumata reoccur in their ontogenetic order, but the parental coitus trauma seems to have had the greater dynamic importance.

All this serves merely as a preliminary to what I regard as the real subject matter of this paper. In this case, the significance of some familiar fantasies of mankind was so clear, and the coincidence of this significance with conclusions I had arrived at on the basis of anthropological data was so great that I decided to publish the case. A certain decoration on a chest in the analytic room—a semicircle—was evolved by the patient into a “goddess.” Whenever she progressed a step in the transference situation she would become frightened and project her anxiety to an outward cause. It was the “goddess” who was hypnotizing her, the goddess who opened a gigantic mouth to devour her. In the second month of analysis she brought the following dream:

“Bessy X., a friend of mine, tells me ‘I do not love my father, I love the doctor.’ And I see the empty—or not empty—skin of a fish.”

The empty skin of the fish stood for the empty nipple, Bessy X for herself, and the sentence in the dream was an avowal of transference. This was followed by great alarm at the “goddess,” who was approaching to bite her. She recognized the identity of the goddess with the analyst’s wife. Then she said with reference to the goddess, “*sunt anima rerum*,” objects have a soul. The goddess, she said, was not a person but the purity that is inherent in the person, the power, or the protecting genius. Gods and goddesses do not cohabit, and she always thought that her school teachers were supernatural beings far removed from everything that was dirty. She has dreamt that the cook was performing cunnilingus with her. The cook had been visiting her mother’s grave. When she smiled, because the teacher praised her, the goddess was angry; when she was sad, the goddess was happy. She hoped there was nothing the matter with the analyst’s wife. “No, the wishes don’t come true in this case.” Then she had a vision: flames burst forth from the mouth of the goddess. She was

grinding her teeth—was she preparing to bite or to kiss or to lick the patient?

Nothing could be clearer than her ambivalent attitude to the parental imagines, in this case to the mother. That all the grinning demoniac faces, negroes and Chinese, satyrs and other bogeys of her fantasy-world stood for the parents in the primal scene, or series of "primal scenes," is now quite evident. But what about gods and goddesses, that is, what about her position with regard to the analyst and his wife? She drew a distinct line between teachers and parents. The "horrors," that is, those who have intercourse, were the parents, and the gods or teachers represent "purity." However, her attention was called to the fact that something was wrong with her Latin. *Sunt animae rerum* is the correct form, *anima* is a lapsus. *Anima* reminded her of "*animál*ni," a Hungarianized form of the Latin root, meaning the activity of a prostitute in a brothel whose job is to "animate," that is, to stimulate the sexual desire, of the guests. But it also reminded her of animals, of the animal element in man, that is, of coitus. Thus the purity of non-cohabitation of the "gods" was revealed as the opposite of what it seems to be, and the difference between the gods and the demons is that the latter represent the anxiety-distorted image of the primal scene, while the gods stand for the same thing in a sublimated form.

After some months of analysis she declared that she could perform magic. Whenever she was in love with a man and desired him to think of her, all she had to do was to think hard of the man in question and to turn her upper lip inwards in a manner strongly suggestive of sucking. In connection with a dream of dolls dancing behind a partition on a stage, whom she tries to approach, but without being able to—she explained what magic is. She said that magic is the power to overstep boundaries and to identify oneself psychically with a person who is somewhere else. The latent content of the dream in question was again the primal scene, and thus "magic" would mean the excitement experienced by the child and her

desire to "overstep the boundaries" which divided her from the parents. This "magic" was evidently the autoerotic repetition of an oral form of gratification and consisted of thumb-sucking, with the thumb as a substitute both for the mother's nipple and for the father's penis. Three dreams forming a series or rather the third dream of this series now brings us to the subject of telepathy.

I. "Your wife tells me now it is Bessy's time, or turn; she is going to perform. I have got something in my hand which is like a hambone, but it gets larger and smaller again as if it were india-rubber."

The "performance" is the same thing as the dolls dancing on the stage, and the rubber-like quality of the hambone refers to the marvel of erection. Gnawing hambones was one of her favorite pastimes in childhood, and her mouth was full of saliva when she talked about this dream. Next night, a dream continues the same theme:

II. "I am sitting on the bank of the Danube with you and X., the photographer. We are all in bathing costumes. I take hold of your penis and feel that you have an erection. I am ashamed, and in order to hide my confusion, I also hold the penis of X. I am happy because his penis is not as big as yours."

She stated that she once saw her father in underwear; he was wearing only pants, and she could see spots on his body. They must have been traces of her mother's lips. Then she went through the motions of coitus and declared that she is cohabiting and that the analyst was masturbating, obviously a reversal of the latent content—the little girl masturbated when she observed parental coitus and perhaps had the fantasy of grabbing the father's penis and taking it away from the mother. Her series formations—many men, in reality and in her fantasies—are due to a flight from the father's big penis. Mr. X. is a photographer; she has brought a collection of his photos which she wants me to see—that is, she is showing me the picture which determined her whole life (primal scene).

In the middle of June 1932, Dr. Hollós gave a lecture on telepathy in the Hungarian Psychoanalytical Society. The lec-

ture was based mostly on occurrences during analysis, that is, on a telepathy between the patient and the analyst. The next day the patient reported the following dream:

III. "I am still at home and I see that it is a quarter to eleven or a quarter to one. I ought to have started at half past in order to come to analysis. It is too late and I go on playing the piano. I feel as if playing the piano were an irresistible compulsion. Twenty-three hours have passed and I am in time for next day's analysis. I have had a dream which I am going to tell the analyst. The dream was this: A white dove alights on a pink cloud. I see this and the sky is blue. I come into analysis, enter the room, but the couch stands crosswise. You begin to talk instead of letting me talk and you say: 'I dreamt that a white dove alights on a pink cloud. The sky was blue.' I am so happy that I scream with pleasure. Your wife comes into the room and says, 'Well, Bessy, what is the matter?' She is very friendly."

The patient dreamt this the same night that I was thinking about the problem of telepathy, a subject I had never been interested in before the lecture given by Dr. Hollós. It is obvious that she dreamt of having dreamt the same thing that I had, that is, *we have before us a telepathic dream on the subject of telepathy*. In analyzing this dream we may therefore expect to obtain some information regarding the unconscious processes underlying telepathy.

It is a quarter to eleven or a quarter to one: The day before she nearly made a mistake. She thought that eleven o'clock was the right time for her to come to analysis. The hour beginning at eleven is the hour of an acquaintance of hers, Mrs. N. She thought Mrs. N. was my favorite patient. If she came at one o'clock she would be disturbing me, for that is the time when I have lunch with my wife. Therefore the meaning of the first sentence is: the analyst is with another woman and the patient wants to disturb them to take the other woman's place. She added another detail: her governess was talking to her and said that her young man was also in love with one of the patient's cousins. The governess was a bad lot, she would go with any man who asked her. This is what she feared was true of herself; if she were to put a little rouge on her face, she would be compelled to become a prostitute. (The compulsion of playing the piano.) The young man in question

was also in love with her, and she had homosexual relations with the cousin in question.

Twenty-three hours afterward she went away from analysis in low spirits because I went into my wife's room after the hour while she was still in the corridor. She felt quite giddy, so she went home and fell asleep in the afternoon. It was as if she had had an abortion. But the central figure in the dream is the *white dove*. It reminded her of a picture of the trinity, the dove being the Holy Ghost, the immaculate conception. Blue and pink are the colors of a dress in which she looked very pretty when she was quite a little girl. Then she began to talk about a subject that kept tormenting her in her school days. She had been told in school that God, who was invisible, had created the world from nothing. She tried hard to picture this, but whenever she tried she saw God like an old man, like her father, and the world was something that was green and sprouting. But if this were so, then God was not invisible and the world had not been created out of nothing. For how can something be visible and invisible at the same time? Then with a sudden outburst of rage: "Damn them for having covered my little bed when I slept in the bedroom. The air was very bad. They even used a chamber-pot. I tore the cover off in my rage." (Her bed stood crosswise to the bed of the parents.) Here the analyst suggested that she must have observed the coitus of her parents and shrieked, and that then her mother (my wife in the dream) probably comforted her. Yes, she stated, she could remember her mother coming to her little bed and caressing her when she screamed at night.

In the situation of the *primal scene*, the little girl had her first "telepathic" experience. The parents were speaking a language that every living being understands, the language of sexual excitement. The child responds by "magic," i. e., it is capable of finding libidinal gratifications that transcend the limits of space. In the cases reported by Hollós, the characteristic feature was that telepathy occurred when the thoughts of the analyst would wander to other subjects, i. e., that the child

would call to the father to love him and not the mother. In the case I have described the day-stimulus of the telepathic dream was that I left her alone and went into my wife's room, and the latent infantile material was the psychic content. We should have to assume that the identification with the analyst involves an interaction between the preconscious systems, or that the identification takes place in a given moment when the cathexis of the unconscious content with the preconscious element takes place. We should also have to assume another element of transition, viz., the transition between identification and object cathexis. I explained the telepathic nature of the dream to the patient, and she was as pleased with this in her waking life as she had been in the dream. She continued to talk about it and dreamt that she was Christopher Columbus who aided by God has discovered the realm of the soul. God reminded her of a picture of an old man with a beard floating in the air; *Columbus*: an expedition, "the realm of the soul," a psychoanalytic expedition (the analyst) and her telepathy. If the analyst is Columbus, she is America. In her childhood she had had a conscious fantasy that she was the Bahama Islands, the place first discovered by Columbus and that the islands were a sort of huge human (or divine) being with Columbus anchoring at the head of this being. This led us to the situation of the child making its first expeditions of discovery on the parent's body. She said that she could not give up this idea of telepathy, that she was brooding on it like a hen on an egg. Perhaps we have to regard this complete identification as the latent survival of primitive phases in the development of the ego, of the mother-child identification. In situations which are analogous to or which bring up the unconscious content of the primal scene, a recrudescence of this prenatal non-limited form of existence might take place, and this might help to explain the shock-like feeling connected with these phenomena.

However, all this is only workable when the two persons concerned are in some sort of contact, for instance, in the same room. It is possible that even the slightest movement

suffices for the unconscious, but we do not know how these interactions can take place at a distance. An explanation of the dream can scarcely be regarded as an explanation of telepathy in the ordinary sense of the word. We must of course take into consideration the peculiarly susceptible character of the patient, her attitude of yielding to all outward influence and the decisive rôle played by the primal scene in her whole mental make-up. Nevertheless, the problem remains unsolved. As somebody (Bernfeld?) once remarked, an aeroplane is a symbol of erection, and the fact that one can also use it for going from Paris to Berlin is merely incidental. It is therefore interesting to observe that telepathy or magic corresponds to or is based on the situation of the child in the primal scene, but that does not explain why the projections formed on this basis happen to correspond to facts.

The anthropological bearings of the data in question are perhaps of greater significance, or, at any rate, of a more unambiguous character. For one thing, we have a striking confirmation of my theory of the origin of hostile supernatural beings—ogres, demons, etc., as representatives of the father (the parents) in the primal scene. I have also contended that the gods (totemic ancestors) were later offshoots of the same stem, with this difference, that in the ogre type we have anxiety—repression—projection, whereas in the case of the gods the original libidinal identification (super-ego formation), which is contained in the repressed, returns from repression and leads to a sublimation of the primal scene content. The mechanism in this case might be described as anxiety—repression—projection—annulment or semi-annulment of this projection by a fictive identification.

Finally, the meaning of magic in its relation to demon-lore (primal scene) is borne out by the patient's magical actions and theories. Magic is the substitute gratification (onanism) of the child in the primal scene situation.¹

¹ See for the present my Hungarian book "A csurunga népe" and my forthcoming paper on *Die Urreligion der Menschheit*, to appear in *Imago*.

OUTLINE OF CLINICAL PSYCHOANALYSIS

BY OTTO FENICHEL (BERLIN)

CHAPTER II *

ANXIETY HYSTERIA

There is still another type of hysteria, which does not number among its manifestations the obscure phenomenon of conversion, and which analysts consequently are able to understand more completely. The reader will recall that in the preceding chapter we chose blushing as an example of an hysterical conversion symptom. It is well known that in many cases such hysterical blushing starts with, or is accompanied by, a painful feeling of anxiety and the thought "I am going to blush." In many hysterical individuals, this feeling of anxiety is so emphasized that it is relatively unimportant whether the blushing occurs or not. In other words, the symptom of anxiety, and not the conversion symptom, occupies the foreground of the picture. This condition is called *erythrophobia* and is often accompanied by ideas of being observed and other feelings which suggest ideas of reference, so that it may to a certain extent resemble some of the paranoid disorders. There are, however, much simpler phobias in which only anxiety as such appears as the essential feature. A person may, for example, be afraid to go out on certain streets or squares, and may finally give up going out at all except with a companion. In such a case, it is obvious that the whole "phobic façade" merely serves the purpose of avoiding the anxiety which would break through if the patient dispensed with such precautions. In other words, the phobia proper is a defense against anxiety, and the anxiety itself is the essential

* This is the second installment of Otto Fenichel's *Spezielle Neurosenlehre*. Translated by Bertram D. Lewin and Gregory Zilboorg.

symptom in these disorders: Freud has designated them *anxiety hysterias*.¹

In the past, anxiety hysterias were often classified as compulsion neuroses. This seemed justifiable, for clinically speaking compulsion neuroses are not infrequently associated with phobias. Freud, however, was able to show that except for the mechanism of conversion, the phobias have all the characteristics of hysteria, and are therefore more closely allied to hysteria than to the compulsion neuroses.

The unconscious prerequisites for anxiety hysteria are in point of fact the same as those for conversion hysteria. It is difficult to say which factors determine the development of one or the other type of neurosis. Nothing definite can be stated on this problem at present. It seems, however, that of the two types anxiety hysteria is the more primitive. Anxiety hysteria occurs very early in the life of the individual; as a matter of fact, it is the typical neurosis of childhood and is the most elementary neurosis with which we are acquainted. To some extent, symptoms of anxiety hysteria seem to be regular incidents in the normal development of the child. There is hardly a child who has not at some time been afraid of the dark or of animals. Fear of the dark may be reduced to a fear of being alone; thus, Freud quotes a child who was afraid of the dark as saying, "If someone talks, it gets lighter."²

At first sight it might appear that a fear (or anxiety) of this sort need be only remotely related to one's instinctual life. To be left alone is an objective danger for a helpless child; and yet one obtains the impression that the outstanding feature in the anxiety that besets the child is longing. This longing increases quite rapidly if the child is left alone or if the child is unable to see the object of its love, and it finally sets up in the child a condition of excitation. It looks, then, as Freud³

¹ Freud: *Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben*. Ges. Schr. VIII, 235. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III, 257.)

² Freud: *Vorlesungen*. Ges. Schr. VII, 422. (Trans. by Riviere *Introductory Lectures on Ps-A*. 340.)

³ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 77.

says, as if the child is not yet able to manage this longing and excitation in any better manner than to transform them into anxiety. We shall have an opportunity later to discuss the meaning of this process and the relation of this longing to the non-libidinal objective danger of being helpless. The relationship of anxiety to the instinctual life of the individual is more evident in phobias in which animals are the objects of the fear. The child is not as haughty as the adult person, who tries to believe in a fundamental difference between human beings and animals; a child can easily imagine human beings in the form of animals and does so constantly in the animal phobias.¹ Psychoanalysis is able to demonstrate that the animals feared are distorted representations of human beings, usually of the father. As we learn from the analysis of dreams this representation of the father as an animal, or masked, or disguised as a demon, possesses a certain uncanny quality—for it signifies a sexually excited father; it expresses the perception of the father as a sexual being. The animal feared is thus a substitutive presentation of the father appearing in certain repellent aspects. This substitute “on the one hand has certain associative connections with an idea which was rejected; while on the other hand, because of its remoteness from that idea, it escapes repression” (substitution through displacement).² The first thorough analysis of an animal phobia in a child, the case of little Hans,³ demonstrated that the essential unconscious content of the neurosis was, exactly as in hysteria, the œdipus complex. The situation (in the unconscious) is made more complicated, as in conversion hysteria, by the fact that the human individual, being naturally bisexual, has therefore an “inverted œdipus complex” also; that is, he may love the parent of the same sex and be hostile to and jealous of the

¹ Freud: *Die infantile Wiederkehr des Totemismus*. Ges. Schr. X. (Trans. by Brill, *Totem and Taboo*, Chap. IV.)

² Freud: *Das Unbewusste*. Ges. Schr. V, 497. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, 115.)

³ Freud: *Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben*. Ges. Schr. VIII. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, III.)

parent of the opposite sex. The inverted œdipus complex also may find expression in an anxiety hysteria, as Freud showed in his publication of a second case of phobia in infancy ("the Wolfman").¹

The fundamental specific problem in these cases is thus seen to be, ultimately, the problem of anxiety. We found it possible to view the conversion symptom as a breaking through of the repressed œdipus complex, which had become colored in the process by the consideration paid to the forces causing the repression. The question arises whether a similar formulation can be used to explain the anxiety symptom.

At one time Freud believed that the repressed excitement coming from the œdipus wishes turned into anxiety by virtue of the repression itself; that is, repression would, so to speak, turn libido into anxiety, and the symptom, anxiety, would represent the instinct breaking through in a distorted form.² How it was possible for a neurotic symptom to appear unaccompanied by anxiety remained obscure. From a descriptive standpoint, much might be adduced to support Freud's theory. Thus, a child "with no better knowledge of what to do with his longing" might serve as an illustration of how, in the absence of the object, the libido is suppressed by force of circumstances and automatically changed into anxiety. Other material, taken from the study of the actual neuroses and illustrative of this aspect of the problem, will be discussed in more detail later. We may say meanwhile that from a psychological standpoint the problem may be approached from a different, apparently more reasonable angle. Anxiety need not necessarily arise from the repression of libido. It might indeed just as well be the preëxistent cause of the repression. A child in the œdipus situation has every reason to dread that he will be punished or that he will cease to be loved. These

¹ Freud: *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*. Ges. Schr. VIII. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III.)

² See, for example, Freud: *Vorlesungen*. Ges. Schr. VII, Vorl. XXV. (Trans. by Riviere, *Introductory Lectures*, etc. Lect. 25.)

are the two possibilities which threaten him whenever he desires to gratify his sexual wishes.¹ It is well known that boys, in consequence of a primal phantasy, conceive the punishment as an impending castration. Girls have an analogous fear of having their genital injured; they sometimes think that if they were to gratify their desires, the father's gigantic penis would tear their body; sometimes the phantasy is more in line with the boys' idea, so that they too believe something might be cut off them. As to the danger of losing love, it is common to both sexes. The anxieties generated by these dangers force the child to repress his instincts. As is well known, persons suffering from a phobia have an attack of anxiety whenever they meet a situation which means, for them, a "temptation." It is easy to think of this anxiety as a kind of warning, by means of which the ego is informed that if it accedes to the mobilized impulse, something terrible will happen. As Freud puts it,² the ego gives a "signal" and with this inaugurates the process of repression. The production of this anxiety is obviously an instrument of the repressing forces and is utilized as a specific mechanism. Just as the ego responds to an external danger with fear, so it may also make use of fear (anxiety), which functionally speaking is an internal perception, as a signal, whenever it senses that internal changes in tension betoken the setting in operation of forbidden impulses which it regards as dangerous. Thus, anxiety, when it represents a signal given by the ego, appears to be the most primitive neurotic symptom formation. It must be borne in mind that we are speaking here only of that anxiety which is an expression of the forces inimical to instinctual gratification. The anxiety resulting from "the return of the repressed from repression" is not covered by the description given so far.

Yet our description is not quite correct. Freud has called attention to the fact that the anxiety which appears in a dan-

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 41.

² Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 65 ff.

gerous situation consists of two components, a useful one—increased preparedness for defense—and an extremely futile one, the emotion of anxiety proper, which quite often is associated with a sort of paralysis and thus frustrates or makes difficult an efficacious motor reaction.¹ Rationally, from the point of view of the ego, it would be better in case of real danger simply to flee or to take measures for self-defense without feeling anxiety, and similarly, in the case of presumably dangerous impulses, it would be better simply to repress them without being anxious. The rational utilization of anxiety as a danger signal may very well be a function of the ego; but that the ego should use anxiety and not some better adapted reaction suggests that some external force must have imposed this expression upon the ego, placing no other means at its disposal. This force external to the ego is the historical basis for reaction of all living beings, the precipitate of past experiences, and it cannot be avoided. Psychoanalysis conceives of affects as distorted reminiscences, which are analogous to hysterical seizures. The futile somatic reactions of the hysterical individual were, at one time and in a certain situation, quite appropriate; but they became “fixed” reactions, much in the manner of conditioned reflexes, so that they reappeared automatically upon occasions which reminded the individual of the original “traumatic” situation. This explains why we find that in the affects, certain ideas and specific bodily innervations (discharge processes) are tied together in an archaic manner. Freud has suggested that the experience of birth might be regarded as the prototype-trauma which determines the affect of fear (anxiety).² The child can perceive his birth subjectively only as an increase in tensions corresponding to an increase in his needs. His reaction to this, his “first anxiety” must have served a useful purpose: “stimulation of the neural

¹ Freud: *Vorlesungen*. Ges. Schr. VII, 409. (Trans. by Riviere, *Introductory Lectures*, etc., 330.)

² Freud: *Vorlesungen*. Ges. Schr. VII, 411. (Trans. by Riviere *Introductory Lectures*, etc., 331.)

pathways leading to the respiratory system prepares the lungs for their activity," and "the acceleration of the heartbeat combats the toxicity of the blood" (Freud¹).

Consequently we must assume that when analogous conditions arise, the old reaction, which no longer possesses utility, reappears. When a small child finds itself in a state of maximal tension due to great needs ("traumatic situation"), anxiety automatically makes its appearance ("id anxiety"). The next step in the process of development takes place as soon as the growing ego learns to distinguish between traumatic situations of this sort and "danger situations," that is to say, situations which are potentially traumatic. For example, hunger is for an infant a traumatic situation, but to be alone is a danger situation, for if he should become hungry while alone, no one would be there to assuage his hunger. When a child already has the capacity to recognize a danger for what it is but nevertheless reacts to it with anxiety, he apparently is assuming that the situation which has not yet arisen will arise. He behaves as if the traumatic situation were there—as if he wished to convey to himself, "Be careful! The traumatic situation may be coming. Think how unpleasant that would be!"

If the child's anxious crying happens to bring to him the person he wants, the child learns that by thinking of the possibility of a traumatic situation in time and going through in advance a bit of the terrifying experience of this situation (namely, anxiety), he may avert the whole situation. We see, then, that what was once id anxiety, that is, an automatic response based on a historical incident, becomes a signal utilized by the ego for a purpose (ego anxiety). The earliest forms of infantile fears, such as fear of being alone or fear of the dark, may still be regarded as automatic id anxieties. We shall see later that in many forms of traumatic neurosis and in the so-called actual neuroses, older individuals may experience these same id anxieties. However, the anxiety which we find

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 75.

in phobias is unquestionably ego anxiety—i. e., fear of losing love, or fear of castration. The ego and its repressing forces utilize the complex of reactions which we call anxiety for a definite purpose, but the anxiety is furnished them by the id for reasons devoid of purpose. Insofar as anxiety may in the final analysis be considered an expression of a given tension due to a given demand, even the anxiety which is a symptom of an anxiety hysteria—clearly an expression of the repressing forces—is at the same time an expression of the libidinal forces. Indeed, it is probable that a great deal of the old theory, which postulated that anxiety automatically arises from repressed libido, must be considered correct in part, since the ego may obtain the energy for the production of the signal, anxiety, from the energy supply of the instinct which is repressed. For our purpose it is unnecessary to pursue the discussion of this topic any further. We may formulate our conclusion as follows: in anxiety hysteria the repressed instinct wins out against the repression by means of symptom formation.

Many anxiety symptoms can in fact be avoided by the development of an appropriate phobia (avoidance of the perception which produces the anxiety), and at the cost of a certain limitation of the ego's freedom the illness can be brought to a standstill. Whether this equilibrium will be attained or not depends on whether the instinctual danger is completely and successfully turned into a "perceptual danger," i. e., one which arises only when a specific object is perceived. However, if the instinctual tension is sufficiently great, the "projection" is no longer adequate; then, in the more severe cases, especially in the phobias of adult persons, it is characteristically found that the phobic conditions sooner or later increase in scope. If, for example, a patient is at first not able to walk across a certain square, he soon finds himself unable to walk across any square, later he cannot go out of doors, and finally, perhaps, not even out of his room except with a companion. It is not difficult to explain this growth of the "phobic façade." The danger which the phobia is designed to avoid is temptation—in

the last analysis temptation arising from the individual's own infantile sexual instincts, his œdipus complex. The elimination of external opportunities does not eliminate these impulses, nor can one prevent the growth of their intensity. The impulses continue to operate and thereby compel the further expansion of the phobia.¹

Freud's older contention is still valid: the phobic individual, he stated, projects an inner danger outward, seeking paradoxically and therefore ineffectually to escape from his own dangerous instinct by avoiding a specific external condition—that is to say, by considering an inner danger to be an external one.² Freud has added, however, that the danger is nevertheless in the last analysis an external one, for it is not the instinctual expression which is feared but the external consequences (castration, loss of love) which might result from it.³ Indeed, though the phobic individual may primarily be fleeing from his castrative parents, nevertheless he is also in flight from his own instincts, for the external danger of castration is dependent on how he behaves in relation to his instincts. Consequently the original formulation: the ego of an anxiety hysteric flees from his repellent instincts, seems to be correct. In substantiation of this, we may refer to what was said of the primitive nature of anxiety hysteria as contrasted with conversion hysteria. The ego in anxiety hysteria is not yet able to undertake other more complicated defensive measures; it can only be frightened and take flight. In point of fact, the typical situation is, that the ego cannot even take flight, for the expansion of the phobic façade indicates that the attempt at flight was unsuccessful.

To be sure the typical anxiety hysteric has not merely developed anxiety and instituted defenses against it; he has done

¹ Freud: *Das Unbewusste*. Ges. Schr. V, 498 f. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* IV, 115 ff.)

² Freud: *Die Verdrängung*. Ges. Schr. V, 475. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* IV, 93 f.)

³ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 66 f.

more than this. He knows as little of his œdipus complex as the conversion hysteric, and in place of the offensive impulse he has erected in consciousness a number of substitutive formations, which, like conversion symptoms, are found on analysis to be distorted substitutes for the original impulse. It is not correct to say that anxiety hysteria develops anxiety instead of repressing—the anxiety initiates a powerful repressive activity. It is true, however, that the formations which develop as substitutes for repressed impulses are connected with the original anxiety.

Such a distorted substitute for repellent instinctual urges (ultimately derived from the œdipus complex) we have in the first place in the ideational contents of the anxiety. On analysis, one can determine from them not only the original unconscious content of the fear but also the unconscious content of the instinctual urge which gave rise to it. As classical examples we have the analyzed cases of little Hans¹ and the "Wolfman."² Both children feared being bitten or devoured. They did not know this clearly, and indeed phobias in general frequently have an indefinite nebulous content comparable in their unclarity to the manifest content of dreams, so that it often takes a great deal of analytic work to ascertain precisely what it is that the patient fears. Usually the content of this fear at one time was clear and definite but later in the course of the neurosis changed and became progressively more comprehensive and indefinite. All the above mentioned facts follow from the self-evident circumstance that the repressive struggle is not settled by the formation of the first symptom. The forces of repression continue to wage war on this symptom (as we have explained in the case of conversion hysteria) because it is an offshoot of the repressed impulse. This principle, it will be seen later, is of cardinal importance in the compul-

¹Freud: *Analyse der Phobie eines fünfjährigen Knaben*. Ges. Schr. VIII. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III.)

²Freud: *Aus der Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*. Ges. Schr. VIII. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* III.)

sion neurosis: the understanding of a complicated or badly defined symptom of long duration may be attained by its historical reduction, that is, by determining the circumstances, when, under what conditions, and in what form it first made its appearance as a symptom. In little Hans the unconscious meaning of the fear was the more significant—the fear of being devoured was a regressive oral way of saying “the fear of being castrated.”

A patient who feared being bitten by a dog discovered one day to his great astonishment that this fear, to judge by the accompanying bodily sensations, actually referred to his genital; that is, its unconscious content was a fear of being bitten in the genital.

In the case of the Wolfman, who was more oriented towards femininity and had developed a negative œdipus complex, the idea was predominantly the expression of the instinctual striving: to be eaten by his father was the regressive oral expression of the wish to submit to his father in coitus.

It must be admitted that the fear of being eaten up by the father or mother may be an archaic fear in its own right, appropriate, obviously, to the oral impulses, just as the fear of being castrated is appropriate to genital ones. In regard to this fear of being eaten up we doubtless have the same situation which we assume in the case of penis envy.¹ In analytic practice this fear may often appear to be more on the surface than the deeply repressed fear of castration of which it is the distorted expression. But the distortion makes use of regressive forms, and we cannot exclude the possibility that there is a primitive oral fear, which is independent of the œdipus complex. Moreover, later in the development of the individual there are frequently manifestations of anxiety which are compounds of the elements of being eaten and of being castrated; among these are the interesting phantasy of the “*vagina dentata*” which occurs in both sexes, and that of intrauterine castration.²

The replacement of the idea of being castrated by the idea of being bitten offers the same advantages as any other repression: the offensive idea is avoided. A similar benefit is derived

¹ See Fenichel: *Zur Angst vor dem Gefressenwerden*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.)

² Fenichel: *Zur Angst vor dem Gefressenwerden*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.)

from the replacement of the dreaded castrator, usually the father, more rarely the mother, by the figure of an animal. One hates those who threaten. If, therefore, an individual feels threatened no longer by his father but by a horse, he avoids hating his father. So, the distortion is a way out of an ambivalent conflict—the father, who was simultaneously hated and loved, is loved, and the hatred is displaced on to the bad horse. Freud quite rightly brings to our attention the fact that, besides this, a boy is forced to associate with his father every day, whereas the threatening horse can easily be avoided simply by not going out of doors, and the wolf even more easily, but not opening the book at the particular page which contains his picture.¹

We may then say: the mechanisms of phobia are characterized by the fact that they succeed in transforming the instinctual conflict into a fear referred to certain definite external perceptions. In phobias, there is no trace of any “internal anxiety” such as we see in the compulsion neuroses.

The circumstance that the precipitant of the Wolfman's phobia was a primal scene in early infancy—the observation of parental coitus—is not an unusual individual feature, but has a general bearing. A primal scene is an event which puts a child into a state of great sexual excitement, an “overpowering need tension,”—the psychic content varying according to the age of the child—and at the same time it convinces him of the perils of sexual satisfaction, either because he misinterprets the coitus as a sadistic act, or because he sees the “castrated” female genital. The content, the intensity, and the time when the experience will be effective naturally vary. Individual factors will determine what the child perceives, how he interprets his perceptions, what psychic connections will be established, and whether the interpretation and the psychic connections will be made immediately or later. (E. g., identi-

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 66; and *Das Unbewusste*. Ges. Schr. V, 498 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* IV, 115 ff.)

fixation with the parent of the same sex or with the other parent; fixation upon the stage of libido organization which prevails at the time; special coloring of the œdipus complex, etc.) But there is always an extreme simultaneous increase in excitement and anxiety. Consequently the primal scene is particularly apt to link together the conceptions "sexual satisfaction" (i. e., satisfaction of œdipus wishes) and "danger," so that in subsequent situations where there is a sexual temptation, a "signal of anxiety" must be given. It is well known that in sleep the inhibiting forces are diminished (as we see in dreams), and that just before going to sleep the temptation to masturbate is greatest. A marked tendency to anxiety dreams and *pavor nocturnus* in children therefore frequently follows a primal scene—a fact attested not only by the analysis of adults but also by direct observation of children.¹ If a real primal scene was not experienced, we find that an imaginary one, its psychic equivalent, will be constructed on the basis of observations of animals having coitus, and the sight of adult genitalia, particularly those of women (this is true of both sexes), more especially when innocuous scenes such as street fights or the like facilitate the transference of the experience to the parents. Freud has pointed out that the infantile idea of observing the parents during intercourse, like that of castration, is one of those "primal phantasies" which, if not actually experienced, will in all probability be produced in phantasy, the child utilizing all hints which reality offers him.² It appears that to experience a primal scene in reality predisposes to anxiety reactions, so that such real experiences are more often found in the analysis of anxiety hysterias than, for example, in those of conversion hysterias, although they naturally occur in the latter neurosis also (hysteria with ocular symptoms). We shall discuss the significance of the primal scene in compulsion

¹ See, for example, *Die Entstehung von Pavor nocturnus bei einem Kinde*, by "A Mother", *Ztschr. f. ps. Päd.* I, 186, 278.

² Freud: *Vorlesungen*. Ges. Schr. VII, 385 ff. (Trans. by Riviere, *Introductory Lectures on Ps-A.* p. 310 ff.)

neuroses in a later chapter. We must now add to the statement that the unconscious content in anxiety hysteria is the œdipus complex the provision that not only as in conversion hysteria is this complex represented by all the links we described there that lead from œdipus wishes to symptoms, but also that the œdipus wishes are strikingly often (though not always) represented by primal scene experiences or phantasies. Of especial importance in anxiety hysteria seems to be an intensification of, or fixation on, the eroticism connected with the organs and function of equilibration, which appears to result from such experiences, and which unfortunately has not yet been adequately studied.

The ideational content of the anxiety in anxiety hysteria is extraordinarily varied. As is well known, pre-analytic psychiatry invented a vast number of Latin names for the various phobias. On analysis all provocations to anxiety prove to be situations of temptation for the instinct which is dreaded and which must be repressed (in which case we should have to take into consideration the damming of libido ensuing from the stoppage of the habitual discharge, i. e., masturbation); or the provocations are found to be reminders of the putative danger which would be incurred if one should yield to the instinct. Most commonly both types of provocation occur simultaneously, as we saw in the cases of the pathological fear of animals.

Occasionally the anxiety is based on strivings which are strenuously engaged in raging against the ego, and which originate in a sadistic impulse turned away from the object and towards the ego—so that a fear of death appears under circumstances which in ordinary persons would lead to an attack of rage. This is true particularly in those cases where there is a partial regression to sadism, that is, where there is a combination with compulsion neurosis. There are many cases of anxiety hysteria in which we may recognize a relatively intense participation of violent destructive tendencies, frequently by virtue of the associational bridge, "looking equals eating."

Not all animal phobias are constructed according to the pattern of the two cases investigated by Freud. A case described by Helene Deutsch seemed to have a simpler construction: An unconsciously passive feminine young man was afraid of hens because they reminded him of his libidinal wishes and the danger of being castrated with which these wishes were associatively connected. Apparently he merely projected his whole internal instinctual conflict on to an avoidable object externally perceivable, an animal.¹

The fear of being in the streets is as a rule a fear of the sexual temptation which is to be encountered there. Fear of being alone is a fear of the temptation to masturbate; fear of being run over or of falling from a high place is the simultaneous expression of a dread of castration and of feminine masochistic wishes which give rise to this anticipation.

The common fear of being infected is in its most superficial layer a rationalized fear of castration, since venereal infection is a real danger which might attend on sexual satisfaction. Less superficially it represents the fulfilment of a feminine wish (infection standing for impregnation), and its deepest meaning is an expression of pregenital phantasies of introjection and incorporation (bacilli are here the equivalent of an introjected object).

The very archaic fear of touching seems not to have any specific content. Frequently it is a manifestation of a fear of being infected. Freud called attention to the fact that there is no repellent instinctual urge without an aim involving the touching of an object, whether this urge involves a hostile, sensual or tender approach to another person, or an autoerotic touching of one's own body.² The things which a phobic dare not touch represent for him one or the other. A fear of masturbating particularly frequently takes this form.

"To touch a thing" for these persons means to touch their

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *Psychoanalyse der Neurosen*. Int. Ps. Verlag, 1930. pp. 101-115.

² Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 62.

genital, and fears of touching seem at first glance to refer to things which are symbols for genitalia. The mildest and most common form of this fear of touching is bound up with the idea of masturbation. There are persons who interpreted the infantile prohibition on masturbation, which frequently takes the form of "Don't touch!", as if it were literally merely a prohibition of touching, or who, through "spiteful obedience," wished to interpret it in this way. These persons develop a fear of touching their own or other persons' genitalia with their hand, although they practice masturbation in some other distorted form, for example, by moving the body while prone, or by rubbing the thighs together. Not infrequently a wish to masturbate, which has been defended against in this way, has been previously altered by regression, so that the phobia appears to be a protection against anal erotic wishes to dirty. Occasionally this is immediately evident—things which are adjudged to be dirty, such as door-knobs, or such things as come into contact with the water closet or which are used in cleaning the body, may not be touched for this reason. In keeping with the regression, such phobias often occur in association with a compulsion neurosis.

If the anxiety changes from a fear of threatened infection to a fear of having been infected, we may be dealing (except in such cases as simple syphilophobia) with a transitional state, in which an idea appropriate to anxiety hysteria is on its way to becoming a delusion. Ideas of this sort may be hypochondriacal in nature, such as notions of being devoured by bacteria or cancer cells, or of being poisoned. However, apprehensions of this order are met with in some anxiety hysterias, and in such cases they correspond to reënforced fears of infection due to unconscious conflicts over castration and impregnation. The nature and meaning of the more important deeper level which we referred to above, phantasies of introjection and incorporation, which are usual in these cases, will become

clearer in our discussion of hypochondriasis and the manic-depressive reactions.

The fears of infection and of touching present a particularly good field for the study of magical ways of thinking. These fears are counterparts in the individual of what ethnologists call "contagious magic."¹ In keeping with this is the fact that they are fundamentally defenses against or representations of the pregenital instinctual aim of incorporating the object, and they are correspondingly more pregenital in quality (anal sadistic and narcissistic) than the other phobias. Claustrophobia in typical cases seems likewise to include memories of infantile sexual activity and punishments, representing threats of castration, which took place in childhood.

That the precipitating situation for the anxiety is in the nature of a temptation is perhaps clearest in those states which Ferenczi has called "Sunday neuroses."² On Sundays, some persons regularly suffer from anxiety or from depressions; on this day, it is more possible than usual to gratify one's instinctual strivings. Psychoanalysis demonstrated that the precipitating factors of these diffuse anxiety attacks were temptations or threats. To be sure, in this discussion we are extending the concept of "temptation," giving it a very broad meaning. As in the case of conversion hysteria, before the œdipus complex becomes visible in the analysis, one encounters all sorts of intermediate formations, which may be vehicles for any of the components of the sexual instinct. These intermediate formations are not fortuitous; they are characteristic of definite types of anxiety hysteria. Thus, we mentioned the rôle which might be played by constitutionally or accidentally intensified anal eroticism, in phobias of infection and of touching. In the case of fears of going out on the street, walking has acquired a great deal of sexual meaning. This presupposes an increased muscle and equilibration eroticism, which can, indeed, be

¹ See Róheim, Géza: *Das Selbst*. Imago VII, 1921.

² Ferenczi: *Sonntagsneurosen*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. V, 1919. (And in *Bausteine* II, 178 ff. Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc., 174.)

demonstrated regularly in the form of a fixation at the time of learning to walk. Abraham¹ first called attention to this finding.

The writer once reported a case of a man who suffered from anxiety while walking on the street. His fears were accompanied by the feeling that his legs were being pulled, or that they were running away of their own accord. The analysis showed that a deeply effective prohibition of masturbation coincided in time with the man's learning to walk. As a little boy the patient took great pleasure and narcissistic pride in walking. His legs and their functions had thus usurped the place and the thwarted function of his penis. Subsequent intensification of old conflicts then permitted the fear of castration, originally applied to the penis, to become manifest in the new field as a fear of losing his legs. This was the basis for his agoraphobia.²

We have already had occasion to refer to the marked participation of equilibration eroticism in the development of street phobias. Another precondition for the displacement of sexual sensations to walking on the street is a constitutional or accidental enhancement of the pleasure of exhibiting oneself, which is even more prominent in phobias which relate to appearing in public, whether this appearance involves special conditions (stage fright), or is merely a fear of being in a crowd.

The anxiety attacks of one female patient had the definite though unconscious purpose of making her appear weak and helpless to all passerbys. Analysis showed that the unconscious motive for this exhibitionism was hostility, originally directed towards her mother, then deflected back on to herself. "Everybody look!" her anxiety seemed to proclaim, "my mother let me come into the world in this helpless [i. e., 'penis-less'] condition." The attack itself represented the exhibition of a phantasied penis; the knowledge that this object was fictitious produced the transformation from perversion to anxiety.

It is not an accident that the castration complex played a prominent rôle in this case. Many such anxiety hysterias are in the true sense of the word, negatives of a perversion. Their psychogenesis is the same as that of true perversions: there is

¹ Abraham: *Über eine konstitutionelle Grundlage der lokomotorischen Angst*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. II, 1913. (Trans. in *Selected Papers*. London: Hogarth Press.)

² Fenichel: *Über organlibidinöse Begleiterscheinungen der Triebabwehr*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XIV, 56. 1928.

a displacement of all sexuality on to one component impulse for the purpose of settling the most important infantile sexual conflicts, more particularly the overcoming of castration anxiety. But this displacement does not accomplish its purpose, for the perverse impulse itself must then be repressed, and the development of anxiety is unavoidable.

Moreover in typical cases of street phobia, the person chosen by the patient to accompany and protect him appears to be more significant than was originally assumed. At first sight the function of this companion seems clear; he protects the patient from temptation. A man cannot approach strange women, a woman cannot be approached, if they are in the company of their respective spouses. The youth or the girl cannot have adventures if they are in the company of their parents. It is easy to think of other appropriate instances of this kind. Freud¹ has pointed out that the same procedure may secondarily give expression to numerous sexual wishes. When a girl demands that her mother be constantly with her, she incidentally succeeds in fulfilling her unconscious desire to separate her mother from her father. The compulsion exerted upon the companion may gratify, in a distorted form to be sure, any number of inimical impulses in regard to this person. Helene Deutsch was the first to show that the selection of companions is intimately linked with the psychogenesis of the whole illness.² According to her, the companion is a substitute for the parent who was hated in the œdipus triangle. The compulsion exerted upon him by the patient is a symptom which gratifies the patient's œdipus hostility and at the same time prevents him from realizing it, for the opportunity to be convinced of the companion's kindness tends to reduce the hostility to him.

Helene Deutsch proved that typical agoraphobics in spite of the genital character of their conflicts are closely related in

¹ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 67 ff.

² Deutsch, Helene: *Zur Genese der Platzangst*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XIV, 1928. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.)

one respect to compulsion neurotics: their ambivalence conflict stands out sharply. The fear that something may happen to the patient while he is on the street is often preceded by a fear for the safety of some other person, the representative of an object towards whom the patient is ambivalent (the hated member in the œdipus triangle). The transformation of this earlier, sometimes conscious, fear into agoraphobia proper is due to a self-punitive identification with the object unconsciously hated. As in the case of the identifications discussed in the chapter on conversion hysteria, this self-punishment at the same time satisfies the patient's sense of guilt, since the turning of the hostility against his own ego replaces a reprehensible wish to kill or to castrate by a fear of dying or of being castrated.

A patient who had not succeeded in "turning" his hostility against himself, and who had no fears for his own safety, kept his wife tied to her home because he was afraid that something might happen to her. This patient fully confirmed Helene Deutsch's contentions. The negative, that is to say, feminine œdipus complex had gained the ascendancy in him, and his mother, represented by his wife, was his hated rival, whose death he desired. The unconscious intention of the neurotic demand made of his wife, not to leave the house, was to keep her removed from any opportunity for sexual adventures. A passionate jealousy was concealed behind the façade of affectionate care. As is so often the case, however, the jealousy was homosexual in origin and had the unconscious meaning "She shall not have sexual experience with men! I shall have it!"

That these cases are clearly allied to compulsion neuroses is shown not only by the intensification of ambivalence and the increased importance of hate in their etiology, but also by the relatively frequent occurrence of cases which are combinations of agoraphobia and compulsion neurosis. Besides remarking the increase in muscle and equilibration eroticism in agoraphobia, Helene Deutsch¹ also pointed out that the anxiety attack in these cases may unconsciously represent a phantasy of giving birth.

It is obvious that anxiety hysteria in adult life, as contrasted

¹ Deutsch, Helene: *Psychoanalyse der Neurosen*. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1930. pp. 134 ff.

with the same illness in children, has been complicated by an accumulation of secondary factors, which are of much importance practically, but theoretically irrelevant. This applies especially to the "regression to childhood" with its resultant secondary gain: the agoraphobic becomes what he was as a child, a creature who must be protected and cared for by a mother.

The difference, important to be sure, between animal phobias of childhood and the anxiety hysterias of adult persons seems to us essentially to be incident to the complications introduced into the picture by the relative complexity of the adult mind. In principle, however, both adult and infantile phobias seem to have the same construction: when the ego is reminded by a temptation of the danger which is supposed to attend on a sexual activity, the signal of anxiety breaks through as a neurotic symptom in both cases—and a phobia develops to prevent this anxiety. Alexander¹ has pointed out that the projection discussed above, by virtue of which an inner impulse that has become a danger is treated as though it were an objective external danger, is more clearly evident in the phobias of children than in those of adults.

Little Hans was afraid of a horse but no longer of his love for his mother or his hostility to his father. In contrast, an adult agoraphobic who cannot go out on the street, because in her unconscious this act has come to mean that she is a prostitute, does nothing more or less than what other people with other inhibitions do: that is to say, she ceases to perform a sexualized function—and she is not projecting her impulse on to "the street" as an object. Yet this contrast though correct does not seem important, for by this "inhibition" the adult also avoids an external situation in order to escape an internal instinctual danger. Indeed in a certain sense we could say that children project *less* than adult anxiety hysterias: after

¹ Alexander, Franz: *Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit*. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1927. P. 154. (Trans. by Glueck and Lewin, *Nerv. & Ment. Monogr. Series*, No. 52. P. 109 f.)

all, the instinctual activity is a danger for the child only because he is afraid that his father will castrate him, and to the extent that he has a manifest fear of being bitten by a horse he has replaced one external danger (castration) by another external one (being bitten). The adult has long since introjected his fear of being castrated, so that he actually escapes from a true inner danger—the risk of being troubled by pangs of conscience—by avoiding an external situation which might lead to remorse. In both types of phobia, the end result is a fear of perceiving something.

As to the therapeutic indications, and the course of treatment, what was said of conversion hysteria, generally speaking, applies to anxiety hysteria as well. The capacity for transference is excellent in both conditions. However, cases in which there are obsessional and compulsive symptoms and which show the unconscious mechanisms of a compulsion neurosis have a correspondingly less favorable prognosis. (See the chapter "Compulsion Neuroses.")

Freud has called attention to a modification in technique necessary in analyzing typical phobias. When the framework of the neurosis has been somewhat loosened by the analysis, the analyst must actively intervene in order to induce the patient to make the first effort at overcoming the phobia; he must induce the patient to expose himself to the attack of anxiety in order to make the analysis a complete success.¹ In general the prognosis is favorable. Only in the presence of some special contraindication should one advise against analysis.

It is unnecessary at this point to discuss the question raised by Freud² as to whether the finding that many phobias essentially represent a reaction to aggressive tendencies, necessitates a revision of the assertion that neuroses are always a result of a sexual conflict. It is true that little Hans hated his father,

¹ Freud: *Wege der psychoanalytischen Therapie*. Ges. Schr. VI, 144. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* II, 400.)

² Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 64 ff.

and therefore feared retaliative measures, and that the agoraphobic's hostility to the parent of the same sex is often more important clinically than the love for the other parent. Yet the question raised is really of interest only to those who consider the contrast between the sexual instincts proper and the aggressive instincts (Eros and death instincts) to be of surpassing importance. It is our opinion that Freud's most recent classification of the instincts,¹ in spite of much that could be said for it still leaves, and even creates, quite a number of theoretical unclarities. The death instinct (*Todestrieb*) especially appears to lack the exact biological foundation that Freud's concept of instinct otherwise has. The facts that led to the assumption of a death instinct could just as well be interpreted as demonstrating the "Nirvana principle" which rules all types of instinctual behavior, rather than as demonstrating a special type of instinct.² But it was our intention to present only the clinical situation and omit any general questions relative to the fundamental theory of instinct. Practically speaking, we are still able to support the formulation that all neuroses have a sexual content, in the first place because during the phase of sado-masochism, aggression and sexuality cannot be distinguished from one another, and secondly because any pathogenic hatred of the father always appears in the form of the œdipus complex—that is, it is associated with sexual love for the mother.

There remains a more important problem, but unfortunately one which presents great theoretical difficulty—namely, what it is that determines whether a given individual will develop a conversion hysteria or an anxiety hysteria. If our contention that anxiety is a signal of a threatened danger is correct, we might expect that every neurosis begins as an anxiety hysteria, and also that all complex symptom formations are preceded by

¹ Freud: *Jenseits des Lustprinzips*. Ges. Schr. VI. (Trans. by Hubback: *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*. Int. Ps-A. Press, 1924), and *Das Ich und das Es*. Ges. Schr. VI. (Trans. by Riviere: *The Ego and the Id*. Hogarth Press, 1927.)

² Cf. in regard to this question Bernfeld and Feitelberg: *Der Entropiesatz und der Todestrieb*. Imago XVI, 1930.

anxiety, with which the ego signals the presence of danger. As a matter of fact, there are such cases, but it is also true that the majority of conversion hysterics are free from anxiety. Alexander¹ has pointed out a factor which in many cases may prove to be the crucial one. He believes that conversion hysterics spare themselves anxiety, i. e., fear of the punitive father or super-ego, by satisfying the demands of the punitive tendencies in a different way; that is to say, conversion symptoms also propitiate the repressing forces and have a self-punitive significance. In contrast to the more primitive ego of the anxiety hysteric, the ego of the conversion hysteric has already learned that suffering mitigates the demands of the super-ego, and consequently enables him to avoid anxiety. As we have said, the plausibility of this theory must be admitted, yet the circumstance that suffering and self-punishment are not necessarily always present in a conversion symptom seems to suggest that this formulation is not final and does not represent the fundamental difference between the two forms of hysteria. For the time being, we must concur with Freud, who says that the crucial factors determining whether or not manifest anxiety will accompany the formation of a symptom are still unknown.²

¹ Alexander, Franz: *Psychoanalyse der Gesamtpersönlichkeit*. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1927. Pp. 66 ff. (Trans. *Psychoanalysis of the Total Personality*. Pp. 44 ff.)

² Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 50.

CHAPTER III

HYSTERIFORM CONDITIONS

a. Organ libido

This chapter will be devoted to certain types of neurosis known as "hysteriform conditions," which in some respects resemble hysteria, but which in other respects differ from it considerably, and at times present clinical states that are transitions from hysteria to psychoses. In common with conversion hysteria, they all number among their symptoms, objective or subjective alterations in physiological function, which in the final analysis are found to be determined by a psychic conflict.

It will be recalled that our study of the conversion symptom showed us that the whole body, or any part of it, may serve as an instrument for the expression of a psychic process. Obviously, however, there are many ways for this expression to be manifest. In this chapter we shall attempt to describe the differences which obtain between the superficial clinical picture of conversion hysteria, on the one hand, and on the other, the actual neuroses, the organ neuroses, states of inhibition, and the traumatic neuroses. But since our chief interest lies in an understanding of the specific unconscious processes in these conditions, before entering upon such a description, we must make an apparent detour. In our discussion of conversion hysteria, we indicated the necessity—but neglected the task—of clarifying the concepts, in terms of which we formulate the problems that involve phenomena which are on the borderline between mind and body. We must now remedy this neglect.

In order to explain the normal or pathological physical manifestations of the instinctual conflicts which take place in our psychic apparatus, psychoanalysis utilizes the hypothesis of organ libido; this hypothesis was first proposed by Freud¹ and

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV.)

then elaborated and made useful by Ferenczi;¹ it was arrived at empirically and helps us in our empirical investigations; its further elaboration and modification depends entirely upon empirical observation.

What is *libido*? According to Freud, it may be defined as the energy of the sexual instinct. In other words, it is a quantitative concept.² We assume that every individual possesses a certain definite quantity of sexual energy—libido—which, naturally, can be increased or diminished by extrapsychic, i. e., somatic factors—such as normal or pathological changes of internal secretions, or drugs—but which otherwise remains a constant quantity in a given individual. In other words, he who spends a great deal of libido on one thing, has little of it to spend on other things. One should not, of course, conceive of the process too grossly and think that a person can do only one of two things: say, either have sexual intercourse, or sublimate, for the field of operation of the “sexual instinct”—as the term has been broadened by psychoanalysis—is quite manifold and complex; but there are a number of manifestations which we are able to explain by means of our hypothesis. As a matter of fact, despite the regrettable circumstance that we cannot measure psychic quantities, one of the three fundamental principles of theoretical psychoanalysis (the so-called metapsychological presentation of psychic processes) requires that a given psychic process be described quantitatively in terms of libido economy.

We must make for ourselves as clear a picture as possible of those somatic processes which are related to the various changes in the distribution of libido. As has been said, libido is the energy of the sexual instinct, and we must remember that in our instinctual life there is actually present a borderline field, which, depending upon circumstances, may be con-

¹ Ferenczi, S.: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

² Freud: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*. Ges. Schr. V, 92. (Trans. by Brill: *Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex*, 74.)

sidered either from the psychological or from the somatic biological point of view. Psychologically conceived, instinct is a stress, equipped with a given amount of energy, which is directed towards the performance of a given action, called the instinctual aim; and its activity is accompanied by the feeling of gratification. Viewed biologically, we must consider the *source* of the instinct—namely, a change in the soma which acts as a psychological stimulus or excitation; from this point of view the instinctual aim appears to be the removal of the excitation, and the tension that goes with it.¹ The question arises as to what physiological changes are associated with the sexual instinct, and what type of tension it is that is produced by an instinctual stimulus and made to disappear by means of an orgasm. Freud, in pointing out the detailed similarity between sexual excitement and the state of intoxication,² was in complete agreement with the physiological theory which considers internal secretions as the fundamental factor of sexuality, and which maintains that the source of the instinct is to be found in the sexual hormones, which circulate in the blood stream, and by their chemical effect produce observable changes, particularly in the central nervous system and in the genital organs. It is not necessary for our purposes to go into the details of sexual physiology, such as the problem of the origin and specificity of the sexual hormones, the nature of the endocrine part of the gonads, the relationship of the sexual glands to the thyroid or the pituitary glands, etc. It will suffice for us to visualize the process grossly and bear in mind the fact that there are sexual substances which act chemically and produce instinctual stimuli which we perceive psychologically. The refinement of this gross presentation, the ultimate chemical isolation of these sexual substances, is still lacking; this will

¹ Freud: *Triebe und Triebchicksale*. Ges. Schr. V, 444 f. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV. Pp. 60 et seq.)

² Freud: *Drei Abhandlungen zur Sexualtheorie*. Ges. Schr. V, 91. (Trans. by Brill, *op. cit.*, 73.)

some day give us a biological foundation on which any psychoanalytical libido theory must rest.

Let us go one step further: Psychoanalysis teaches us that sexual excitation originates not only in the genital organs, but in other parts of the body as well, such as the so-called erotogenic zones. This would lead to the conclusion that the sexual hormonal substances accumulate in and affect not only the genital organs but also all the other erotogenic parts of the body; in other words, they must be sufficiently displaceable to accompany, for example, the regression which, as psychoanalysis shows, may take place, psychologically, from genital to anal eroticism. This conception agrees with our assumption that the sexual hormones are transported through the blood stream. We must assume, therefore, that the sexual hormonal substances are present in every part of the body but that they are distributed unevenly; their distribution will vary depending on physiological and psychological factors. Therefore, the statement, that various organs possess varying libido cathexis, is a somewhat incorrect way of saying that they are supplied with varying quantities of sexual hormonal substances and consequently serve as sources for libidinal excitations in varying degrees. A number of objective and subjective data tend to corroborate this theory; however, the subjective and objective signs are rarely consistent with each other, and it is one of our most important tasks to explain why it is that in most cases we find only subjective, or only objective signs. As an example of objective physiological evidence of an increase of libido cathexis, we may cite the erect phallus: it shows certain physiological changes; its turgor is increased; it shows swelling and redness—in a word, it shows signs similar to those of inflammation. Ferenczi showed in detail that when their libido cathexis is increased, other organs of the body show similar changes. (Cf. "the genitalization of organs" in hysteria.)¹ However, factual data lead us to believe

¹ Ferenczi, S.: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*, 17. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc., 82.)

that such objective signs of libido cathexis of organs become evident only under certain definite circumstances. We shall discuss later the quantitative and qualitative factors which play a decisive rôle in these phenomena. As an example of subjective evidence of the increase of libido cathexis in a given organ, we may best cite the phenomenon of hypochondria, the nature of which remained obscure until Freud advanced the following hypothesis:¹ the organs which happen to be the source of hypochondriacal sensations are *actually* altered, even though physiological investigation fails to demonstrate any changes; these organs are invested with an increased charge of libido, which is perceived psychologically as a disagreeable tension. The changes observed in the psychological attitude of hypochondriacal individuals speak in favor of this point of view; their attitude is narcissistic, which means that their libidinal interest in people about them is diminished, proportionally to the increase of their hypochondriacal complaints. In other words, we assume that the libido which is usually directed to the outside world is diverted to the bodily organs (we shall discuss this concept later) and that a blockage or damming up of libido ensues. Freud adopted a similar hypothesis regarding the "actual neuroses," anxiety neurosis and neurasthenia: he claimed that anxiety or neurasthenic complaints follow in the wake of such factors as failure to obtain sexual gratification, or an abortive orgasm, i. e., a frustrated excitation.² Freud thus assumed that in a case of an inadequate orgasm the quantities of physical libido (or of sexual hormonal substances) which fail to find an outlet are retained in the body and exert a toxic effect on the organs. An investigation into the nature of these conditions, and of the variability of the libido fluctuations in the organs, would form the subject

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI, 166 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, p. 40.)

² Freud: *Über die Berechtigung, von der Neurasthenie einen bestimmten Symptomenkomplex als "Angstneurose" abzutrennen*. Ges. Schr. I, und: *Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen*. Ges. Schr. V. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers* I.)

matter of a special physiology of pleasure, which Ferenczi advocated as a supplement to the usual physiology.¹

The question now arises, how is "erogeneity" related to the symptoms of the damming up of libido? "Erogenicity" is the accumulation of sexual substances in definite body zones, with instinctual consequences in the psychic sphere, that in turn are ultimately expressed through an objective physical sign, the erection of the genital; the symptoms produced being particularly defined in the actual neuroses, and in hypochondria. Should we assume that the difference between the two phenomena is a purely quantitative one, and say, that a certain charge of libido produces psychologically a state of sexual excitement, but that a greater concentration of libido produces a damming up and consequently a psychological state of painful tension? This assumption would lead to the conclusion that in the case of the actual neurosis, external circumstances cut off the possibility of a libidinal outlet and give rise to the disorder, while in the case of hypochondria possibly psychogenic internal circumstances bring about the same closure of a libidinal outlet. Should we consider this as the only factor responsible for the difference between the two phenomena?

At this point we must take into consideration the complication which we introduced into our discussion when we said that in the hypochondriacal individual the object libido is transformed into organ libido, that his libido is withdrawn from the outside world and directed towards his own organ. By this statement we abandoned the "pleasure physiology" description and point of view, and turned to psychological ones. We must bear in mind that as long as we spoke in physiological materialistic terms—i. e., as long as we meant sexual substances when we said libido—we had in mind only the displacement of libido from the genital on to other organs; we could not be thinking of any displacement of libido on to individuals in the environment, since the latter obviously cannot be the

¹ Ferenczi, S.: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

bearers of the sexual hormonal substances of another person. A thought then suggests itself: the purely physiological process may very well be the same in hysteria or similar reactions, such as extragenital perversions and the like, and in hypochondria (or similar reactions such as actual neuroses, physical sensations in psychotics, etc.). In all these instances one may say that there is too little concentration of the sexual substances in the genital organs and too great an accumulation in other organs. Evidently the difference between the two processes, that is to say, the factor deciding whether erogeneity or damming up of the libido will take place, cannot be simply the accumulation of dammed up quantities of libido; evidently, too, it cannot depend merely on whether or no there is a possibility for the sexual substances concentrated in the organs to find an outlet in the form of definite instinctual behavior; for it appears that some factor of a psychological order must decide whether the discharge of the libido is to take the form of a hysterical symptom or of a sexual perversion. It is the psychological factor, then, that we must examine more closely.

When there is sexual excitement accompanying object love, sexual substances must accumulate in the genital organs and in other erotogenic zones and produce the characteristic tension; in hysteria or in perverse object love, these substances accumulate primarily in erotogenic zones other than the genitals; one may say, therefore, that in these instances, too, organs are charged with libido. The same is true of the narcissistic state known as hypochondria. We may therefore formulate the situation in a preliminary fashion and state that it makes an enormous difference whether the organs are charged with quantities of object libidinal energy or with quantities of narcissistic, or ego libido. The question then arises, how are we to imagine the psychological status of the energy coming from the sexual instinct under the two above-named qualitatively different states of the libido.

We stated that when there is an object libidinal attitude, the objects are charged with libido, while in the narcissistic

state they are not. What do we mean by "object cathexis"? By this expression we undoubtedly signify something that has nothing to do with the distribution of sexual hormonal substances in the body. Also, it has nothing to do with the actual person who serves as the libidinal object; it is, rather, an intrapsychic process in the person who loves, i. e., the subject. If A falls in love with B, the process, love, does not take place within or via B; it is a process taking place wholly in A, who begins to feel and think and behave differently towards B. One would naturally ask, what is it, then, that becomes charged with libido? Evidently not B himself—but the sum total of the ideas which A has in regard to B, B's intrapsychic object representation in A. This sum total of representations possesses a special force; in other words, a special mass of psychic energy is at its disposal. The sexual tensions produced by the libidinal, i. e., hormonal, charges of the genitalia or other erotogenic organs, force the person to engage in instinctual action in relation to the individual whose intrapsychic representation is charged with libido.¹ Object representations of this type lose their libido charges when a regression to narcissism takes place. In order to understand whither this object libido is turned then, we must remember that our own body was at one time to us (psychologically), a sort of outside world; it was a singular part of the outside world; it was only after the peculiar nature of it was recognized that a differentiation between ego and outside world was made, and the organization of an ego brought about. However, this is a problem outside the scope of these pages.² Our own body and its organs are represented intrapsychically by means of a number of perceptions and their interrelations.³ Hence, there exist also intrapsychic organ representations, and therefore when we speak of nar-

¹ Fenichel, Otto: *Die Identifizierung*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XII, 1926.

² Freud: *Das Ich und das Es*. Ges. Schr. VI, 369. (Trans. by Riviere: *The Ego and the Id*, 30 ff.)

³ There is a great deal to be said about the significance for our psychic life of this representation and of the body scheme. Cf. Schilder, Paul: *Das Körperschema*, Berlin 1923.

cissism it is more correct to say that the charge of libido is transferred from the object representations to the organ representations and not as we stated before in a general way—from the object to the ego; these organ representations may then stimulate in the respective organs various chemical, neural, or hormonal changes.

It is clear that if sexual substances accumulate in given organs when there is an intrapsychic libido investment of the object representations, we are dealing with a hysteria, a perversion, or a normal individual—and that a different situation obtains if the libidinal charges make up the investment of the organ representations, in which case we deal with hypochondria or psychoses. Between these two main types of reaction we could place the actual neuroses, neurasthenias, anxiety neuroses, and the so-called organ neuroses. As we have pointed out, the actual neuroses and the neurasthenias are viewed by Freud as organic, toxic results of the fact that sexual hormonal substances through external—or perhaps more frequently internal psychogenic—factors failed to find a proper outlet (abortive orgasm). One might easily imagine that such an inhibited orgasmic reaction may very well take place more frequently and with greater readiness in those individuals who have a certain predisposition to libidinize the intrapsychic organ representations; hence, there are a number of intermediary forms presenting transitions from these neuroses to completely narcissistic hypochondria. As to the reactions which we call organ neuroses, we shall find among them some reactions more like hysteria, others more like hypochondria; we may thus find a conversion hysteria, the chief symptomatology of which is concentrated on one single organ and which follows all the laws of a straight hysteria, with symptoms that have specific unconscious infantile sexual meaning; on the other hand, we may also find narcissistic states resembling a psychosis, the symptoms of which are unspecific expressions of the narcissistic libidinization of the organ representations and

of the resulting accumulation of sexual substances in the given organs for which there is no adequate outlet of discharge—this outlet was closed by the regression to the narcissistic state. We must remember that these symptoms always represent the original conflicts with the outside world in a regressive distorted form.

Some confusion found in the literature dealing with the problem of organ libido is due to the fact that it is not always clear what the authors mean by organ libidinal processes. It is not always clear whether they think of these processes as the immediate sexual hormonal—i. e., chemical—reactions within the organ, or as processes which are primarily psychological and refer to the *organ representations*, to which the physiological organic changes are secondary. Freud, in speaking of the actual neuroses, had in mind direct physical agents,¹ as had Ferenczi in his description of the pathoneuroses.² Yet a number of organ libidinal manifestations, to be distinguished from hysterias and normal reactions, have to be viewed from another point of view. Freud, for example, in describing pain, considered it an organ libidinal phenomenon,³ but in the first work in which he discussed organ libido, "The Introduction to Narcissism", he pointed out the difference between an "overloading of erotogenic zones with sexual substances" and a "narcissistic libido cathexis of the organ representations"; he stated: "Any change in the erogeneity of the organs may be paralleled by a change in the libido charge of the ego," that is to say, of the organ representations.⁴ It is only this libido

¹ Freud: *Über die Berechtigung, von der Neurasthenie einen bestimmten Symptomkomplex als "Angstneurose" abzutrennen*. Ges. Schr. I. *Meine Ansichten über die Rolle der Sexualität in der Ätiologie der Neurosen*. Ges. Schr. V. See also: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 82. (First two papers trans. in *Coll. Papers*, I.)

² Ferenczi, Sándor: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*. (Trans. in *Further Contributions, etc.*)

³ Freud: *Hemmung, Symptom und Angst*. Ges. Schr. XI, 114f.

⁴ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI, 167. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, 41.)

charge of the ego which has a claim to be called narcissistic organ libido in the narrow sense of the word. One more difficulty remains to be overcome. If our theory of hypochondria is correct, then it could also be applied to organic diseases, since, as Freud pointed out,¹ in organic diseases too a regression to narcissism takes place—that is to say, libidinal cathexes are withdrawn from objects and turned on to the organ affected by the disease. This is true as far as the results of the disease are concerned, for both in hypochondria and in organic diseases we deal with a psychic hypercathexis of the organ representation at the expense of object representations. The difference between the two conditions lies in their origin: in hypochondria we think of the material, sexual, hormonal changes in the organs as being the result of a primary psychogenic hypercathexis of the organ representations, while in organic disease the same hypercathexis is a result of antecedent organic changes within the organ. Ferenczi has proved that this is actually so. He described as pathoneurosis, a form of neurosis which represents a direct consequence of libido displacements produced by an organic disease.² This brings forth another difficult question: If it is true that in order to bring about the healing of a diseased organ—to raise the organ's resistance to the illness—our organism needs an increase in the libido cathexis of the given organ, then what we call the body libido must have some general vital function; body libido thus appears to become equated with "vital energy." This is to a certain extent quite true and is fundamentally not unknown to psychoanalysis. Our experience leads us to believe that even in the domain of purely psychological phenomena, it is not always possible to differentiate sharply the energies used in self-preservation from the libidinal ones; moreover, it is

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI, 165 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, 39.)

² Ferenczi, Sándor: *Hysterie und Pathoneurosen*. (Trans. in *Further Contributions*, etc.)

possible to infer the existence of a purely libidinal self-preservation factor, i. e., the existence of narcissistic or ego libido.¹ In other words, narcissistic libido is nothing else than body libido, the libido with which the body representations and the organ representations are charged—in contradistinction to object libido, with which object representations are invested. We may thus assume that bodily, as well as psychic, self-sustenance depends upon the infusion of a certain amount of libidinal energy. Tausk was therefore right when he spoke of a *libidinal tonus*, to indicate the libido cathexis of organs which provides a physiological optimum; this refers both to the material, sexual hormonal cathexis and the psychological cathexis of the organ representations.² The results of a pathological increase of these cathexes are manifested clinically as hypochondria and as psychoses. There exists also a pathological diminution of these cathexes. However, we must state that not every "elimination" of an organ from the mind, not every removal of bodily parts, and not every disappearance of deep sensibility from the realm of the ego, should be interpreted as a pathological diminution of the libidinal cathexes of the organ. We know for example that in a neurosis, certain ideas or instinctual stimulations do not always appear on the surface, yet this does not mean that these are actually divested of libido; they may be repressed—really invested with a large quantity of libido—yet at the same time counteracted and prevented from coming to manifest expression by an equally large counter-cathexis. One may observe the analogous phenomenon in the field of organ libidinal processes;³ the problems involved, relating to the conflicts accompanying defense and repression, and their influence on body sensibility and motor

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV.)

² Tausk, Viktor: *Über den Beeinflussungsapparat in der Schizophrenie*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. V, 1919.

³ Fenichel, Otto: *Über organlibidinöse Begleiterscheinungen der Triebabwehr*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XIV, 1928.

expression, are of the greatest importance in the study of the organ neuroses, of the actual neuroses, and of a number of bodily inhibitions met with in normal individuals; but up to the present they have not been sufficiently studied.

b. Actual Neuroses, Pathoneuroses and Organ Neuroses

Having outlined the above mentioned neuroses from the standpoint of the theory of libido, we may now present briefly and systematically their chief clinical characteristics.

Of all the actual neuroses, hypochondria stands out most clearly as typical; it is typical, however, only from the theoretical point of view, for in reality hypochondria very rarely appears alone, as an isolated neurosis; it appears more frequently as a factor complicating the picture of some other psychopathological condition; it is to a mild degree a complicating factor in the compulsion neurosis and other neuroses, and, as is well known, it is an important complication in all psychoses. We have made it clear that the individual who complains hypochondriacally is quite right: his organs are actually affected because of the antecedent accentuation of his narcissism, which brought about a hypercathexis of his organ representations, and, in turn, too great a damming up of libido in his organs.¹ The cause of such hypercathexis of the organs may, naturally, be a physical one too. As has been said before, the same mechanism is at work in ordinary physical disease. However, when we speak of hypochondria, we have in mind a condition which is not accompanied by any gross organic lesions. Even when there are no such lesions, physical factors may have forced the individual into a narcissistic state; there may, for example, be a toxic factor, but hypochondria, accompanying the toxic psychoses, has not been investigated psychoanalytically. Later we may have an opportunity to discuss the possibly toxic nature of the hypochondria which is found in schizophrenic and depressive states. At present we are more

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI, 166 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, 40 ff.)

interested in the pure types of hypochondria, i. e., those produced by a purely psychological regression. The psychological causes responsible for hypochondria may be the same as those producing other regressions to narcissism; for we frequently observe hypochondria as part of the clinical picture in narcissistic neuroses. It is impossible, of course, to deal here exhaustively with the problem of narcissism—a problem which is of such importance in schizophrenias and depressions.¹ We shall merely point out that the impulses which were originally object libidinal in their orientation, turn from the objects to the individual's own organs. The hostile, sadistic impulses appear to play a particularly important rôle in hypochondria. Hypochondria, then, is the expression of one's sadism turned against one's own self; at the same time, because of the original hostile attitude towards the object, one's conscience may create a need for punishment; hypochondria can thus serve as a gratification of this need for punishment, and of masochistic libidinal impulses.

One should differentiate hypochondriacal sensations from hypochondriacal anxiety. Usually, these two reactions are found in one and the same individual, but occasionally one predominates over the other in the clinical picture. Both express a turning away from the objective world and a narcissistic turning toward one's own organs; in the case of anxiety one thinks of an isolated hypercathexis of the intrapsychic organ representations, or of the antagonistic counter-cathexis. The torturing hypochondriacal self-observation may as justly be considered an expression of counter-cathexis, as the self-observation seen in compulsion neurotics or depersonalized individuals. As to those cases in which the hypochondriacal sensations predominate: in them, the changes produced by the hypochondriacal process in the organs themselves play a more important rôle. It often happens that psychoanalysis uncovers in a surprisingly clear and definite way the psychological meaning of

¹ To be discussed in later chapters of this *Outline*.

a given hypochondriacal anxiety. As a rule it represents in a distorted manner, castration anxiety as well as masochistic gratification. One is reminded in this connection of the continuation of the analysis of the Wolfman by Mack Brunswick.¹ The Wolfman's outspoken hypochondriacal delusion bore the definite earmarks of a castration trend.

Not infrequently psychoanalysis can detect the infantile history of the castration anxiety and discover how it became displaced and was transformed into fears of becoming ill, or physically altered. In such cases, it appears that in the deeper psychological layers, the mechanism of introjection has acquired an outstanding importance. When hostile impulses, originally directed against an object, become regressively directed against one's own organs, this process is expressed in the unconscious as an introjection, usually an oral one, though occasionally the introjection is anal, epidermal, or respiratory. Hence, the organ invested with hypochondriacal trends represents not only the endangered penis; it represents at the same time the object, which along with its ambivalent cathexis, was taken from the outside world and into one's own body.

One of my cases of hypochondria, which was successfully analyzed,² showed that in the upper layers of his psyche his hypochondria had the meaning of castration, as punishment; at a somewhat deeper level it meant a sexual gratification, pregnancy; and on a still deeper level the organ affected was equated with the introjected object, the super-ego. His nose, which was chosen to play the chief rôle in his illness, stood not only for the injured penis, but the nostrils served him as an anal vagina, which he wished to have. It also stood for his dead mother, whom he incorporated in an oral and respiratory way.

Thus, the formula stating that the hypochondriacal individual estranges himself from his own organ requires some supplementation in the light of this last deepest meaning of a hypochondriacal complaint. Despite the estrangement from

¹ Brunswick, Ruth Mack: *Ein Nachtrag zu Freuds Geschichte einer infantilen Neurose*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XV, 1929. (Trans. in Int. J. Ps-A. IX.)

² Fenichel, Otto: *Über respiratorische Introjektion*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XVII, 1931.

its bearer, this organ represents the introjected object and the super-ego. Simmel pointed out this unconscious equation between the organ, which is hypochondriacally or pathologically affected, and the introjected object. He writes: "The introjected parental substitute becomes the morbid material which must be eliminated if the patient is to recover." He further states that an organ may represent this morbid material.¹

Painful sensations and fear of physical illness may also appear in conversion hysteria, and there are cases in which it is more or less a matter of free choice whether they should be considered as belonging to a hysterical or a hypochondriacal process. As a rule, however, it is quite easy to differentiate the hypochondriacal from the hysterical individual. This can be done on the basis of the personality traits, which are due to the differences in their libidinal situation: the hypochondriac is a conspicuously narcissistic, seclusive, monomaniacal creature. Hypochondria is thus a transitional form between the light hysteria-like reactions and the severe, delusional, clearly psychotic reactions.

It is easier to understand the anxiety in actual neuroses. Let us recall the finding reported by Freud, which is readily confirmed: that there are individuals, suffering from a chronic disturbance of their orgasm, who show anxiety, or autonomic symptomatic equivalents, without ideational content, and whose symptoms disappear with the cessation of the unhealthy sexual practice. It is questionable, however, whether one often finds such pure anxiety neuroses; moreover, it might be questioned whether the majority of chronic disturbances of the orgasm, though they do produce anxiety, are not them-

¹ Simmel, Ernst: *Doktorspiel, Kranksein und Arztberuf*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926. (Trans in Int. J. Ps-A. VII, 1926.) This equation with the object had already been recognized in the case of a definite "organ", namely, the intestinal contents, and was genetically worked out in *Die psychophysische Bedeutung des Intestinalorgans für die Urverdrängung*. Paper read at the 8th International Psychoanalytic Congress in Salzburg. Abstract in Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. X, 1924.

selves the result of a psychoneurotic disturbance. If we bear in mind our considerations outlined in the chapter on anxiety hysteria, we should have no difficulty in understanding the anxiety which occurs in the actual neurosis: it is purely id anxiety—of the same type which the hungry suckling experiences. The whole mass of sexual excitation, which is unable to find an outlet, is a psychological analogue to the trauma of birth—an increase in tension due to an increase in needs. Anxiety here cannot be a signal given by the ego; there is merely a tension created by unsatisfied needs due to the lack of sexual gratification. The accumulation of sexual substances—the effect of their being dammed up—and their toxic action automatically sets up an anxiety reaction.

Reich pointed out that during sexual excitement typical autonomic nervous reactions occur. In normal sexual life, such autonomic cathexes evidently become transformed into genital ones and find an outlet through the genital apparatus. On the other hand, in cases of disturbed orgasmic function, this does not take place, the autonomic system remains overcharged—and this produces the manifestations of actual neuroses, especially the anxiety of the anxiety neuroses.¹ We might add that psychologically this autonomic hypercathexis seems an analogue of the increased tension accompanying birth.

The most obscure problem is that of neurasthenic manifestations, which are closely related both to hypochondria and anxiety neuroses. We may say in general that they too are results of the damming up of libido, which in turn is probably caused by a psychological factor. The acute forms of neurasthenia are apparently like those of anxiety neurosis, an expression of the hypercathexis of the autonomic system. As to the chronic forms, they present to psychoanalysis a more difficult and as yet unsolved problem. According to Reich, the uncontrolled libido which floods the organs or the organ representations, is exclusively pregenital in nature; in neurasthenic indi-

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*, p. 69 ff.

viduals even the genital organs appear unconsciously to serve pregenital aims.¹ Reich characterizes the situation in the following formula: "I do not want to have sexual relations; I want to use my genital organs for pregenital purposes." This in contradistinction to the formula of the hysterical individual: "I do not want to have sexual intercourse because I am afraid."² As we shall see later in the chapter on compulsion neuroses, there are also some patients who substitute pregenital wishes for genital ones because of anxiety; hence, there can be a combination of both of these formulae: "I do not want to have sexual intercourse—I want to use my genital organs for pregenital purposes—because I am afraid." It appears therefore that chronic neurasthenia is related to the compulsion neurosis. It is also possible that in contradistinction to regressive compulsion neuroses, the severe developmental disturbances of libido are peculiar to that group of individuals who in their childhood never reached the phallic phase and therefore never developed a real œdipus complex. Therefore, their pregenital nature is not a result of regression but of an actual arrest of development. Their characteristic sexual disturbance is the severe asthenic *ejaculatio præcox*, of which the psychological contents are anal, urethral, and sadistic impulses and an identification with mother and suckling.³ To be sure there are among neurasthenic individuals masturbators, but it is the rule, that because of their organic impotence, their masturbation fails to gratify them, and as a result they develop their actual neurosis. Frequently it suffices to analyze the form of their masturbation to recognize its pregenital latent content.⁴ The following unconscious formula expresses their masturbation: it is an attempt to relieve pregenital tension by means of

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Chronische hypochondrische Neurasthenie*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. XII, 1926.

² Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*, p. 131.

³ Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*, p. 125 ff.

⁴ Reich, Wilhelm: *Über Spezifität der Onanieformen*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. VIII, 1922.

genital methods. Quantitatively speaking, they fail in this attempt to obtain an adequate outlet, so they try again and again. This explains why compulsive masturbators and their extreme types, "the masturbation addicts" are so frequently chronic neurasthenics.¹ The same damming up of the libido which cannot find an outlet is responsible for the fact that neurasthenics are externally restless, cannot concentrate, or do any work.

It is clear now that actual neuroses, conditioned as they are by disturbances of the orgasm, have indirectly a psychological etiology, for these disturbances are produced by the anxiety and the feelings of guilt with which the individual reacts to his sexuality, this sexuality being reduced to infantile terms. On the other hand, in all psychoneuroses, as in actual neuroses, sexuality is repressed and remains without a proper outlet, so that the libido is dammed up.² For this reason we find that in reality the symptoms of the actual neuroses and the psychoneuroses are frequently intermingled. A sharp differentiation between actual neuroses and psychoneuroses is at times possible only in theory.

In regard to indications for psychoanalytical therapy, actual neuroses present a more problematic situation than hysterias. In those acute cases in which it appears possible by means of a comparatively simple investigation to detect the precipitating cause, if the patient is accessible, it may be possible to remove the cause; and insofar as it is generally possible, to achieve a quick therapeutic success. However, insofar as the causative factors are anchored in realities which cannot be changed, psychotherapeutic help is hardly of any avail. As to the severe chronic forms of actual neuroses, the situation is different. Insofar as they represent a result of infantile instinctual development, i. e., a regression to narcissism, one might expect

¹ A detailed consideration of this will be found in the chapter on "Perversion-like Neuroses."

² Reich, Wilhelm: *Die Funktion des Orgasmus*, p. 18 ff.

that psychoanalysis would obviously be indicated, but it is easy to recognize at once the disadvantages these neuroses present compared to hysteria: the chronic actual neuroses are no longer transference neuroses. The more hysteriform they are the better the prognosis; however, the more narcissism appears to predominate, the more doubtful and insecure, and the less useful therapeutically are the transference manifestations which these neuroses might show. From the standpoint of therapeutic possibilities, the severe hypochondriacal forms hardly differ from real psychoses. But even if this difficulty did not exist, chronic neurasthenia presents still further difficulties; to which Reich¹ emphatically called our attention. The point made by Reich is as follows: The ease or the difficulty with which the neurotic disturbances of an individual's libido economy can be eliminated and the individual turned towards a condition of normal genital primacy, depends on how much the given individual has been psychologically ready, previously, for such a primacy of the genital sphere; in other words, it depends on the extent to which the genital pathway had been, as it were, "opened up." Thus, what gives hysteria a good prognostic outlook is the fact that the primacy of the genital sphere had already been established before the neurosis set in; the therapeutic aim in hysteria is not to raise the individual to genitality, but to have him give up his infantile object choice. For the same reasons, the more definite it is that a compulsion neurotic individual, in his infantile development, had reached the phallic phase before the critical regression set in, the easier it is for him to be cured. The neurasthenic individual, however, is a type of person who failed completely or almost completely to reach just this level of infantile genitality, upon which a therapy would subsequently have to rely. It appears, therefore, that the outlook for a psychoanalysis of chronic cases of actual neuroses is rather unfavor-

¹ Reich, Wilhelm: *Weitere Bemerkungen über die therapeutische Bedeutung der Genitallibido*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XI, 1925.

able; the decision to apply psychoanalytic therapy to such cases would depend upon such circumstances as capacity for the development of a transference and the status of the infantile genitality of the particular case. At any rate, these factors can be estimated only by means of a rather long trial analysis. Yet one may say that in doubtful cases the indications are nevertheless in favor of psychoanalysis; for it is quite definitely established that many individuals of this type cannot be helped by any other therapeutic method, whereas psychoanalysis affords at least a hopeful possibility.

The group of pathoneuroses, which Ferenczi first described, is related to that of the actual neuroses, but the etiological process is here reversed. In the various forms of hypochondria, as we have seen, a psychological cause forces the object cathexis to be turned into an organ cathexis, which in turn produces physical symptoms. In pathoneuroses the process is as follows: a physical cause demands that a given organ or its representation be furnished with large quantities of libido; the psychic apparatus, then, in order to satisfy this demand, has to withdraw quantities of libido from the objects of the outside world. The result is that the person becomes more narcissistic.

As we have already stated, there is no physical illness which fails to set up a pathoneurosis, at least in some degree, for, as Freud¹ pointed out, every physically ill individual temporarily becomes more narcissistic. As to the problem, whether or not a particular organic disease is psychogenic in origin, the decision—very difficult in practice—depends largely on whether the relationship of the organic symptoms to the psychological conflicts corresponds more to the hypochondriacal or the pathoneurotic type. In other words, the point to establish would be, whether a psychogenic hypercathexis of the organ gave rise to the illness, or whether a primary physical involvement of the organ produced the hypercathexis, and

¹ Freud: *Zur Einführung des Narzissmus*. Ges. Schr. VI, 165 ff. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, IV, 39.)

thus mobilized a psychological conflict.¹ Occasionally one finds objections to the idea that physically afflicted organs are hyper-cathected narcissistically. It is sometimes objected, that it seems improbable that a psychologically normal person, who becomes somewhat more egotistic and self-willed as a result of being physically ill, should be using the same mechanism as a psychotic person, that is, narcissistic regression. The answer to this objection is, that the psychological changes in the physically ill are in point of fact more like those met with in psychotic and less like those of neurotic individuals. For, in physical illness, as in a psychosis, the individual turns away from objects, real or phantasied. The difference between the physically and the psychotically ill is, to be sure, considerable; yet theoretically speaking, it is only a quantitative difference. The physically ill individual has relegated only a small part of his libido to the same fate which the psychotic individual has imposed on almost the sum total of his libido.

From these considerations, it follows that the pathoneuroses proper—that is to say, psychological sequelae of organic illnesses which quantitatively go beyond the normal psychological reaction to physical illness—bear the earmarks of a psychosis like reaction. Again we appear to be dealing with a psychopathic reaction that is intermediate between hysteria and psychosis, whose most typical or, at any rate, best defined forms are more nearly related to the psychoses. It will also be clear that individuals with a tendency to narcissistic regression, who show other evidence of heightened constitutional narcissism, are most predisposed to the development of a pathoneurosis; and that pathoneuroses are most likely to develop as a result of an illness in those organs which are most highly cathected narcissistically, such as the genital organs or the brain. It is

¹ This problem up to the present appears to have suffered too much neglect in psychological literature. Cf. for example, Deutsch, Felix: *Psychoanalyse und Organkrankheiten*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. VIII, 1922; *Der gesunde und der kranke Körper in psychoanalytischer Beleuchtung*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XII, 1926; and Groddeck, Georg: *Über die Psychoanalyse des Organischen im Menschen*, Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. VII, 1921.

probable that the majority of acute postoperative psychoses belong to this group. Ferenczi and Hollós seem to have proved that much of the symptomatology of general paralysis is not a direct consequence of the degenerative processes in the brain, but an indirect pathoneurotic reaction to the patient's own observation of his organically determined loss of cerebral function.¹ Psychoses which develop after mutilating accidents are also based on a narcissistic regression of the pathoneurotic type. The function of these psychoses is very evidently to deny the unpleasant reality, and their clinical picture is dominated by the conflict between the tendency to deny and the perception of the real state of affairs (so that projections, etc., appear). The whole conflict, however, in such cases has undergone a much greater psychic elaboration.²

As to the treatment of pathoneuroses, a number of them, as we should expect from the nature of the libidinal disturbance, run an acute course and recover spontaneously after a short while. In such cases, although a psychoanalysis would undoubtedly yield many interesting findings, it would only be of theoretical interest without any therapeutic significance. In more severe forms of pathoneuroses, we are no longer dealing with a "pathoneurosis proper," but with chronic true psychoses precipitated "pathoneurotically" by the organic disease.

The field of organ neuroses stretches from conversion hysteria to hypochondria.³ For the purpose of differential diagnosis, it is first of all necessary to establish to what extent a particular physical symptom represents the converted expression of a phantasied infantile sexual relationship—that is, to what extent it is a conversion symptom—and to what extent it represents a completely narcissistic substitute for a libidinal relationship with objects.

¹ Ferenczi and Hollós: *Zur Psychoanalyse der paralytischen Geistesstörung*. Int. Psa. Verlag, 1922. (Trans. in Nerv. and Ment. Monograph Series, 1925.)

² Cf. Freud: *Neurose und Psychose*. Ges. Schr. V. (Trans. in *Coll. Papers*, II); and Brill, A. A.: *Unconscious Insight*. Int. J. Ps-A. X, 1929.

³ Cf. Ferenczi, Sándor: *Organneurosen und ihre Behandlung*, in Federn-Meng, *Das psychoanalytische Volksbuch*; and Schultz-Hencke, Harald: *Zur Diskussion der Organneurosen*. Nervenarzt I, 11.

Let us consider at first the reaction which is in the main similar to hysteria. We have already mentioned the multiplicity of circumstances which determine the choice of an organ for a hysterical conversion symptom. These are: somatic compliance, special factors in the infantile history of the individual, a partial pregenital fixation, and the particular suitability of an organ for symbolic representation. Under certain circumstances a particular organ may satisfy all of these conditions to such an extent that a hysterical reaction may be limited to this one single organ. From the clinical standpoint, it is customary to speak of such reactions as organ neuroses. However, it would be more correct to call them localized conversion hysterias.

Most cases of so-called cardiac neuroses are illustrative of this group of cases. Psychoanalysis of such cases brings most clearly to light the phenomenon which, following Ferenczi, we are accustomed to call *genitalization*. Thus a patient suffering from a cardiac neurosis related that the constant palpitation of his heart was accompanied by the feeling that the heart was getting larger and larger; that his whole chest became more and more tense up to a certain almost unbearable point; and that then the whole thing would stop—the palpitation would cease and his heart would “shrink” again. On the basis of infantile material obtained in the case, the patient accepted the following interpretation that was given to him: his heart represented his penis which would become erect and finally reach an ejaculation. A few days after this interpretation was given, the patient reported that his cardiac sensations had disappeared but that other remarkable symptoms had set in. He now felt as if his heart were breaking open in order to take something in. This feeling, he said, was not less torturing than the former expansion and shrinking. Thus, the heart in this case took over symptomatology of a bisexual nature representing the masculine as well as the feminine genital organs.

It is self-evident that all the organ systems may display analogous reactions. Thus gastro-intestinal neuroses are of the same nature. The choice of the organ in such cases is determined by oral and anal fixations. Such pregenital organ neuroses occur not only because the pregenital erotogenic zones become the seat of pregenital symptoms, but also because in certain cases the genital wishes are actually given up, and the pregenital wishes with all their pregenital characteristics regressively take their place and then become expressed in conversion symptoms. The true pregenital conversion neuroses,

which in contradistinction to hysteria arise as a result of a complete regression, are represented by such reactions as tic, stammering, and bronchial asthma. We shall return to these after we have studied the compulsion neuroses, which are also caused by a complete regression.

We must say a few words about the deeply regressive organ neuroses which are far removed from hysteria and therefore represent a transition to the narcissistic hypochondriacal reaction. These are, in contradistinction to hysteria, the genuine narcissistic organ neuroses which respond with difficulty to therapeutic influence. The organs afflicted in such cases are libidinized in the same way as they are in conversion hysteria. The foundation on which these states arise is also the general erogeneity of all our organs and functions, and their symptoms appear whenever and wherever physiological functions acquire a sexual meaning, and when the carrying out of these functions is productive of a sexual sensation which the individual wants to reject. However, the difference between these reactions and hysteria is now easy to understand: in the hysterical libidinization of organs the unconscious object cathexes are preserved, while in the genuine organ neuroses, these object cathexes are, if not entirely, then partially given up; in other words, the organs, as in actual neuroses and psychoses, acquire a special significance at the expense of object libidinal relationships. As in hypochondria, it is possible to prove analytically that in these cases the organic symptoms mean not only libidinal gratification and castration, but also that the organs represent the introjected objects; that is to say, the conflicts which originally took place between the individual and the objects of the outside world now take place intrapsychically between himself and his own organs. This characteristic increases the similarity between these cases and the depressions, the psychologic content of which is also a narcissistic conflict between the individual and the introjected objects.

I had the opportunity to analyze a severe vasomotor neurosis which was accompanied by attacks similar to those of angina pectoris. These attacks

appeared for the first time soon after the death of the patient's mother, when he was told that his father had become seriously ill. The patient, an infantile and narcissistic individual, who was fixated on the home of his parents and who was unable to live without them, thus found himself suddenly facing the danger of living alone. The pseudo angina pectoris had for him not only the obvious meaning of an identification with his father, who was dying of heart disease, but another one as well: since becoming ill, the patient's father had lost all interest in the son. The latter then completely relinquished his object relationships, and from that time on devoted himself to his attacks and his terrific dread of dying. He introjected his father and was afraid that his heart would abandon him (i. e., kill him), just as in reality he faced the danger of being deserted by his father. Although he surrendered himself in a passive masochistic manner to his illness, the latter nevertheless reflected perfectly the patient's infantile sadistic attitude towards his father, for he constantly hurled terrific curses against his own heart. His heart became in all respects the super-ego which represented his father; the full ambivalence which he felt for his father and which dominated his whole life was now directed towards his heart and his neurosis. The whole clinical picture and the patient's dreams showed that his attitude towards his illness and his infantile attitude towards his father coincided with each other even to the minutest details.

Such deeply narcissistic pregenital "organ neurotic" mechanisms, which resemble those of hypochondria (or depressions), are often found in vasomotor neuroses, or neuroses involving the autonomic system, as well as in psychogenic disorders of the skin.

The similarity in the psychological structure of such cases with that which Freud discovered in Dostoievsky¹ leads us to ask whether epilepsy, or at any rate, the so-called hysteropilepsy, does not belong, also, to the group of genuine or narcissistic organ neuroses. According to Freud's conception, the epileptoid complex is a syndrome which is organically pre-conditioned. This complex may find its expression either in the form of an organic reaction (Jacksonian or genuine epilepsy), or in the form of a psychological reaction (hysteroepilepsy).² This conception is so illuminating that one can

¹ Freud: *Dostojewski und die Vätertötung*. (In *Dostojewski: Die Urgestalt der Brüder Karamasoff*, edited by Fülöp-Miller and Eckstein. Munich: Piper. Also in the "Almanach der Psychoanalyse 1930".)

² Various investigators have studied epilepsy psychoanalytically in various ways. Cf. Stekel, W.: *Die psychische Behandlung der Epilepsie*. Zentralbl. f. Ps. I, 1911, and Clark, L. Pierce (*Vide* the abstract of his lecture): *Psychologische Studien über Natur und Pathogenese der Epilepsie*. Int. Ztschr. f. Ps. III, 1915, 175.) No definite results have been achieved by these studies.

hardly doubt its correctness. At any rate, an analysis of such cases will always bring out certain psychological relationships, because even purely organic symptoms are found to have psychological relationships, that is, pathoneurotic meanings. Those epileptic cases which are closer to the purely psychological type of reaction, in accordance with the archaic nature of the epileptoid syndrome, will be found to have regressed more deeply and to be more narcissistically fixed, than the usual conversion hysteria; it would appear, therefore, that epilepsy may best be characterized as an organ neurosis of the brain. That such a cathexis of the brain is mostly an expression of an extraordinary destructive sadistic drive which is turned against one's own self, is a clinical empirical fact. However, we shall find that the idea of a cathexis of the brain gives us a theoretical foundation for our discussion of compulsive rumination and hair-splitting.

In the treatment of organ neuroses, an exploratory trial analysis is indicated in order to establish the characteristic libido structure of the particular case. A hysteria with symptomatology limited to one single organ is naturally not more difficult to analyze than one with a multiple symptomatology. Therefore, what has been said about hysteria in general applies to such cases also. The closer an organ neurosis is to a psychosis, the more doubtful the prognosis. Just as in the psychosis, the criteria to be applied will vary from case to case. As to epilepsy, the main purpose of a trial analysis should be the following: one should endeavor to establish whether or not we are dealing with an organ neurosis—that is to say, one would have to evaluate the relative importance of the organic and psychic factors in the case. Needless to say, this is not easy because we do not possess as yet any precise criteria.

(To be continued)

CLINICAL COMMUNICATIONS

ANAL EROTICISM AND THE MECHANISM OF UNDOING

BY BERTRAM D. LEWIN (NEW YORK)

A man of forty suffered from severe anxiety that he might cut off his penis while shaving, or injure this organ in some other way. His fears began after he had resorted to prostitutes during a period when his wife was suffering from a serious uterine illness. It was clear for many reasons that he regarded his intercourse with prostitutes as incestuous and unconsciously wished to harm himself by way of punishment. A curious manifestation of his self-punitive tendency was his preference for those prostitutes who worked as manicurists, that is, persons who might cut him. A second determinant for his self-castrative impulses was his identification through a sense of guilt with his wife, for whose illness he unconsciously accepted the blame. This brief sketch of the patient's psychic situation will furnish a background for an understanding of the following dream:

"I dreamed I had lost my penis, but in two segments, leaving the foreskin and the skin of the shaft hollow. I saw the two segments on the chair between my legs, but I felt no pain or fear. Then I went up on the roof of a tall building, and gleefully shouted, 'My penis is off.' A man on the street answered, 'You should worry! You can do that as often as you want.'"

The patient associated the segmentary loss of the penis with defæcation, and the hollow skin with vagina and anus. He commented on his going up to the roof, "I guess I wanted to shout it from the house-tops." The "man in the street" he said was the proverbial representative of common sense. The latent content of the dream is clear: "I wish my penis were a fæcal mass. If I then lost my penis it would not be painful, I should have an anal vagina. I could shout from the house-tops that I am innocent and feel no guilt or anxiety; and common sense tells me that the loss would only be temporary, since in this manner I can produce as many penises like that as I wish." In the dream this man puts into effect his impulse to self-castration which is the source of his waking anxiety, but he does so without "pain or fear". His sense of guilt

is satisfied by the castration, but the fear of permanently losing the penis is allayed by the reassuring thought that the castration is only temporary. We see then the economic value of his anal regression: for it is by virtue of equating penis with fæces that he may expect new penises repeatedly to take the place of the lost one. Hence the idea of castration, so painful at the genital level, loses its irreversibility.

The reversibility of the situation reminds us that the dream is constructed after the fashion of an obsessional symptom. The equation penis=fæces permits the undoing (*Ungeschehenmachen*) of the castration. We have indeed two points of view from which to regard the same phenomenon: the id aspect of anal-sadistic satisfaction, and the ego aspect of defense. Wälder¹ upheld the validity of considering psychic mechanisms from these standpoints, and maintained that the defense process of the ego may simultaneously serve as a vehicle of gratification for an id striving. Thus, he stated, the mechanism which, considered as a defensive function of the ego, we call "identification", may be equally justifiably considered an oral gratification, if we think of it as a function of the id. The process called "paranoid projection"—a defensive process of the ego—is also a process which gratifies a passive homosexual striving of the id.

Similarly in the dream, the defensive process, "undoing", is seen to be itself a source of anal-sadistic gratification. Whereas the ego is concerned in undoing the castration, and the super-ego is gratified by the self-punishment, the id by the same process is indulging anal and sadistic impulses.

We have then a hint why *undoing* is a favorite defense mechanism in the compulsion neurosis, where an anal regression is cardinal. Freud tells us that the child's daily experience of parting with his fæces may serve as a model for, or give content to, his fear of parting with his penis. This daily experience, however, is made less painful by the reassurance that tomorrow and the next day there will be more fæces: that is to say, the loss will be "undone". This assurance is the fore-runner of the one which our dreamer applied to genital castration, and which the compulsion neurotic applies to many other losses: they can be undone.

¹ Wälder, R.: *Das Prinzip der mehrfachen Funktion*. Int. Ztschr. f. Psa. XVI. 1930.

INTERPRETATION OF A RESISTANCE: THE ANALYTIC TREATMENT AS A NEUROTIC DEFENSE

BY ALBERT SLUTSKY (NEW YORK)

The patient whose resistance is referred to in the title of this communication is a woman of forty-five, unmarried and extremely ignorant in sexual matters. Indeed until her middle thirties she had no clear ideas concerning childbirth. She was protected against sexual interests and strivings by an extreme childish dependence on maternal surrogates, and by an identification with a brother six years her senior, which she had developed on the basis of penis envy.

She had tried to shape her life in accordance with this identification, but her effort had not led to much good fortune. The brother himself had not mastered his own castration complex, and developed numerous illnesses because of his sense of guilt. The patient followed him closely in this. She remained dangerously near to the original conflict and consequently was almost completely dominated by castration anxiety. Every step in the direction of this identification was reacted to with a severe sense of guilt, so that she either became ill, or felt threatened by an impending illness. The attainment of a feminine identification was still more difficult for her. This was due not only to the usual oedipus anxiety but also, in my opinion, to the circumstance that her mother had died while psychotic—which meant that an identification with her would entail a most serious threat.

During the analysis, in due time, she began to masturbate—at first with strong feelings of guilt, which gradually diminished till she was able to masturbate very freely. Often, however, she forced herself to masturbate to relieve a feeling of tension in her head and uncomfortable sensations in the genital region. For a long while her attitude oscillated between being feminine and expressing intense wishes to have coitus, and being vindictive and disappointed, reproaching the analyst because all her activity was not solving anything—she was repeating the same performance without gaining more than temporary relief. It became evident that she was using the analysis to free herself from the sense of guilt arising

from her active castration wishes, and that by means of masturbation she was denying the hostility connected with her desire for a penis.

When this situation was presented to her, she reacted with strong emotion and great sexual excitement. She masturbated energetically, but now with the mental reservation that she would have to pay dearly for doing so. Later in the day she became uneasy and apprehensive; she became beset by fears that she might become insane, act in a violent manner, and even lose control of her bowels, so that she would have to be cleaned and cared for. She felt an urge to defæcate, and while doing so, had the thought that this was the way a child is born. She wished she were giving birth to a child.

That night she dreamed: "I am in church. There is a statue of the Madonna and a veiled child. The Madonna comes to life, removes the veil, and passes the child to a nun. In one corner of this scene is a pipe from which water is flowing."

Her associations were: to *Madonna*—purity, immaculate conception, imaginary child. She wishes she had a child and is jealous of her brother's child, often feels that she might hurt him, and feels unworthy of having a child. She has been like a Madonna all her life, stiff and rigid, not permitting herself to feel warmly. The Madonna's coming to life means to her that she wants to give up her false notions of purity and virtue. She feels herself cheated in having been deprived of motherhood and normal relations with a man. The *pipe* suggests a man urinating. She often has dreams of boys urinating, or of being thwarted in a desire to urinate. *Water* means life to her; she thinks of drinking when parched; then she recalled a childhood experience in which she sucked on a little boy's penis. To *church*, she associated, that being faithful to the church does not necessarily require the suppression of natural human desire.

With a little suggestion on my part, she was able to see that the church represented the analytic room. She then made the interpretation that underneath her Madonna-like exterior she cherished a wish to enjoy all the beauties of sex. "But what good is it if the analysis doesn't provide opportunities for indulging these wishes?" The dream actually says, "I am willing to give up the imaginary

penis or child if you will give me a real child in exchange"—an unconscious answer to the suggestion I had made to her the previous day, that masturbation served as a cover for her masculine wishes. My suggestion apparently acted as a challenge to her to express her feelings concerning her penis envy—as though I had said, "You are playing with me. At the same time that you say you love me, you have thoughts of violence towards me." This would account for the anxiety which she developed, and the compromise settlement proposed in the dream: an anal child in exchange for the penis.

The day after the dream, the patient continued to be disturbed; she felt tense and tight in the head and feared she would become ill and not be able to appear for her next hour. Her throat felt "irritated", and she decided to speak in a whisper so as to spare her voice. She took a cathartic to insure a bowel movement the next morning. At dinner time she felt unusually hungry, ate with relish, and became more cheerful. In her words, "A good meal always makes a big difference."

That night she dreamt: "Someone, a nurse, is pouring fluid in my mouth through a funnel. It has the color of lemon juice though it is like milk or cream. It is then pumped out and sent to the drug store for analysis." She added: "But it doesn't show anything." To this dream she could only associate sending specimens of urine to the drug store for analysis—this she had been doing periodically since her health began to give her concern.

She then volunteered the following interpretation, facetiously: "If I should tell you I have a wish for a penis, you will only analyze it." Her flippancy betrays and expresses her ambivalence. Under her manifest seductiveness there is much hostility. In the dream she punishes herself for her wishes in the same way that she relieves her sense of guilt in waking life: the periodic urine examinations are assurances against anticipated punishments, and this is the use to which she is putting her analysis. She presents her thoughts and experiences for analysis with the same attitude or for the same purpose as that which makes her submit specimens of urine—to relieve her conscience. For her, urine and thoughts have the same significance—aggression.

The anxiety she experienced before the dream was obviously a

reaction to oral fantasies of hostile nature. In the dream she says, "I submit to analysis in order to expiate the sense of guilt due to my hostile wishes." Or, in other words: "By putting up with the expense and inconvenience attendant on being analyzed, I am suffering sufficiently to permit myself a certain amount of pleasure."

The analysis, then, assumes the significance of a protective measure or ceremonial. It becomes part of the defensive scheme of the neurosis, and acts as a barrier to analytic progress.

BOOK REVIEWS

MODERN EDUCATION. *A Critique of Its Fundamental Ideas.* By Otto Rank. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1932. 243 p.

After the resistances, with which a new discovery is at first met, are overcome and followed by an enthusiastic response, a reaction usually sets in; this reaction, as yet incapable of self-conscious and orderly critical thought, presents as a rule a critical devaluation of the new idea and an overevaluation of the older and even oldest principles which have been abandoned.

The new book by Rank dealing with modern education may be viewed as being essentially an exposition of this return to the past. Thus, if Freud's new concepts postulated that character formation is essentially determined by experiences related to the first few years of one's life, Rank brings to the foreground the emphasis on the important factors of later life, such as accidental occurrences, profession, success in life, etc. If Freud broadened our vision by his new understanding of the instinctual life of the child, Rank lays stress on other feelings of the child: he avers the child racks its brain much less over sexual problems than over the general mysteries of life, i. e., over problems of a philosophic or religious nature. If Freud taught us to appreciate how important it is that the child understand more fully certain things, Rank points out the dangers involved in the tendency to understand everything. If Freud gives extraordinary insight into the psychology of the individual, Rank comes to point out how relatively irrelevant this insight is as compared with the importance of broad sociological factors.

However, to point out that the book is an expression of a retrogressive trend does not mean that its value is thus properly estimated. One may ponder over those things which gifted men before Freud have known well and yet produce a welcome and valuable contribution; also, it is beyond any doubt that a critical review of the body of knowledge which is embraced by psychoanalysis could undoubtedly be of great value. It is therefore a matter of regret that both the critical part of the book, and the somewhat muddled firework of some old and some new ideas which are presented in the positive part, fall short of even the most

modest requirements for scientific thoroughness. Thus among the ideas offered, there are a number of highly questionable scientific value, as for instance the theory of the development of feelings out of inhibited "impulsive life". On the other hand, one finds a series of interesting views like those attempting to throw new light on the *Oedipus* drama of Sophocles from the sociological standpoint of the earlier stages of the patriarchy. Yet, nowhere in the book can one find any solid basis for or clearly conceived formulations of the author's contentions.

KAREN HORNEY.

HUMAN SPEECH. SOME OBSERVATIONS, EXPERIMENTS AND CONCLUSIONS AS TO THE NATURE, ORIGIN, PURPOSE AND POSSIBLE IMPROVEMENT OF HUMAN SPEECH. By Sir Richard Paget, Fellow of the Physical Society of London, Fellow of the Institute of Physics. *The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method.* New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company. 1930. 360 p.

Sir Richard Paget, the well known physicist, in a book written with distinction, has proved again the old contention that science is one. Beginning with a discussion in the first six chapters of the mechanical principles involved in voice production, he tells us of experimental attempts to apply these principles in the construction of machines to imitate the human voice. From the consideration of these "speaking machines", it was not difficult for the author to come to think of the human organs of speech, and to reflect on what it was that made of these organs, which serve such different purposes in other animals, a "speaking machine".

His theory of the origin of speech is a counterpart of his experimental studies. In these he had been using machines producing motions which imitated speech. His theory of how speech originated, put in briefest terms, is that speech originally imitated motions, particularly bodily motions, and this theory he calls the "gesture theory of language".

The sounds produced by the larynx, the phonational element in speech, make up the emotional part. "The vocal cords supply the language of the emotions, and just as our facial expression 'registers' pleasure, pain, surprise, fear, affection, and the like, so the lips of our vocal cords change their expression, and consequently produce

changes of laryngeal sound as the air from our lungs is forced out between them. It is the rising and falling of the pitch of the speaking voice which carries the emotional message, while the movements of articulation—remote descendants of the original descriptive pantomime made by primitive man—carry the intentional message which accompanies it."

The ideational content of speech, as we should say, is given by the motions of the lips and tongue. They "make gestures." "What drove man to the invention of speech was, as I imagine, not so much the need of expressing his thoughts (for that might have been done quite satisfactorily by bodily gestures) as the difficulty of 'talking with his hands full'. It was the *continual* use of man's hands for craftsmanship, the chase, and the beginnings of art and agriculture, that drove him to other methods of expressing his ideas—namely, by a specialized pantomime of the tongue and lips."

Paget vividly pictures the prehistoric origin of speech:

"Originally man expressed his ideas by gesture, but as he gesticulated with his hands, his tongue, lips and jaw followed suit in a ridiculous fashion, 'understudying' (as Sir Henry Hadow aptly suggested to me) the action of the hands. The consequence was that when, owing to pressure of other business, the principal actors (the hands) retired from the stage—as much as principal actors ever do—their understudies—the tongue, lips and jaw—were already proficient in the pantomimic art.

"Then the great discovery was made that if while making a gesture with the tongue and lips, air was blown through the oral or nasal cavities, the gesture became audible as a whispered speech sound. If, while pantomiming with tongue, lips and jaw our ancestors sang, roared or grunted—in order to draw attention to what they were doing—a still louder and more remarkable effect was produced, namely, what we call voiced speech." (p. 133)

Readers of the psychoanalytic literature will recognize that Paget here postulates for phylogeny what Ferenczi has assumed for the individual where the period of gesture language and "magic gestures" is succeeded by the period of speech and "magic thoughts and words". Ferenczi does not state that speech imitates manual gesture; he regards both gesture and speech as forms of bodily means for representing wishes and objects wished for.

An example of how Paget supposes speech may actually have

begun follows: "If the mouth, tongue and lips be moved as in eating, this constitutes a gesture sign meaning 'eat'; if while making this sign, we blow air through the vocal cavities, we automatically produce the whispered sounds *mnyum-mnyum*, or *mnya-mnya*¹—words which probably would be almost universally understood, and which actually occur as a children's word for food in Russian, as well as in English." "Similarly, the action of sucking liquid in small quantities into the mouth, if 'blown' as before, produces the whispered words *sip*, *sup*,¹ according to the exact position of the tip of the tongue behind the lower teeth."

Paget's further experiments with what he calls "pantomimic gestures" are very interesting. As one might suspect from his mechanical interests, he is evidently a person with an excellent kinæsthetic sense endowment, which he utilizes in an ingenious manner. With his tongue and lips he mimicked certain gestures, for example, feeling or stroking with the hand, the tongue motion being one of feeling the palate backward and downward. By sending the voice through the mouth while this motion was going on he obtained a sound, the "phonetic result", roughly resembling *thra*, *dra*, *lra*. Or similarly to imitate shooting, the voice was sent through while the tongue was reflexed, then gripped at the back and suddenly released; the phonetic result was *dr-ki* or *dr-ku*. Curiously, these artificial words, which suggest the machine-made sounds described in the first part of the book, are very similar to real words in certain primitive languages, especially archaic Japanese and "Protopolynesian", which have just the meaning of the corresponding manual or brachial gesture.

Beginning at the other end of the process, then, Paget tries to see whether imitating with other muscles the tongue motions which produce words will give gestures that correspond to the meaning. For this purpose he uses the Aryan roots, Chinese, Arawak and Sumerian words. In Skeat's list of Aryan roots, he found that of the first hundred, seventy-seven were clearly pantomimic, twelve suggested pantomimic origin, while only eleven showed no evidence of pantomimic origin.

In view of Ernest Jones's recent pioneer attempt to interpret the Aryan root MR, it may be of interest to see some of the results of

¹ The words in italics are transcriptions of a phonetic system used by the author. REVIEWER.

Paget's mode of approach. The Aryan root meaning give, DA, he tells us, seems to be an offering gesture of the tongue. DHUGH—to milk, yield milk—is due to sucking and swallowing gestures in succession. PA—feed, nourish—is a sucking gesture; MA is due to a precisely similar lip gesture, but with the lip closure prolonged and the nasal passage open. LUBH—love—appears to be a phallic tongue gesture of which the receptive counterpart was KA or KAM—also meaning love. In discussing the gesture imitated by the consonant *l* Paget states that it is probable that in primitive speech the tongue was in fact protruded at times, as it still is among children. (Psychoanalysis can offer supporting evidence for the belief that the tongue may represent the phallus. Cf., for example, Flügel, *Int. J. Ps-A.*, VI. 1925.)

Paget also tries to assign gesture values to the individual vowels and consonants, which again brings to mind Ernest Jones's work (the consonant *r*). Paget believes that *p*, *b*, *m*, and *bh* commonly denote closing, containing, or gripping actions; thus the Aryan root SWAP—sleep—consists of a representation of the human eye, *sw*, closed by the *p* gesture.

The reader will be much interested in Paget's experiments with Polynesian, Sumerian, Chinese, and Arawak words and his ingenious imitations of them with other motions. Onomatopœia—the imitation of sounds—he regards as a secondary and accessory source of words, of much less importance than the imitation of gesture.

Paget further speculates as to how racial muscular habits may cause differentiation between dialects and languages, holding that rugged stocks might articulate more vigorously, effete stocks more softly, and that modes of articulation might correspond to other general muscular activity and gestures.

Of the remaining chapters, three (Chapters X, XI, and XII) deal with the physics of voice production; chapter XIII is on "The Advancement of Language and Notation". In this latter chapter the section on the notation of numerals and the origin of the symbols from gestures of the lip and hands is of great interest. There are eight appendixes, appendix VIII being the one which will interest psychoanalytic readers most. This is a reprinting of the article "Polynesian Language" by Dr. J. Rae, published in *The Polynesian*, a Honolulu newspaper, in 1863. Paget finds his

own views so remarkably foreshadowed in Rae's article that he reprints it complete.

A part which cannot fail to be of interest to analytic readers deals with the syllable *mi* (pronounced to rhyme with *bee*) which occurs in many Polynesian dialects. Rae was interested to find whether words containing this syllable might have some sense in common. The *i* sound represents a confinement of the stream of breath; its utterance is attended by the smallest opening of the mouth for any vowel. The *m* modifies the stream of breath in that "the lips are first compressed through their whole extent, and then slightly opened through that extent to allow the *i* to escape."

"You have thus a broad, but thin stream flowing through a wide orifice whose sides approach. There is, therefore, nothing impossible in the suggestion that the effort to pronounce the sound in question might be suggestive of that idea.

"It is likely that the natural evacuations would be among the first things to which men would give names. I shall, therefore, take the Polynesian word used to express the voiding of urine as the first example. Suppose, then, that in the rudimentary state of things we are considering, someone, imagining he has found a proper term for the act, calls the attention of another to it, uttering at the same time the two syllables 'mi mi', and that this other individual attempts to reproduce, and succeeds in reproducing the sound. Would not the two actions, the one which he was performing by means of the organs of speech, the other at which he was looking, have a certain resemblance to each other? Would they, in effect, have any essential difference, but that in the one there was an aerial, in the other a liquid stream? Is there anything, therefore, impossible in the supposition that he might instinctively feel that the utterance of the sound 'mi mi' had in it some certain appropriateness to the act of urinating? . . . Is not this supposition much strengthened by the fact that this double syllable has, in truth, become the name for the thing in question over 'islands' scattered over many thousands of miles of ocean; that the same syllable is found in other languages for that evacuation, as in Sanscrit 'mih'; in Greek, 'omicho', in Latin, 'mingo', and that we shall in vain search for any other syllable, the utterance of which produces in the organs a movement having any, or equal, analogy to the thing?"

Rae then proceeds to discuss other words containing *mi*, showing

how they relate to the ideas just expressed. Thus: "Milo"—to spin—the fingers take the place of the lips, and the thread that of the current; "lo" is for long. "Mimilo" to whirl, and whirlpool. "Umi"—a rat trap—the word imitates the shape and action. "Umi"—infanticide—usually performed by strangling, again a constriction.

The Polynesian word for the nipple is "U", an imitation with the lips; hence "U" also means milk, to be damp or wet, moisture; "Ua" is rain; "Uma" is the breast, and "Umauma" both breasts, the chest.

When S. Spielrein proposed the theory that the consonant *m* as applied to mother or breast (*mamma*, *mater*, etc.) began as a labial imitation of the babe's activities at the mother's breast, most students of linguistics paid little attention to the proposal; nor have they utilized Ferenczi's and other analysts' work on stuttering for possible leads to linguistic research. The contribution of the academic psychologists to any theory of the origin of speech is indeed, with certain notable exceptions, remote from life and the possibility of empirical evaluation.

All the more gratifying is it that two gifted amateurs of language, one an eminent physicist, and one a Honolulu physician, should both have looked for the solution of the problem in the very fields to which a psychoanalyst might naturally have turned. Rae was essentially a thoughtful and independent observer; Paget as an acoustic physicist is by profession engaged in reducing the phenomena of nature to motion. It is remarkable that both with the greatest naturalness should have selected as important for their purposes just those psychological topics which psychoanalysts regard as most important. We may imagine that a man who will combine Paget's kinæsthetic gifts with Róheim's insight into the mind of primitive peoples will some day solve the problems which still remain unsolved in this particular domain of linguistics.

BERTRAM D. LEWIN.

RITUAL: PSYCHOANALYTIC STUDIES. By Theodor Reik. With a Preface by Sigm. Freud. Translated from the second edition by Douglas Bryan. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1931. 367 p.

Dr. Reik's book is a collection of essays on the application of psychoanalysis to the problems of primitive customs and religious ritual. He investigates "The Couvade", the puberty rites of

savages, and under the title of "Kol Nidre" and "The Shofar", he studies several aspects of the religion of the ancient Hebrews. These essays represent one of the earliest attempts to follow up the principles that Freud posited in his "Totem und Tabu". Originally conceived as lectures in 1914-1919, they are here presented in a revised and enlarged form in an English translation.

Notwithstanding the variety of subjects investigated the book is held together by a uniform program and method. The basic observation from which the research proceeds is the one made by Freud, that there is a striking resemblance between the compulsion neurosis and religious ritual. It was this observation which led Freud to the formulation that the compulsion neurosis was a "private religion", or that religion is a communal compulsion neurosis. This phenomenological resemblance was subsequently proven to be based on a similarity of the underlying instinctual conflicts. The hypothesis of the "primal horde" and the communal blood guilt, which takes the place of the personal oedipus complex, presents the background against which the dynamics of primitive religion are conceived.

Though we acknowledge the merits of the theory of the "primal horde", Reik makes rather indiscriminate use of it to explain every manifestation of an inhibited aggression. He does not define the limits of the analogy between an individual neurosis, as we know it now, and a communal neurosis of which the rituals are survivals. Nor does he attempt to trace the steps by which restrictions came to be placed on the instinctive impulses of man in order to make any form of social existence possible. In other words, one cannot quarrel with the evidence that ritual is the result of repression; one cannot deny that it is carried out in a manner characteristic of compulsion neurosis; one can only question the completeness of the explanation of the motives for repression. This is where the theory of primal guilt is used as a short cut. One can hardly avoid the impression that Reik uses this not as a theory, but as a historical fact. Even if the theory were correct it permits the exploration of a very limited number of phenomena.

The essay on "The Couvade" is by far the best of the series. The couvade is a custom of wide cultural and geographical distribution. One does not find it except among peoples whose cultural development is between the lowest and highest. The father of the

newborn child lies in bed for a period during and after the labor of his wife, under certain restrictions of diet and activity, while the wife, who has just given birth to the child, carries on her usual occupation. Reik discusses the variations in the custom, most of which are to be found in the character of the abstinence imposed. The two chief forms of the couvade are (a) the pseudo-maternal and (b) the dietetic.

The first rests on the principle of imitative magic, better known in psychoanalysis as "omnipotence of thought", which is the technique of the animistic system. The purpose of this type of couvade cannot be merely to ease the labor pains of the woman; if it were, the activity of the husband would stop with the end of labor. But it doesn't. It must therefore serve other ends. It may take the place of an inhibition of sexual activity or express a hostility to the woman.

The dietetic couvade consists of a system of dietetic injunctions which purport to protect the newborn child. This part of the couvade is expressed in the familiar language of the compulsion neurosis—"if I eat this, then harm will come to my child". When the distortions and displacements are analyzed, it is found that the prohibitions prevent the father from killing and eating his child. Some of the customs in connection with the couvade even go a step farther; they chastise the father as if he had actually given vent to the repressed impulse. The following is a typical end result. Immediately after birth the child is wrapped in rags on which there is some of the father's blood. This protects the child from witches and demons and illness. Breach of the dietetic taboos always bring misfortune to the father. Some of the practices even separate the father from the child for a time, presumably to permit his murderous and cannibalistic impulses to wear off.

This practice is therefore a definite landmark in the growth of morality, where the repression is successful and the libidinal gratification of killing and eating the child is transformed into a form compatible with the interests of the group as a whole. It operates as an expedient measure to protect the social group against the hostile tendencies of the individual. But there is something more specific about the couvade; it protects the child from the father. What are the sources of this hostility to the child? It can only be a fear of retaliation, the child being identified with the father.

The conflict is resolved by a displacement; the totem animal is substituted for the child. The final result, the eating of the totem animal, is an hysterical compromise, where the repressed impulse is satisfied by substitutive gratification.

In the essay on "Puberty Rites of Savages" Reik studies further the father-son ambivalence and how it is resolved in primitive society. These rites all turn out to be substitutive or phantasied reënactments of eating the novitiate, castrating him, or making him die and be reborn. The dynamic conception of these rites as described by Reik make the rational explanations of other ethnologists, namely, that puberty rites are means of testing the boy's courage, look rather anæmic. The conclusions of Reik have more recently been corroborated by an investigator who, with the aid of the psychoanalytic method, observed these rites and studied the societies in which they are still practiced. He states: (Róheim, Géza: *Psychoanalysis of Primitive Cultural Types*, Int. J. Ps-A. XIII, 72) "I have repeatedly been told that if a boy were not initiated something terrible might happen. He might become an *erintia*, i. e., devil, fly up in the air and kill and eat all the old men of the tribe. This is what the ritual must prevent, first by going as near to castrating the boy as may well be imagined (circumcision and subincision), and then by creating a basis of identification with the men. 'Don't cry; your penis is now like mine, you are a man', Kanakana said to the boy whom he had circumcised". The act of circumcision or subincision, the eating of the totemic meal and the resurrection rites all furnish the elders the opportunity to vent their hostility on the youths, but furnish the latter with the opportunity to identify themselves with the elders by renouncing their hostile and incestuous impulses.

The essays on "Kol Nidre" and "The Shofar" follow. The author takes as his starting point a passage in the ritual of *Kol Nidre* which seems at variance with the tenor of the ritual as a whole. The *Kol Nidre* is originally a formula of consecration; it places the individual under restrictions which in the ceremony takes the form of self-punishments, vows, renunciations and asseverations. The paradoxical passage is in effect: "All vows, obligations, oaths and anathemas . . . do we repent. May they be deemed absolved, forgiven, annulled and void, and made of no effect . . ." In this paradox Reik finds not only evidence of the struggle of the

repressing forces against the repressed, but an actual breaking through of the wish in the form of confession to abrogate the covenant with God. It is a blasphemy uttered in the guise of worship; it is the parricide and atonement side by side. This mechanism is commonly found in religious ritual where the forbidden act is carried out in the name of religion; sacrificing the totem animal is a substitution of the father, crime and reconciliation in one. The ceremony of atonement begins with an orgy of eating, is then followed by penance in the form of fasting, and terminates in a reconciliation, in a reassertion of the uniqueness and power of God. He is given back his paternal rôle, and the conditions of being loved by him are reestablished.

In the ritual of the blowing of the shofar Reik sees evidence of an identification with the father by means of re-creating the voice of the slain bull, the totem animal of the ancient Hebrews. He comes to this conclusion by a rather cumbersome but most ingenious correlation of deductions. From the interpretation of several passages in Exodus, Reik concludes that the noise on Mount Sinai while the Lord was conversing with Moses was none other than the voice of God. The bull was the totem animal of several Semitic tribes, Babylonians, Assyrians and Israelites. The voice of God is therefore the voice of the totem animal, just as the noise of the totem animal is imitated by savages, e. g., with the bull-roarer. The blowing of the shofar is therefore symbolic of the murder of the father (totem) and the triumphant assumption of his rôle (sexual power). The horned Moses is a symbol of the killing of the feared bull-god by the rebellious son-god. In Judaism however the father-god retains dominance and the ascendancy of the son-god does not come until Christianity.

Reik further tries to deduce the origin of music as an imitation of the voice of the slain father, and the dance as a representation of the movements of the slain god; but this is only more evidence of the limits within which the author is willing to use these facts.

Reik's theory is too general. There is all haste to correlate the end phenomenon with what he regards as the basic motive of repression, primeval parricide and the guilt consequent upon it. It is all too simple and omits a consideration of those factors which give the various religions their respective morphology. Even if we grant the main premise of Reik, that religious practices have

the record of a struggle with the group constellation of the œdipus complex, we must account for the specific character of the various religions, or trace the changes in the same religion. We recall that Maia was an important figure in the Roman Pantheon when the Romans were an agrarian people, but that Mars and Jupiter occupied the positions of prominence when they became a predatory people. The end forms of a religion contain the record of a changing destiny of its adherents. By the very same standards that Reik employs, one can see in the triumphant assertion of the power and uniqueness of Jehovah the dynamic record of a people who were constantly surrounded by warlike neighbors who finally beat them into complete subjection. The obedience to the Lord and his Law became supreme and fixed only from the time of the Babylonian captivity. Did their destiny make the end forms of their religion, or did their religion make their destiny what it was?

We put this question merely to indicate that with peoples, as with individuals, there are many ways of handling a given repression; and a study of the specific terms in which the repressed phenomenon is couched by no means indicates the various forces that gave it its particular mould. But the effort to trace the factors responsible for repression must depend on facts and circumstances which, as far as the ancient religions are concerned, are probably beyond recovery. A religion that terminates with the assertion of a catatonic-like denial of reality is the religion of a people whose destiny is one long frustration; its dynamics must differ greatly from one which ends in the exaltation of a passive masochistic ideal. Dr. Reik has given us the outlines of a general theory; the special theory yet remains to be written.

A. KARDINER.

THE SOCIAL LIFE OF MONKEYS AND APES. By S. Zuckerman. New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1932. 356 p.

This valuable study cannot fail to be of great interest to psychoanalysts. The author, who is anatomist to the Zoological Society of London, disclaims any special knowledge of psychology. He approaches his subject from the "deterministic point of view of the physiologist, treating overt behavior as the result or expression of physiological events which have been made obvious through experimental analysis." His observations are all the more valuable, for although he is committed to this completely mechanistic

point of view, he is not influenced by a special penchant for any particular school of psychological thought. His method of approach is, however, an almost perfect instrument when applied to the study of the behavior of lower mammals, but leads to difficulties when the attempt is made to interpret the complicated reactions of the subhuman primates. The animal psychologists quoted by the author are in no agreement, and when the overworked conditioned reflex breaks down from exhaustion, the term "insight behavior" is introduced by students of the subject to designate a distinct psychological entity in animals showing characteristics distinctive of human behavior.

Those critics who decry psychoanalysis because it lays too much stress upon the sexual function as a motivating force in human behavior, will be pained to learn the author's ineluctable conclusion that "reproductive physiology is the fundamental mechanism of (animal) society", and that "the most profitable classification of the societies of mammals involves the classification of their sexual mechanisms." So much so, that the only reason advanced to explain why the monkeys have any society at all is the fact that, along with man, monkeys seem to be the only mammals that do not experience a period of seasonal anæstrous when the female is not ready to accept the sexual advances of the male.

The second principle, closely allied to the first, which determines the *mores* of monkey society is that of dominance, which occurs throughout the animal world. The typical primate family consists of a mature male "overlord" and as many females as he can keep or wrest from the weaker males. Frequently there are attached to this family unit, one or more "bachelors" who are in complete subjection to the overlord. When the supply of food is limited, the overlord will take all, and the females and weaker males will make no attempt to obtain any. "If by any chance it does and is also unfortunate enough to attract the notice of a more dominant animal—who at that moment does not happen to have its mouth and cheek-pouches full—in all probability it will be attacked. If it does not disgorge the food contained in its cheek-pouches, they will be raided by the exploring fingers of the dominant animal. . . . When the dominance of a few animals is very pronounced, the weaker members in a cage would starve if it were not for the protection they get from keepers."

The primate overlord's ruthless dominance does not exclude the members of his own family. Thus: "Six bananas . . . were thrown to a pair of baboons—the one a male, the other his female who was nursing a newly-born baby. The male snatched them all, keeping those he could not push into his cheek-pouches in a heap in front of him, while his female made no attempt to secure any. . . . she might have obtained some had her sexual skin been swollen" (viz. in a condition of optimal sexual attractiveness to the male).

It is in the sexual field, however, that this principle of dominance is most strikingly exhibited. The females are in complete sexual subjection to the dominant males and are treated as material objects. The weaker males remain unmated. "An overlord may scuffle with bachelors for the possession of some fruit and may be worsted. He does not, however, thus lose caste. Nor do such circumstances usually lead to serious fighting. If, on the other hand, adult bachelors were to try to steal his female, the situation would immediately result in serious fighting. . . . If he is dispossessed, he immediately loses caste, to become submissive to those animals whom he formerly dominated." The bachelors mount the females only when the overlord is not looking or is engaged in a fight. They are, however, not always the aggressors in these encounters. The author describes the following scene: ". . . when her overlord's back was turned she quickly presented to the bachelor attached to her party who mounted her for a moment. The overlord then slightly turned his head, whereupon the female rushed to him, her body low to the ground, presenting and squealing and threatening her seducer (*sic*) with grimaces and quick thrusts of her hands on the rocks. This behavior immediately stimulated an attack by the overlord . . . closely pursued, the bachelor fled."

Most striking is the observation that subhuman primates habitually exhibit a diffuse sexual reaction and that much of their sexual behavior has not as its aim the reproduction of the species. It might be said that monkeys function normally in a state of polymorphous-perverse sexual behavior. (In this connection, there is a reference made in a footnote to Freud's "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex".)

Monkeys of both sexes when attacked present a sexual stimulus to divert the aggression of a fellow, which may be successful if the sexual stimulus proves stronger than the act which initiated the aggression. "A weaker animal secures some food and immediately presents sexually to a more dominant fellow. Its act of sexual submission may or may not be followed by the dominant animal mounting it or grooming it, but the sexual stimulus usually serves as a means of inhibiting the dominant animal's initial response of antagonism aroused by its deprivation of food." This type of behavior is characterized as "prostitution".

Also classed as prostitution but better, if less euphemistically, called perversion (although it is not accompanied by the intense excitement of coitus and it is not recorded that it becomes in individuals a preferred sexual reaction, yet one female chimpanzee studied was predominantly masculine-aggressive in her social and sexual behavior) are all types of sexual stimulation and response: Homosexuality, observed in males and females both in the wilds and in captivity, is rife. Animals of both sexes, finger, lick and smell the ano-genital regions of their companions. "Any member of a social group old or young, will stimulate sexual responses in another. A monkey . . . will attempt to use kittens, puppies, foxes, and even snakes as sexual objects. Baboons chained . . . are often observed proffering themselves sexually to dogs. . . . A female ape will masturbate with fruit, glass and sticks." The grooming or picking through one another's fur so constantly seen in monkeys is regarded as a form of sexual activity; and to complete the catalogue, there is noted the tendency "to show off sexually in the presence of interested observers" and of one another.

The text is based upon personal observations made by the author in the field and on the colony of baboons of the Zoological Society of London. In addition he has made an extensive survey of the literature. Over four hundred items are listed in the bibliography. While his detailed observations are limited to the Hamadryas baboons, the author states that his observations are valid for all species of primates. "Indeed," he adds, "The social habits of different, monkeys and apes appear to be so similar that naturalistic accounts of their lives in the wild soon acquire distressing monotony."

CALIGULA. By Hanns Sachs. Translated by Hedvig Singer. London: Elkin Mathews & Marrot, Ltd., 1931. 224 p.

Dr. Sachs once stated that the psychoanalysis of dead men is a fatuous and precarious undertaking; that it is justified only when it concerns a person whose life exerted great influence on his contemporaries, and whose nuclear psychic constellations were so clearly drawn as to be discernable in the broad outlines of his life, or when these constellations present a unique psychological situation. Dr. Sachs's book on Caligula satisfies all these conditions. It deals with a figure whose distortions of character for a time influenced the entire Roman world. In the circumstances of his early life and his relations to Tiberius we have an opportunity to observe the interplay of psychic forces, which, because of the exalted position of the man, produced a characterological monstrosity rarely to be found in nature. Moreover in the life of this man we have the opportunity to study not only the disease of an emperor, but in part a disease of the entire Roman world.

The usual earmarks of biographies of this character are entirely absent. One hears nothing of Caligula's mother or father fixation; there is no effort to fit his character into our modern nosology, nor is there any effort to strain at the known facts of his life to yield dubious but high sounding formulations. The absence of these technical formulations greatly enhances the power of the book. The appeal is made to the reader's unconscious. From the choice of material, the order in which it is presented, and the description of the setting in which it is enacted, it is nevertheless easy to see that this biography is guided by the psychoanalytic conception of human destiny. The book, like the man it describes, moves swiftly and dramatically to an inevitable dénouement.

The book describes a man—Tiberius—who casts a very hideous shadow—Caligula. Whereas both men come in the end to have similar psychopathological traits, the one is a wild caricature of the other. Moreover they both arrive at the same end by different routes. Tiberius came by his wanton cruelty and his contentless debauchery honestly, one may say. He was an integrated personality, even if distorted, had lived a long and useful life, and administered competently the affairs of an empire. A pedant, slow dealing, severe, meticulous, independent, leaving nothing to chance, thrifty, unimaginative, thorough and patient: these were the native

characteristics of Tiberius. The deterioration of his character began rather late in life when he was outshone by his own nephew Britannicus, with whose brilliant achievements and winsome character he could not compete. When accident removed Britannicus, Tiberius set out to exterminate the whole brood of his nephew. However, for motives that transcended all reason, he spared Caligula. He did this not because of mercy or affection; it was only another phase of Tiberius' patient cunning. His own son having been murdered by his most trusted servant, Sejanus, the legitimacy of his grandson in doubt, Tiberius could now avenge himself upon the world he could no longer libidinize by letting Caligula live. It was under these circumstances that this unsensual pedant broke into an orgy of wholesale massacres and sterile debaucheries. The debility of advancing years, frustrations in his own sexuality, the death of his son, led to a withdrawal of libido from sublimations; the inability to neutralize the enormous increase in narcissistic tension could only take the form of wanton destructiveness and debauchery without sensuality. This was not only the situation of Tiberius, but of the entire Roman people. It was a time, which, "giving no scope for either great deeds or men of action, lay under the shadow of a new disease, the pursuit of pleasure in which imagination played no part". Rome had nothing to dream about.

With Caligula the case was very different; there the ego was dwarfed. Tiberius, in whose shadow he lived, was the man who had hated his father and killed his mother and brothers. This very man becomes Caligula's benefactor and Caligula lives in mortal terror lest he be the next victim of the emperor's wrath. This situation lasted from the time Britannicus died, Caligula being seven years old, until the death of Tiberius when Caligula was twenty-six. The situation became even worse toward the end of Tiberius' life.

What kind of an ego can develop under constant threat of destruction? And what a catastrophic collapse of tension when Caligula took over the rôle of the man whom he hated and dreaded! While Tiberius lived, Caligula protected himself by aping the externals of Tiberius. But this was only a "protective coloring". In addition he craftily avoided any suspicion. In other words, although he imitated Tiberius, Caligula could not identify himself with him. No identification can be founded on hatred

and fear. These two men were not in the least mistaken in each other. Tiberius said of Caligula: "Caius lives only for his own and everyone's else destruction; in him I am nurturing a viper for the people of Rome and a Phaeton for the whole world". And Caligula unconsciously responded to his great-uncle's unexpressed intentions. The older man had set in motion the forces that eventually destroyed "Bubi".

Such a dwarfed ego could not support the demands of an ideal whose range was without limits and which even included divinity. These he could only give form, but no content. He could only live as an infant in a world where he need wait for nothing and where omnipotence of thought is reality. All higher forms of libidinization being impossible, he could only master the world by destroying it. The remaining data of his life demonstrate his infantilism; the one and only love of his life was his sister Drusilla, with whom he lived in open incestuous relationship. Nothing was real, everything play. There was only one reality, the sure and direct path to his own death. "Everything he did served only the one unconscious purpose of inviting annihilation . . ."

To the clinician this biography is of special interest. It throws into relief a problem that is commonly enough encountered in clinical practice, namely, the fate of a character whose early life is dominated by an inordinately cruel father. The result is an ineffectual ego, with enormous increase in tension between ego and super-ego. Caligula's life demonstrates this problem in gigantic proportions; it shows that even kings cannot escape their fate.

A. KARDINER.

CHILDREN WHO RUN ON ALL FOURS AND OTHER ANIMAL-LIKE BEHAVIORS IN THE HUMAN CHILD. By Aleš Hrdlička, M.D., Sc.D., D.Sc.Nat. Curator, Division of Physical Anthropology, U. S. National Museum, Smithsonian Institution. New York: Whittlesey House. 1931. 418 p.

This book is a record of the behavior and mentality of 387 persons who as children ran on all fours. Of these 369 were white, 18 of other races. Dr. Hrdlička finds that the usual age at which children run on all fours is in the second half year of life between seven and twelve months. He finds also that this phenomenon may appear somewhat later even after the child has learned to walk

erect, and the capacity may even be retained in latent form in adult life. He records certain related behavior, such as "sleeping on all fours", and mentions other animal-like behavior sometimes found in infants. It is Dr. Hrdlička's opinion that the phenomenon would be very common if parents did not attempt to suppress it and train the child in other ways of locomotion. He can discover no constant correlation of this finding with any physical or psychic characteristics. He regards it simply as an ontogenetic manifestation of a phylogenetic pattern.

Psychoanalysts will be interested in the short section entitled "Running on All Fours in Dreams". Three persons reported dreaming of this activity. One man writes:

"I have had several dreams, generally nightmares, in which when pursued I was forced to run on my hands and feet in order to escape. In all of these dreams I realized that this was undignified and felt humiliated at being compelled to resort to it, and yet I knew that I could run on all fours faster than on two feet.'" He did not know whether he ran on all fours as a child.

A physician, who ran on all fours in infancy, and whose sister and probably whose mother did the same describes a recurrent dream:

"In my dream I find myself fleeing in terror from some unknown pursuer, running as fast as I am able, bending my body somewhat forward. My arms must be a good deal longer than normal, although if this is the case I have never taken any notice of it. At any rate, in my haste and anxiety to get away I find myself frequently placing my hands on the ground and vaulting forward on them, very much as I have seen long-armed apes do in running about the floors of their cages. This terrified flight of which I dream usually takes place through a rather open woodland, and sometimes on the side of a hill. But whether I am running up hill or down, I assist my feet with my hands."

The third report is from a woman:

"Dreaming if I wanted to get away from some terrible indefinable menace which has always beset me asleep and often awake, I took to all fours. If in my dreams tonight I was beset by this threat I would get down and run on my hands and feet, but I do not run as animals do; my arms do more of the work than my legs. I pull myself forward in an unexplainable way, and

several times in my life when running to catch a car or hastening to keep an appointment I have had a momentary impulse to get down on all fours.' "

The third dreamer also reports many psychopathic traits in herself: "spells" or trances up to the age of twelve, "seeing things", and disturbances in her sense of reality.

Dr. Hrdlička's opinion of running on all fours is that it cannot justly be called an "atavism", but more strictly a continuation of a prehuman practice, "a continuance that has already become weakened and irregular, but which has not been preceded as in the case of true atavisms by any period during which the manifestation appeared to be completely eliminated". The manifestation is an inheritance from the past, which is masked or more or less inhibited in a large majority of human infants.

The reviewer is inevitably reminded of H. G. Wells's scientific fantasy, *The Island of Dr. Moreau*. "Dr. Moreau", who has surgically transformed beasts into human beings, forces them on pain of further vivisection to obey the taboo against walking on all fours. The humanized beasts unhappily struggle against the tension of their "prehuman" impulse. Dr. Hrdlička's study implies that this same "organic conflict" may take place in weaker form in human infantile development.

In Freud's latest book, *Das Unbehagen in der Kultur*, we read how the erect gait of human beings may have been responsible for the development of many purely human psychic characteristics. "*Am Beginne des verhängnisvollen Kulturprozesses stünde also die Aufrichtung des Menschen.*" Freud speaks of the "organic repression" of prehuman gait, prehuman interest in smell, and the like. In Dr. Hrdlička's work we have empirical proof for the ontogenetic existence of this organic repression.

BERTRAM. D. LEWIN.

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- ERNST SCHNEIDER: Kinderreigen (*Children's Dances*).
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- WILHELM HOFFER: Das Archaische im Spiel (*The Archaic Element in Play*).
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- LILI E. ROUBICZEK: Die wichtigsten Theorien des Spiels (*The Chief Theories of Play*).
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H. MENG: Psicoanalisi ed educazione sessuale (*Psychoanalysis and Sexual Education*).
N. PERROTTI: La suggestione (*Suggestion*).
R. CAFTALE: Psicoanalisi e grafologia (*Psychoanalysis and Graphology*).
E. SERVADIO: Quattro casi di "lapsus" (*Four Cases of Parapraxis*).

NOTES

The Educational Committee of the New York Psychoanalytic Society announces that Dr. Sándor Radó, Visiting Director of the New York Psychoanalytic Institute, will be in New York another year (October 1932 to June 1933) under the auspices of the New York Psychoanalytic Society, to continue supervision of the educational activities of the Society. He will be available for didactic analyses and controlled analyses, and will give the following courses: The Development and Scope of the Theory of Instincts; Female Sexuality; Narcissism and its Morbid Manifestations; Technical Seminar. Lectures are open to members of the Society, to candidates in training and to other interested scientists on special application. The Seminar is open only to members of the Society and to candidates in training. The ultimate decision as to eligibility to any course is vested in the Educational Committee.

The New York Psychoanalytic Institute offers the following courses during the year 1932-1933, beginning the end of September, 1932: (1) Psychoanalysis in Medicine (10 lectures), open to physicians only. Course approved by the Committee on Medical Education of the New York Academy of Medicine. Lecturers: Drs. Brill, Feigenbaum, Kardiner, Lehrman, Lorand, Meyer, Oberndorf, Zilboorg.—(2) Popular Lectures on Psychoanalytic Topics (8 lectures), open to the public. Lecturers: Drs. Brill, Kenworthy, Lehrman, Meyer, Oberndorf, Williams, Wittels, Zilboorg.—(3) Pedagogy and Psychoanalysis (15 lectures), open to teachers. Course accredited by the New York State Department of Education and accepted by the Board of Education of New York City for "alertness credit". Lecturers: Drs. Brill, Broadwin, Meyer, Oberndorf, Shoenfeld, Williams.—(4) Introductory Course in Psychoanalysis (10 lectures), open to social workers, jurists, theologians and members of allied professions. Lecturers: Drs. Brill, Glueck, Meyer, Oberndorf, Shoenfeld, Williams.—(5) Intermediate Case Discussion Course, open to social workers who have completed Course No. 4 or its equivalent. Lecturers: Drs. Glueck, Kenworthy, Stern, Williams.—(6) Advanced Seminars for Social Workers—Round Table Discussions. Open to experienced social workers. Attendance limited to twenty per section. Lecturers: Drs. Shoenfeld, Stern, Zilboorg. Further information is obtainable from the Executive Director, The New York Psychoanalytic Institute, 324 West Eighty-sixth Street, New York City.

The Viennese Psychoanalytic Clinic recently celebrated its tenth anniversary, in commemoration of which the Psychoanalytic Society has published a booklet giving the history of the clinic and a statistical account of its growth. The Clinic was established in 1922, following the example of the Berlin Polyclinic which had been created in 1920, to fill a long felt need for reaching a wider circle of the population. A child guidance division under the direction of the late Dr. H. Hug-Helmuth, with Dr. Wilhelm Reich as its first assistant physi-

cian, was established in 1925 and has developed rapidly. The Training Institute, with Dr. Helene Deutsch, Miss Anna Freud and Dr. Siegfried Bernfeld as directors, was organized in 1925, and a division for psychoses added in 1929. The statistical tables provide a survey of the diagnoses of 2245 cases analyzed at the clinic. Predominant during the period of 1922/23 to 1930/31 were Conversion Hysteria (176), Anxiety Hysteria (268), Compulsion Neurosis (135), Sexual Impotence (366), Depressions (208), Schizophrenia (69), Paranoia (37), Actual Neuroses and Neurasthenia (116), Homosexuality, manifest and latent (52), other perversions (34), and Neurotic Character Disorders (34). Of interest, too, are the tables showing the patients' age, sex and occupation. The majority of the cases (1083) fell into the age group between twenty-one and thirty. The next greatest number were between eleven and twenty (246 cases), and between forty-one and fifty (231 cases), while there were only eighty-six cases between fifty-one and sixty and twenty-six between sixty-one and seventy. Thirty-six patients were under eleven years of age.

The Italian Psychoanalytic Society has established a new publication, the *Rivista Italiana di Psicoanalisi*. It is edited by the president of the Society, Dr. Edoardo Weiss (Rome), with the coöperation of F. Banisconi, G. Dalma, C. Musatti, N. Perrotti, and E. Servadio.

